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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
The over-arching aim of this thesis was to evaluate a new experimental 
approach to detect recognition memory in liars, when recognition of familiar 
photographs was intentionally concealed. Eye tracking was selected as a novel 
methodological approach to memory detection because previous eye movement 
research documented that recognition of familiar faces and scenes produced fewer 
fixations to fewer regions of longer durations.  The effect of deception on fixation-
based measures of memory was examined in four experimental chapters.  
Experiment 1 explored whether fixations exposed concealed person recognition 
of three different familiar face types: newly learned via one exposure, famous 
celebrities, and personally known.  Multiple fixation measures exposed recognition 
when liars denied recognition of famous celebrities and people who were 
personally known. Memory for newly learned faces was revealed during honest 
recognition solely in fewer fixations, with a trend in the number of fixations to 
suggest memory in lie trials.  Experiment 2 emphasised monitoring of memory 
and eye movements during a similar concealed recognition task. Participants told 
the truth and lied about faces that were newly learned-to-criterion and personally 
familiar faces followed by a confidence rating (0-100%) based on each honest and 
deceptive recognition judgement. Effects of memory were observed in multiple 
fixation quantity measures and in fixation durations.  The pattern of results for 
newly learned faces was the opposite of results found in Experiment 1.  
Unexpectedly, no effects of memory were found during honest recognition of 
newly learned faces, but fewer fixations and run counts were observed during lie 
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trials.  The data suggest that the clear reduction in viewing during lie trials could 
be a consequence of participant’s efforts to control their gaze behaviour to evade 
detection combined with recollective efforts to remember then conceal newly 
learned faces.  Experiment 3 monitored fixations during concealed recognition of 
objects and scenes. When participants told the truth about personally familiar 
scenes and buildings memory effects were observed in fewer fixations, run counts 
and interest areas visited.  During lie trials, effects of memory were only robust for 
the number of fixations.  Similar to Experiment 2, lies about items newly learned-
to-criterion produced no effect of memory in truth trials but revealed fewer 
fixations, run counts and areas of interest visited during lies.  In both Experiments 
2 and 3, a reduction in the variability of verbal confidence ratings was associated 
with recognition of personally familiar faces.  Experiment 4 monitored fixations 
whilst participants viewed pairs of faces associated with specific scenes. The 
location and duration of first fixations revealed a preference for viewing faces that 
matched the scene displayed. Longer fixation durations in the last fixation also 
indicated deceptive efforts when intentionally making misidentifications.  
 
Overall, the results of the present thesis supported the potential of fixations 
as markers of memory when people lied about recognition of faces, scenes, and 
objects, as well as face-scene relationships. The results suggest that memory effects 
during recognition of personally known faces is robust in the number of fixation 
measure, but is observed in less fixations measures during lies about recognition of 
personally familiar objects and scenes.  Furthermore, memory effects during 
recognition of newly learned items is more vulnerable to cognitive load and other 
executive processes, such as trying to control eye movements, and thus caution is 
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advised when interpreting the effect of memory on fixations during concealed 
recognition of newly learned items.  The research recommends that future 
experiments carefully explore the ability of liars to effect countermeasures on gaze 
behaviour to evade memory detection.  The research further suggests that fixations 
durations might be a better measure to distinguish lies from truths about 
recognition and that the combined effect of memory and cognitive effort during lies 
produce more consistent and distinguishable differences in fixation durations 
between truth tellers and liars.   
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CHAPTER 1.   
 
General Introduction. 
 
Eye movements and Memory Detection. 
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1.1. Overview 
 The on-going threat from terrorism and organised crime demands new and 
better methods to extract concealed information from the memories of deceivers.  
The overall aim of the present research was to develop a novel eye movement 
methodology to explore the cognitive processes that occur during concealed 
recognition of photographic evidence.  Despite the prevalence of photographic 
evidence in forensic investigations (Ministry of Justice, 2011), most memory 
detection research has focussed on verbal or manual responses to questions or two-
word phrases presented on computer screens such as blue coat or green tie, and so 
have been more relevant to identifying persons lying while being interviewed than 
to persons lying while inspecting photographic evidence (e.g., Farwell & Donchin, 
1991; Rosenfeld, Soskins, Bosh, & Ryan, 2004).  The overarching research question 
concerns whether eye movements might facilitate memory detection when 
recognition of photographic evidence is being intentionally concealed by liars.   
 
 In a series of laboratory experiments, the current research employed eye 
tracking technology to investigate the effect of perceptual and other cognitive 
processes (response conflict, eye movement strategies) on fixation quantity and 
durations during concealed recognition.  Predominantly the experiments explore 
fixations during concealed person recognition (Experiments 1 and 2).  Establishing 
the identity of persons connected to a crime, whether suspected associates or 
potential victims, is a critical task for intelligence-gathering officers.  Despite the key 
role that person identification plays in intercepting and resolving crimes, relatively 
few studies (as compared to interviewing protocols) have employed memory 
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detection approaches to detect concealed recognition of photographs of known 
persons.  Of the few studies that have investigated concealed recognition of known 
persons, only one (Schwedes & Wentura, 2012) has adopted an eye movement 
methodology to detect memory during concealed person recognition.  
 
 Suspects and witnesses may also conceal critical knowledge relating to a 
crime scene or an object critical to an investigation (i.e., a weapon).  For this reason, 
the thesis also examines concealed recognition of non-face photographic stimuli: 
namely concealed object or scene recognition (Experiment 3).  Only one peer 
reviewed study has combined eye movement monitoring with a memory detection 
paradigm to look for signs of recognition memory when lying about photographs of 
objects central or peripheral to a mock crime (Peth, Kim, & Gamer, 2013).  No 
research has explored eye movement behaviour to detect concealed recognition of 
whole scenes.  In a final experiment (Experiment 4), the extent to which eye 
movements revealed memories for critical faces associated with specific scenes was 
also examined.  The monitoring of eye movements to explore relational memory 
effects during lies about face-scene pairs is a unique contribution to research in 
memory detection.  Furthermore, Experiment 4 is the first known experiment to 
explore an alternative deceptive decision making strategy (false incrimination of 
known innocent) during relative processing of more than one person at a time 
(concealed information tests typically require absolute decisions to single items).  
This final experiment makes the first step to exploring alternative decision making 
strategies potentially exploited by deceptive witnesses viewing line-ups. 
 To explore the cognitive processes in concealed recognition, and the 
potential use of eye movements in memory detection, the thesis combined two 
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leading paradigms in memory research: The Concealed Information Test (CIT; 
Lykken, 1959, 1960) and Eye Movement Memory Assessment (EMMA; Althoff, 
1998).  By developing novel combinations of these paradigms, the present work 
developed variations of the CIT to create three original tests of concealed 
recognition (Experiments 1 -3).  In the final experiment, an alternative 
Differentiation of Deception Paradigm was employed (i.e., Furedy, Davis, & Gurevich, 
1988; see Chapter 5).  
 
1.1.1. Cognitive Approaches to Deception 
Most modern lie detection techniques focus on developing cognitive load 
approaches (CLAs) to the study of deception (Lancaster, Vrij, Hope, & Waller, 2013; 
Leal, Vrij, Mann, & Fisher, 2011; Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2011; Vrij, Fisher, 
Mann, & Leal, 2008; Vrij, Mann, & Fisher, 2006; Walczyk, Igou, Dixon, & Tcholakian, 
2013; Walczyk, Roper, Seemann, & Humphrey, 2003).  Cognitive aspects of 
deception (Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981) emphasise the need to 
strategically monitor memory and control behaviour to appear honest when lying, 
which underscores the cognitive demands of truth-lie conflicts.  A liar must suppress 
a dominant truth response before executing a pre-formulated lie, and this response 
competition allegedly exerts increases in cognitive load that makes lying harder 
than truth telling (Spence et al., 2001; Vrij, Fisher, et al., 2008; Zuckerman, DePaulo, 
& Rosenthal, 1981).  The fundamental assumption that lying is, under some 
conditions, harder than telling the truth is defined as the Cognitive Load Theory of 
Deception (Vrij, Fisher, et al., 2008).  This conceptual notion defines most 
contemporary and well-accepted approaches to lie detection.  A popular approach in 
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lie detection is to impose additional cognitive load on interviewees to make lies 
easier to detect (Lancaster, Vrij, Hope, & Waller, 2013; Vrij et al., 2011; Vrij, Fisher, 
et al., 2008; Vrij, Mann, et al., 2008).   Such socio-cognitive approaches are often 
applied in the field of field of investigative interviewing but are quite disparate from 
theoretical approaches to memory detection research (although see Visu-Petra et al., 
2013 for an exception).   
 
 In contrast to CLAS, memory detection research tends to focus on 
detecting the presence of crime critical information stored in long term memory via 
the recording of various dependent measures that are thought to be largely 
involuntary such as the skin conductance response (for a comprehensive review see 
Verschuere, Ben-Shakhar, & Meijer, 2011).  To do this, memory detection 
researchers use a particular test, known as The Concealed Information Test (CIT).  
The Concealed Information Test (CIT), originally referred to as The Guilty 
Knowledge Test (Lykken, 1959; 1960), is an experimental and diagnostic tool used 
to detect the presence or absence of crime-critical information in long term memory 
when a person is intentionally concealing that knowledge.  During a CIT three 
stimulus protocol, examinees are presented with three types of information to 
which they are asked if they recognise the item or not; these items are defined as 
probes, irrelevants and targets.  Probes are familiar, crime-relevant, items that are 
presented infrequently among several unfamiliar, irrelevant items.  The CIT is based 
on the assumption that presentation of critical information, presented by the probe 
item, is salient only to the liar and thus elicits an enhanced response that 
distinguishes them from an honest naïve person who has no knowledge of the 
critical probe item.  An honest person should, in theory, display similar responses to 
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probes and irrelevants, whereas a liar will should display enhanced responses to the 
probe items.  CIT measures thus look for signs of recognition of familiar items, from 
which deception is inferred when liars deny or conceal recognition.  For liars the 
presentation of the rare but meaningful probe carries a signal value and thus elicits 
an observable response in a particular dependent measure (Lykken, 1959, 1960).  
The additional target item (familiar but not crime relevant) is a relatively new 
additional to the original guilty knowledge test (Farwell & Donchin, 1991; Rosenfeld 
et al., 2004) to encourage attention towards the stimulus screen so that the 
participant does not systematically respond unfamiliar for every trial without 
engaging properly to the test.  The target item also serves to establish cooperation in 
the interviewee.  Also, because the target is a rare task relevant (but crime 
irrelevant) stimulus it evokes a benchmark with which other responses can be 
compared.  The probability based formula (rare probe: many irrelevants) of the 
three stimulus protocol have earned it the status as the most reliable and valid tool 
for the study of memory detection (Ben-Shakhar, Bar-Hillel and Kremnitzet, 2002; 
Ben-Shakhar and Elaad, 2003; Lykken, 1998). 
 
The most popular theoretical account of the CIT is Orienting Response Theory 
(OR; Sokolov, 1963).  The human orienting response is based on theories of 
attention orientation.  If a person experiences a novel or unexpected stimulus, a 
change to a previously seen stimulus, or the presentation of something that is 
personally meaningful to them, attention will be preferentially oriented towards 
that significant element (Sokolov, 1990).  In the CIT liars’ attention orients towards 
the rare but meaningful crime relevant test item that may be recorded via 
physiological measures from the autonomic nervous system (e.g, skin conductance 
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response; Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003; Gamer, 2011), or psychophysiological 
familiarity signals in event related potentials (Marchand, Inglis-Assaff, & Lefebvre, 
2013; Meijer, Smulders, Merckelbach, & Wolf, 2007; Meijer, Smulders, & Wolf, 
2009).  In addition to measures such as SCRs and ERPs that tend to focus on 
orienting responses to recognised crime critical items, other researchers focuses on 
the measuring of response conflict component of lying.  ERP (Johnson, Barnhardt, & 
Zhu, 2003, 2004) and  fMRI researchers (Bhatt et al., 2009; Ganis, Rosenfeld, 
Meixner, Kievit, & Schendan, 2011; Schumacher, Seymour, & Schwarb, 2010) have 
also focussed, on monitoring executive processes and response conflict experienced 
during lying.  The relative contribution of the orienting response and executive 
processes required for lying has been addressed by some memory detection 
researchers in single studies (Ambach, Stark, Peper, & Vaitl, 2008; Furedy, 2009; 
Sokolov, 1990; Verschuere, Crombez, Smolders, & De Clercq, 2009) although field 
practitioners are less concerned with the relative contribution of the different 
subcomponents given that they provide incremental discriminative ability to detect 
liars (Ambach, Bursch, Stark, & Vaitl, 2010; Gamer, Verschuere, Crombez, & Vossel, 
2008).   
 
A more comprehensive memory-based account  of concealed knowledge tests 
that attempts to account for orienting of attention to familiar items as well as efforts 
to conceal that knowledge, is described by The Parallel Task Set (PTS) model 
(Seymour, 2001).  The PTS model emphasises competing demands for sub 
components crucial to the concealed information task: memory processes, response 
selection, response preparation, and motor execution (Schumacher, Seymour, & 
Schwarb, 2010; Seymour & Schumacher, 2009; Seymour, 2001).  Recognition can be 
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explained in terms of two task sets that occur independently and in parallel for each 
question relating critical probe items: familiarity and recollection.  The familiarity 
task set occurs quickly and relies predominantly on automatic priming mechanisms 
whereas the recollection task set occurs more slowly, is under conscious control and 
draws on cognitive resources.  Truthful responses are triggered by automatic 
familiarity based memories, whereas deceptive responses are mediated by the 
recollective task set overriding the automatic processing of familiarity.  Responses 
initiated by familiarity may well be underway when they are interrupted by 
recollective task sets, resulting in response competition and thus conflict.  Of course, 
honest familiarity based judgements also subsequently employ recollective  
processes for the classification of faces into different categories such as friends or 
foes (e.g., Schwedes & Wentura, 2012).  The importance of response competition 
between source memories and response intentions during lying are central to 
conflict-monitoring and cognitive control (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 
2001).  Considering the importance of both tasks sets to the concealment of 
recognition it is important to develop a tool that can identify and account for both 
(Blandon-Glitlin, Fenn, Masip, Yoo, & Blando, 2014).  In each experiment presented 
in the current thesis, the effect of deception on a range of fixation-based measures is 
explored to evaluate the effect of cognitive load and memory effects on visual 
attention during lies about recognition. 
  
Proposing an modified eye movement-based CIT  
 A key aim of the thesis is to explore a new method for memory detection that 
fulfils the key objectives of modern day CLAs: to better elucidate the cognitive 
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mechanisms that underpin deception, to inform how to better detect instances of 
deceit in field settings, and to develop a tool that will be relatively practical, 
relatively non-intrusive and effective to implement in the field. 
 
 In 1959, when Lykken first discovered that phasic skin conductance could be 
used to detect concealed knowledge based on the orienting response (OR; Sokolov, 
1963), the most common method of measuring OR with humans had been through 
the recording of eye movements (Zajonc & Burnstein, 1959).  This method was 
favoured because, in experiments of perception and attention, not only is it 
important to determine if the participant is in fact looking at what they are 
hypothesised to but it is also informative to know exactly where, when and how 
they are attending the visual stimulus.  The ability to accurately monitor visual 
attention via eye movements might be particularly informative when trying to 
identify potential countermeasures or strategies used by liars to evade detection.  
Unfortunately eye movement apparatus such as the opthamolograph or Brandt’s 
eye-camera were costly and presented technical weaknesses and thus fell out of 
favour (Allen, 1955; Brandt, 1945).  In recent years, however, there have been 
considerable advances in eye tracking technology such that a range of eye 
movement parameters can be collected simultaneously and with relative ease and 
speed (e.g., SR Research Eyelink II).  Each eye movement parameter provides 
insights into different aspects of visual processing and cognition.  It is important to 
note that the practical and technical problems that eye movement monitoring faced 
in the 1950’s are largely resolved, however similar issues are still problematic in the 
present day for the data collection and analysis of ERP and fMRI recordings. 
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 ERP and fMRI procedures have, and continue to make, important theoretical 
contributions to the understanding of cognitive processes central to concealed 
recognition, but the apparent lack of utilisation by practitioners suggests limitations 
as practical tools for real world application.  Limitations of both methodologies 
include their invasive nature, the technical expertise and time required for precise 
administration.  All these limitations are costly, especially considering that research 
reveals them to be vulnerable to simple countermeasures such as toe wiggling 
(Ganis et al., 2011, Rosenfeld, Soskins, Bosh, & Ryan, 2004).  If eye movement 
monitoring succeeds in revealing key processes central to deception, such as the 
identification of critical memories as well as the effort required to conceal these 
memories then eye tracking might be a relatively simpler and less invasive way to 
measure concealed memories as compared to other ERP-based or neuroimaging 
approaches to memory detection. 
  
 Trends in eye movement research reveal that eye movement monitoring is 
evolving as a popular cognitive process tracing methodology in human decision 
making research (Glaholt & Reingold, 2011).  The eye-mind assumption (Just & 
Carpenter, 1980; Just & Carpenter, 1976) that eye movements provide direct 
insights into brain processes was influential to the rising popularity of eye 
movement research in experiments of attention, perception and memory in the 
1980’s.  Eye tracking as a process tracing methodology allows the tracking of 
psychological events that occur prior to a response, advancing research on human 
decision making from a purely behaviourist approach to a more cognitive one that 
focuses on attentional resources and decision processes as opposed to decision 
outcomes alone (Russo, 2011).   
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 In the past decade or so, eye movement monitoring has played a major role 
in investigations of memory (for review see Hannula, Althoff, Warren, Riggs, Cohen 
& Ryan, 2010).  Eye movement research allows the tracking of visual (i.e., hue and 
luminance) and cognitive factors based on previous experience during recognition 
(Antes, 1974; Buswell, 1935; Henderson, Weeks, & Hollingworth, 1999; Loftus & 
Mackworth, 1978; Mackworth & Morandi, 1967; Parker, 1978), whilst being able to 
examine the link between concealed recognition and attentional processes more 
directly (Ganis & Patnaik, 2009; Just & Carpenter, 1976). 
 
 Furthermore, on a practical level, the development of video-based mobile 
trackers potentially allows the covert recording of these eye movements should the 
examiner desire to minimise awareness in the examinee.  Conversely, more evident 
eye tracking equipment may be used if the goal of the experiment is to heighten 
awareness.  Regardless, unlike other cognitive-based procedures to study memory 
processes (i.e., ERP and fMRI), eye movement data may be gathered relatively non-
invasively, quickly and inexpensively; making it a relatively practical and flexible 
tool for the study of cognitive processes while liars are attempting to conceal secret 
memories.  Eye movement monitoring also allows the examination of the key 
subcomponents required for the concealment of memory; memory (Althoff & Cohen, 
1999; Hannula, Althoff, et al., 2010), response selection efforts (Ryan, Hannula, & 
Cohen, 2007; Schwedes & Wentura, 2012) and deception on fixations (Cook, Hacker, 
Webb, Osher, Kristjansson, Woltz, & Kircher, 2012; Zenzi M Griffin & Oppenheimer, 
2006). 
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1.1.2. Eye Movement-based Memory Assessment  
While the past ten years of CIT research has developed sophisticated 
methods (i.e., ERP, fMRI) to elucidate the cognitive neuroscience of deception, the 
field of eye movement behaviour has made similar advances in the neuroscience of 
memory (for a review see Hannula et al., 2010).  The memory at the centre of the 
current thesis is that of recognition, specifically the ability to recognise people, 
places and objects that have been previously viewed and subsequently stored in 
declarative long term memory.   The ability of eye movements to identify 
recognition memory, as explored in the present thesis, was guided by two key 
articles that were pivotal to the development of the experiments presented (Althoff 
& Cohen, 1999; Ryan et al., 2007): 
 
   The first paper by Althoff and Cohen (1999) documents memory 
reprocessing effects in eye movement behaviour during recognition of famous faces 
compared to non-famous faces.  The main finding of their research was that 
different fixation patterns were observed when participants viewed familiar 
(famous) and unfamiliar faces (non-famous), and that this effect of memory on eye 
movements could be quantified in a range of fixations measures prior to recognition, 
as indices of memory.  The reprocessing effect was observed in multiple eye 
movement parameters such as fewer fixations and the number of areas viewed on 
the face when familiar faces were viewed, compared to unfamiliar faces.  Althoff & 
Cohen’s (1999) seminal article was the first to explicitly document the finding that 
previous exposure changes the way we visually inspect photographs of familiar 
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faces.  The authors propose that this occurs because familiar faces re-engage visual 
pattern analysers encoded during previous viewings and thus influence face 
processing mechanisms in the brain. 
 
In their experiments, Althoff and Cohen (1999) presented participants with a 
series of portrait photographs of familiar (famous) and unfamiliar (non-famous) 
faces.  Faces were each presented for five seconds, during which participants made a 
familiarity based button press response.  Their findings documented fewer fixations 
and fewer regions sampled for famous faces, reported in the number of fixations, the 
regional distribution of the number of fixations on the face (right eye, left eye, nose, 
mouth, outer) and the spatial distribution of these fixations (proportion of fixations 
directed to the inner regions of the face).  The order of the fixations on the face was 
also more random (less constrained) when viewing famous faces than for non-
famous faces.  Simply put, a re-processing effect occurred when viewing familiar 
faces that changed the nature of perceptual processing and way in which familiar 
faces were subsequently viewed (Althoff & Cohen, 1999).  The quantification of 
familiarity via physical eye movement behaviour has since provided a range of 
opportunities for the study of multiple memory systems in the brain (Hannula, 
Althoff, et al., 2010). 
 
In further experiments, Althoff and Cohen (1999) documented that the effect 
of memory on eye movements extended from recognition of identity to judgments of 
emotions.   From the emotions task the researchers suggested that the recognition 
based effects were obligatory, because they occurred irrespective of the nature of 
the task.  By measuring the fixations before a response selection was made, the 
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researchers also observed that memory effects occurred early in viewing behaviour 
before an actual judgement was made (first two seconds), a finding that they took to 
suggest that memory effects on eye movements were obligatory in nature.  The 
proposed obligatory effect of memory on eye movements is also reinforced by 
clinical research that has found the same pattern of eye movements in patients with 
amnesia (Robert Russell Althoff, 1998) and congenital prosopagnosia (face 
blindness) (Bate, Haslam, Tree, & Hodgson, 2008).  If the effect of recognition 
memory on eye movements is obligatory in nature it may prove to a useful method 
for memory detection, as an involuntary markers of recognition are favourable in 
memory detection due to the belief that they are more resistant to countermeasures 
(Verschuere, Ben-Shakhar, et al., 2011). 
 
In another experiment, the researchers also discovered that memory effects 
were not limited to viewing of and judgements to pre-experimentally familiar faces 
(i.e., famous celebrities) but that they also emerged with repeated exposure to pre-
experimentally unfamiliar faces.  Also importantly, the eye movement effect was not 
specific to face stimuli.  The researchers observed memory effects in the eye 
movements of participants that viewed images of famous and unknown buildings.  
That the EMME is generalisable to non-face stimuli such as familiar and unfamiliar 
buildings (Althoff, 1998) and scenes (Ryan, Althoff, Whitlow, & Cohen, 2000), makes 
it a potentially comprehensive tool for all types of photographic, forensic evidence. 
 
 
In sum, the effect of memory on eye movements distinguished not only 
between repeated and novel faces, it also emerged during controlled exposures to 
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pre-experimentally faces, and was found for faces (pre-experimentally unfamiliar 
and famous faces) and non-face photographic stimuli (buildings).   Althoff and 
colleagues (Althoff et al., 1999; Althoff & Cohen, 1999; Althoff, 1998) extensive and 
original research paved the way for understanding how previous experience 
changed the nature of visual processing and the resultant manifestation of memory 
effects in eye movement behaviour.  Researchers have since extended Althoff & 
Cohen’s (1999) seminal work to more specifically identify exactly when the effect of 
memory on eye movements emerged (Ryan et al., 2007; Schwedes & Wentura, 
2012). 
 
Ryan et al., (2007) further explored the emergence of memory on fixation 
durations by monitoring eye movements using fixation-by-fixation analyses and 
time course analyses (500 ms time bins).  The researchers presented participants 
with three-face displays of familiar and unfamiliar faces.  Familiar faces had been 
learned during a study phase (5 seconds exposure) prior to the experimental trials.  
There were two types of display: known and unknown.  In the known displays one 
known face was presented with two unknown faces.  In the unknown display all 
faces were unknown.  In the known display the participant was instructed to select 
the known face, whereas in the unknown display they were asked to select a face at 
random.  The main finding was that fixation durations were longer for known faces 
selected in the known display than unknown faces selected in the unknown display.  
Fixation-by-fixation analyses identified the effect of memory (longer fixations) 
during recognition judgements emerged as early as the first fixation, and time 
course analyses revealed the effect of memory from 1000-1500 ms and was 
remained for the rest of the viewing period (10 seconds).  The researchers also 
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found effects of memory effects whether participants freely viewed the face 
(incidental encoding) or made a recognition based judgement (intentional identity 
retrieval) or told to avoid looking at the face, which the authors documented 
support for Althoff and Cohens’s (1999) claim that the effects of memory are 
obligatory.  Furthermore, from these findings the researchers inferred that changes 
in fixation duration in the unknown display were mainly a result of cognitive efforts 
required for the planning and execution of their intended response (response 
intention).  Later work further dissociated the effect of planned response selections 
on fixations durations separate from memory (Schwedes & Wentura, 2012). 
 
The potential for fixation durations to elucidate the temporal dynamics of 
different cognitive processes (recognition and response intentions) during 
recognition of faces was a new finding in the eye-movement literature.  The 
potential of this particular eye-movement parameter to explore cognitive efforts 
associated with recognition and response intentions during concealed recognition is 
yet to be thoroughly explored.  Given the clear link between memory and eye 
movements it is surprising that only one study modified a CIT to investigate fixation 
durations as a marker of cognitive processes during lies about recognition 
(Schwedes & Wentura, 2012; see Chapter 2 for a full discussion of this paper).  No 
other known peer reviewed articles have been published on the topic.  More 
importantly, no work has directly explored the effect of deception-based cognitive 
load on recognition memory and response intention effects. 
 
Aim of Thesis 
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The present research developed novel modifications of the Concealed 
Information Test (mCIT) to investigate whether eye movement memory effects 
could reveal concealed recognition of faces, scenes and objects.  In each experiment 
the impact of cognitive load on multiple eye movements during concealed 
recognition was assessed.  A key focus throughout the thesis was to manipulate the 
familiarity of faces to test the robustness of eye movement memory effects when 
familiarity varied.  The abstracts for each experimental chapter are presented.  
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1.2. Abstracts for Experimental Chapters 
1.2.1. Chapter 2: The effect of deception on fixation-
based measures of memory during concealed 
person recognition. 
Experiment 1 monitored participants’ eye movement behaviour whilst they 
lied and told the truth about recognition of different familiar faces that varied in 
familiarity (newly learned, famous celebrities, personally known).  Experiment 1 
primarily examined whether fixations could distinguish known from unknown faces 
during truths and lies, and also explored the sensitivity of the eye movements to 
distinguish memory for faces that varied in degree of familiarity.  Multiple fixation 
behaviours were recorded to examine the effect of cognitive load on different 
fixation measures during lies to familiar probe items, directly compared to the truth 
trials (unfamiliar irrelevants and familiar targets) for each familiar face type.  
Results reveal multiple markers of memory in fixation-based measures and that 
lying had negligible difference on pattern of fixations for memory detection.  The 
number of fixations made to familiar faces was most reliable and strongest marker 
of memory across different face types (newly learned, famous celebrities and 
personally known).  Proportion of fixations to inner regions was the least reliable 
measure of memory.  Largest and most consistent effects of memory were observed 
during recognition of personally familiar faces. 
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1.2.2. Chapter 3. Emphasising memory confidence and 
eye movement monitoring:  Effects on the 
detection of concealed person recognition. 
 Experiment 2 introduced memory confidence judgements as a novel way to 
distinguish truth tellers and liars by assessing variability in verbal confidence 
reports based on recognition judgements, and whether eye movement behaviour 
differed during deliberation of confidence reports.  To encourage task focus and 
motivation to deceive the experiment made four main adjustments to the previous 
experiment: (1) To investigate the role of meta-memory in recognition judgements, 
participants were asked to report a confidence rating (0-100%) after each truthful 
and deceptive recognition judgement. (2) The experimenter explicitly emphasised 
that they would be monitoring the location, duration and distribution of fixations 
during both recognition and confidence judgements.  (3) To encourage task-
focussed motivation, participants were asked to make a verbal response at the same 
time as a button-press for both recognition (e.g., familiar) and confidence 
judgements (e.g., ninety).  (4) Participants were also informed that they would 
receive £5 cash at the end of the experiment if they evaded lie detection by the 
examiner.  Instructions emphasised that, in both recognition and confidence 
judgements, the task was to appear honest during both truths and lies and that eye 
movement behaviour would be monitored during both judgements.  The changes to 
the procedure were intended to stimulate meta-cognitive monitoring and control 
processes in the interviewee that likely operate at a high level during real-world 
questioning of suspects.  Predictions that honest confidence reports based on 
unknown faces would display more variability than lies about familiar faces was 
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partially supported by the data (personally familiar faces only).  Predictions based 
on fixation behaviour were that eye movement patterns would be similar to 
Experiment 1 but that cognitive demands would be greater as a consequence of 
increased efforts for cognitive monitoring and control.  The recognition based data 
revealed large effect size differences in multiple fixation behaviours between 
unfamiliar faces and personally known faces during both truths and lies.  Contrary 
to Experiment 1, large effect size differences were observed between unfamiliar and 
newly learned faces, although only during lie trials.  The lack of differences in 
fixation data during honest recognition of newly learned faces, compared to large 
effect size differences when lying, are discussed with reference to the attempted 
strategies to control of eye movements during lies. 
 
1.2.3. Chapter 4.  The effect of deception on fixation-
based measures of memory during concealed 
recognition of objects and scenes. 
Extending Experiment 2, which examined whether memory effects were 
observed during concealed recognition of faces, Experiment 3 explored the effect of 
cognitive load on liars’ fixation patterns during concealed recognition of objects and 
scenes.  Instructions that emphasised the monitoring of memory confidence and eye 
movements by the examiner was consistent with Experiment 2.  Predictions were 
also the same as Experiment 1.  Participants would display fewer fixations of longer 
durations during recognition of familiar objects and scenes, and that memory effects 
would be strongest and most reliable to during recognition of personally familiar 
objects and scenes.  Results revealed that lies about personally familiar objects and 
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scenes produced fewer and longer fixations in liars’ eye movements.  Contrary to 
predictions, but consistent with Experiment 2, larger differences in fixations were 
found between probes and irrelevants during concealed recognition of newly 
learned objects and scenes.  The results suggest combined effects of memory and 
deceptive strategies for fixation patterns during lies about newly familiar items.  
Fixations durations were longer during concealed recognition of both newly familiar 
and personally familiar probes, compared to unknown irrelevants.  Longer fixation 
durations for probes were significant in the third fixation (but trends emerged in the 
second fixation for personally familiar items only), and were tightly linked to 
deceptive response selections (500 ms before a lying response).   
 
1.2.4. Chapter 5.  Faces in context: Do fixations reveal 
memory for faces related to scenes? 
Experiment 4 explored whether liars’ eye fixations revealed (1) memory for 
previously learned associations between faces and scenes and (2) cognitive efforts 
to mislead the experimenter when liars purposely selected the wrong association. 
Participants were shown two-face displays presented on a single background scene; 
one face had been previously paired with the background scene during a study 
phase, the other face had been presented during the learning phase but was 
matched to another scene.  Thus, test screens displayed two faces and a scene that 
were similarly familiar but only one face matched the scene displayed.  At test, the 
participant either told the truth (identified face that matched the background scene) 
or lied (identified the non-matching face). Results revealed that the majority of first 
fixations were made to the matching face during both truth and lie trials, suggesting 
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preferential orienting of attention to the face previously matched to the scene. Also, 
durations of first fixations were longer to the non-selected, matching face in lie trials 
than to the non-selected, non-matching face in truth trials.  In the last fixation, the 
majority of lie trials revealed preferential orienting of attention to the face that did 
not match the scene, consistent with action planning.  Durations were longer for the 
last fixation on the selected but non-matching face on lie trials compared to the last 
fixation on the selected matching face in truth trials, supporting predictions that 
planning of response selections is more difficult for liars.  This novel experimental 
design contributes to memory detection research that traditionally uses protocols 
that investigate responses to known and unknown stimuli to reveal memory.  The 
protocol presented here may be useful for police officers attempting to directly link 
a particular suspect to a specific crime scene. 
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CHAPTER 2.   
 
The effect of deception on fixation-based 
memory effects during concealed person 
recognition 
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2.1. Introduction 
 During criminal investigations, deceptive interviewees might conceal 
recognition of persons they know and these will likely vary in degree of familiarity 
(i.e., highly familiar co-conspirators or lesser known criminal associates).  To 
address this problem, Experiment 1 systematically manipulated familiarity of 
concealed faces and instructed participants to lie about different groups of faces 
(newly learned, famous celebrities, personally known) during a modified Concealed 
Information Test (mCIT).  Experiment 1 novelly combined eye movement 
monitoring with a mCIT to investigate whether eye movement patterns might 
facilitate memory detection of known faces that varied in saliency.  Previous CIT 
research has revealed test sensitivity to vary as a function of probe encoding 
strength (Rosenfeld, Shue, & Singer, 2007; Rosenfeld, Biroschak, & Furedy, 2006; 
Seymour & Fraynt, 2009).  Recognition effects in eye movements are also known to 
scale with amount of previous exposure (Althoff, 1998; Althoff et al., 1999; Althoff & 
Cohen, 1999: Ryan et al, 2007).  The present experiment, however, is the first of its 
kind to have combined eye movement monitoring with a mCIT whilst systematically 
manipulating probe familiarity within a single experiment. 
 
 The Concealed Information Test was designed to detect guilty knowledge 
withheld by a liar (Lykken, 1959, 1960).  Interviewees probed under the CIT are 
presented with a series of single items to which they respond if they recognise the 
item or not.  During a CIT three stimulus protocol, three types of items are presented 
to participants: probes, irrelevants and targets (3SP; Farwell & Donchin, 1991; 
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Rosenfeld, 2011).  Critically, liars conceal recognition of probe items (such as a 
familiar face) whilst responding honestly to unknown irrelevants and familiar 
targets.  The idea is that the probe item will be salient for the liar, thus an orienting 
response will be observed in the guilty persons as measured by a suitable 
dependent variable (behavioural, psychophysiological, or neural) that would not be 
evident in an honest person’s responses to probe items.  Target items in the 3SP are 
similar to the probe, such that they are familiar, rare and task relevant.  The crucial 
difference is that they are not crime relevant and thus do not require concealed 
recognition.  The function of the honest response to targets in the 3SP is to 
encourage and monitor task compliance, whilst providing a familiar benchmark by 
which to compare responses to probes items.  Whereas orienting responses to 
targets and probes items tend to be similar, direct comparison of differences 
between targets and probes can further quantify cognitive efforts specific to a lie. 
 
 Few studies have adapted the CIT to study concealed person recognition 
(Bhatt et al., 2009; Ganis & Patnaik, 2009; Lefebvre, Marchand, Smith, & Connolly, 
2009; Meijer, Smulders, Merckelbach, & Wolf, 2007; Meijer et al., 2009; Schumacher 
et al., 2010; Seymour & Kerlin, 2008).  In these studies concealed recognition of a 
critical probe item resulted in slower response times (RT-CIT; Seymour and Kerlin, 
2008), stronger event-related P300s (CIT-P300; Meijer et al., 2007, 2009) increased 
cerebral blood flow (fMRI-CIT; Bhatt et al., 2009; Schumacher, Seymour, & Schwarb, 
2010) and an attentional blink in which detection of a familiar probe stimulus 
reduced detection accuracy rates of subsequent familiar target stimuli (Ganis & 
Patnaik, 2009).  Changes in dependent measures during concealed recognition of 
familiar probe items are sometimes called guilty knowledge effects (GKEs; Seymour, 
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Seifert, Shafto, & Mosmann, 2000), because they are used to infer guilt when an 
examinee explicitly denies secret knowledge of the probe item. 
  
 Central to Experiment 1, previous research supports that GKEs are 
modulated by probe saliency (Carmel et al, 2003, Gamer, Kossiol, & Vossel, 2010; 
Rosenfeld et al., 2007; Rosenfeld et al., 2006; Seymour & Fraynt, 2009).  For 
example, self-referring probes such as the interviewees social security number have 
produced larger probe versus irrelevant difference amplitudes during an ERP-CIT 
compared to probes that were incidentally acquired details of a mock crime ( 
Rosenfeld et al., 2007).  Although larger probe-irrelevant difference amplitudes 
made probe detection easier for personally significant details, P300 amplitudes for 
probe items were greater than irrelevants for both self-referring and incidentally 
acquired details. 
  
 Despite the obvious importance of probe saliency for the discriminative 
ability of the CIT to reveal knowledge of known persons, no studies of concealed 
person recognition have systematically manipulated probe saliency in a single 
study.  One study, however, explored the discriminative ability of the event-related 
P300-CIT to identify actively concealed recognition using differently familiar faces 
as probes (Meijer et al., 2007).  When participants were presented with highly 
familiar photographs (i.e., siblings and best friends) and instructed to actively 
conceal recognition, results showed that the detection of concealed face recognition 
was highly successful.  When photographs depicted faces of university professors 
and participants were given no specific instructions to conceal recognition (mere 
recognition), detection was unsuccessful.  In a later study (Meijer et al., 2009) the 
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researchers re-examined the P300 using personally significant photographs of 
friends and siblings during mere recognition (respond to the presence of a dot on 
the right or left cheek) and found that a P300 was elicited even when the task was 
not to explicitly conceal recognition.  Although task instructions about truthful 
versus false responses were confounded with probe salience in the first experiment 
(Meijer et al., 2007), the results highlight that photographs of personally known and 
highly familiar faces elicit stronger P300 markers of recognition that may affect CIT 
results. 
 
 The idea that face recognition is not an all-or-none process, as suggested in 
the previous CIT studies (Meijer et al., 2007, 2009), is extensively supported by 
decades of research face processing research (Bruce & Young, 1986; Natu & Toole, 
2011; Schweinberger & Burton, 2011).  Essentially, the processing of an unfamiliar 
face requires more cognitive effort to optimise information extraction in the initial 
viewing for encoding, whereas a familiar face is already represented in memory and, 
as a consequence, requires less effort for recognition on subsequent viewings.  In 
the face processing literature, for example, it is generally accepted that unknown 
and relatively unfamiliar faces are processed in a qualitatively different way to 
known faces.  Indirect tests of recognition memory report speed, confidence, and 
accuracy as indicative of richly encoded memories (Balas, Cox, & Conwell, 2007; 
Ellis, Shepherd, & Davies, 1979; Stacey, Walker, & Underwood, 2005), whereas the 
opposite is more characteristic of weaker memories which are often poorly 
identified and more fragile (Hancock, Bruce, & Burton, 2000).   
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 It is also important to acknowledge that unfamiliar faces become familiar in 
different ways and are therefore represented differently in the visual system.  A face 
may be familiar because we have seen a photograph of a particular person in a 
photograph album (visual familiarity), exposed to images and information about 
them in magazines and on the television (e.g., famous celebrities) or someone we 
encounter regularly on a day to day basis (personal familiarity).   Support that 
different familiar face types are represented differently is found in the neuroimaging 
literature that extensively documents that different classes of familiar faces (i.e., 
newly learned visual familiarity or well established personal familiarity) are 
reprocessed to different degrees and activate distinct neural pathways in the brain 
(for a review see Natu & Toole, 2011).  Increasingly familiar faces require less 
processing, such that with each new exposure, stronger and multiple memories are 
created that are represented more richly in neural networks for later access and 
retrieval (Schacter, Norman & Koutstaal, 1998).   
  
 According to Bruce and Young’s (1986) cognitive-based model of face 
perception, newly learned faces likely only activate face recognition units (FRUs) 
and familiarity, whereas personally familiar faces would access FRUs and personal 
identification nodes (PINs) with fast and accurate recollection of all aspects relating 
the person’s identity.  This logic is consistent with dual process theories of memory 
that occur at different time points prior to a recognition based judgement 
(Yonelinas, 2002).  Recognition of familiar famous faces such as celebrities, 
however, is quite different.  In most cases famous faces will be associated with 
numerous pictorial, semantic and episodic representations but these are 
predominantly gained through the media and not through real-life personal 
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interactions, thus lack the social experiences associated with people who are 
personally known.  Faces with which we have real world experience are recalled 
more automatically and with less effort due to the amount of exposure to that 
person but also to emotional and semantic associations as well as representations of 
that person’s personality and other mental states (Gobbini, Leibenluft, Santiago & 
Haxby, 2004; Gobbini & Haxby, 2007).  Considering the wealth of knowledge 
concerning important differences in the processing and recognition of faces that 
differ in type and degree of familiarity, it is surprising that researchers interested in 
faces often use different types of familiar faces interchangeably in their experiments.  
To provide a more comprehensive investigation of the effect of memory for familiar 
faces on eye movements, Experiment 1 included the use of newly familiar faces 
(learned within the experimental environment), famous celebrity faces and 
personally familiar faces to specifically examine the effect of memory on visual 
processing for different familiar face types during concealed recognition.   
 
 
2.1.1. Eye movements and honest identification of 
faces 
  
Two key studies on memory and eye movements, presented below, further 
support that the processing of familiar faces is qualitatively different to unfamiliar 
faces, and that re-processing effects for familiar faces are observed most strongly in 
fewer and longer fixations to famous compared to visually familiar faces learned at 
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task (Althoff & Cohen, 1999; Ryan et al., 2007).  Neither study however explored 
how patterns of fixations differ to personally known faces.   
 
Althoff & Cohen's (1999) paper on memory and eye movements documented 
how previous experience with a person’s face changed the nature of visual 
processing, resulting in distinct changes in the quantity and distribution of fixations 
during face recognition.  Participants who were serially presented with a sequence 
of single photographs of famous and non-famous faces revealed changes in 
characteristics of fixations that indicated a general decrease in eye movement 
sampling behaviour to known famous faces compared to those that were unknown.  
Decreased quantity and distribution of fixations were observed in fewer fixations, 
less regions of the face viewed, less return fixations to previously viewed regions of 
the face and less fixations directed to the inner regions of the face.  The authors 
coined this The Eye Movement-based Memory Effect (EMME; Althoff & Cohen, 
1999). 
 
Most relevant to the issue of graded familiarity in the present experiment is 
that the effect of memory on eye movements increases when a new face is 
repeatedly viewed: the more familiar the face, the less fixation behaviour (Althoff et 
al., 1999; Althoff, 1998).  Three groups of participants were presented with the 
blocks of previously unfamiliar study images on a computer screen either once, 
three times or five times (5 seconds each).  At test, participants made recognition-
based judgements by pressing one of two buttons.  Effects of memory on eye 
movements were robust after three repeated exposures of the previously unfamiliar 
face.  The number of fixations at recognition further decreased after five previous 
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exposures.  The finding that memory effects resulted in decreased fixations for 
newly learned faces that were only visually familiar support the robustness of the 
memory effect and its potential to detect recognition of faces that vary in familiarity, 
whether via years of exposure to faces (such as famous celebrity faces in the media) 
or relatively recent exposure to previously unknown faces. 
 
Ryan and colleagues (2007) explored fixation duration as a marker of 
memory also for two types of familiar faces; visually familiar, famous faces.  
Participants were presented with three-face displays of photographs of peoples’ 
faces.  Participants viewed two display types: a known display and an unknown 
display. The known display comprised one known target face and two unknown 
faces and the unknown display showed three unknown faces only.  In the known 
display the participant selected the familiar target face whereas in the unknown 
display they were instructed to arbitrarily select any one of the unfamiliar faces.   
 
Ryan and colleague’s (2007) main finding was that the fixation durations on 
the known target faces that were selected in the known condition were longer than 
on the unknown faces that were selected in the unknown condition.  The author’s 
named this the Recognition Effect.  An important point for the present experiment 
was that fixation durations were longer on familiar faces whether the familiarity of 
the face was via experimental familiarisation or from years of indirect exposure to 
famous faces.  Effects of memory on eye movement behaviour were more robust for 
famous faces (known prior to the experiment) than faces familiarised only within 
the experimental context.  Effects of recognition emerged early in viewing for both 
face types but earliest for the familiar famous faces (as early as first fixation).  The 
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data suggest that fixation duration, like the ERP-300, may provide an early, 
uncompromised index of recognition.  More familiar faces may take only one or two 
centrally directed fixation for recognition whereas a newly learned face may require 
a lot more sampling by the eyes to determine from memory if it is familiar or not 
(Althoff, 1998; Heisz & Shore, 2008; Hsiao & Cottrell, 2008).  The differences in 
fixation patterns, therefore, not only index familiar and unfamiliar recognition but 
also recognition strength. 
 
From their data the authors also inferred that the fixation length in the 
unknown display was a result of the response intention to select the unknown face.  
The assumption that fixation duration in the known display was a consequence of 
both early recognition and response intentions has important implications for the 
analysis of fixations during concealed recognition, since the response intentions of 
liars presumably require more effort than those making honest recognition 
judgements (Vrij, Fisher, et al., 2008; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981).  
Whereas the fixation duration to a known selected target (truth) would be 
moderated by the effects of recognition and efforts required for an honest response, 
the fixation duration for a liar would represent recognition of the familiar target 
face, but efforts to suppress responses to that face instead of selected it.  In tests that 
require a dichotomous (familiar/unfamiliar) button press to single face displays this 
would require pressing a different button to indicate the familiar target face was 
unfamiliar, most likely whilst still viewing the single face on the screen (e.g. Althoff 
& Cohen, 1999).  In multiple face displays, this would likely involve orienting of 
visually attention to the alternative face intended for selection before making the 
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appropriate response (e.g., one of three buttons depending on face location in Ryan 
et al., 2007). 
 
Ryan et al (2007) observed particular qualities in the memory effect that led 
them also to conclude that memory effects may be an obligatory effect of previous 
experience on perceptual processing and eye movement behaviour.  One of these 
qualities was that memory increased fixation durations whether the participant was 
instructed to make a familiarity judgement, to view the face freely or to avoid 
looking at the familiar face.  Ryan et al.’s (2007) series of recognition tests support 
the notion that certain elements of eye movements may be difficult to control 
(Rayner, 1998; Russo, 2011) and that this appears to be particularly true when 
making fast recognition judgements to well known, highly familiar faces (Ryan, 
Hannula & Cohen, 2007).  Taken together, both Althoff and Cohen (1999) and Ryan 
et al.’s (2007) studies support that processing of unknown faces is cognitively 
effortful.   Participants appear to engage in more effortful and deterministic 
sampling behaviours to maximise information extraction from completely novel 
faces and newly learned faces.  Re-processing of progressively familiar faces during 
recognition results in increasingly fewer fixations of longer durations than 
processing of unknown faces.  
 
One final point on the obligatory nature of the eye movement memory effect 
for familiar faces: The pattern of eye movements (fewer fixations, longer durations) 
for familiar faces also distinguished recognition memory when reports of conscious 
memory failed  (amnesia; Althoff et al., 1999; prosopagnosia; Bate, Haslam, Tree, & 
Hodgson, 2008).  More relevant to the forensic nature of this work, a mock line-up 
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experiment also found recognition effects in the eye movements of participants who 
made unintentional suspect misidentifications (Hannula, Baym, Warren, & Cohen, 
2012).   
The question pertinent to the present experiment, however, is whether eye 
movements can establish veracity when errors are intentional acts to deceive and 
not incidental.  Deception in the present context is defined as “a successful or 
unsuccessful attempt, without forewarning, to create in another a belief which the 
communicator considers to be untrue” (Vrij, 2008, p.15).  The distinction between 
lying as an intentional act is an important one, and this is not the same as accidental 
misidentification.  Particularly emphasised in the deception literature, lying involves 
addition cognitive operations that make lying harder than truth telling (Zuckerman 
& Driver, 1985; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981).  This Cognitive Load 
Theory of deception (Vrij, Fisher, et al., 2008) hypothesises that cognitive demands 
will likely differ during lies and truths about recognition that may potentially impact 
recognition-based eye movement patterns as an index of memory during deceit.  Eye 
movement evidence that documents the effect of cognitive load and lying on fixation 
characteristics is described below. 
 
2.1.2. Eye movements and lies about face recognition 
The investigation of intentional concealment as compared to unintentional 
errors is an important one considering that intentional deceit involves additional 
cognitive operations that impose extra cognitive load on an individual (Vrij, Fisher, 
et al., 2008), a phenomenon commonly known as response conflict (Botvinick et al., 
2001; Spence et al., 2001; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981).  Despite the 
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importance of understanding how memory and response processes interact, 
theories of exclude recognition performance often focus on familiarity and 
recollection processes alone (Yonelinas, 2002).    Fast  familiarity based judgements 
are a component of all recognition judgements, but more often than not recognition 
generates slower recollective processes to determine to whom that face belongs.  
Empirical support for the role of response conflict in intentionally concealed 
recognition can be found most simply in behavioural reaction time data (e.g., 
Walczyk, Roper, Seeman & Humphrey, 2003; Seymour and Fraynt, 2009, Seymour, 
Kerlin, & Kurtz, 2000, Seymour, Seifert & Shafto, 2000, Seymour and Kerlin, 2008) 
and are further validated in fMRI brain imaging studies that record activation from 
brain regions that are associated with response conflict, such as the anterior 
cingulate cortex (McDermott, Jones, Petersen, Lageman, & Roediger, 2000; Seymour 
& Schumacher, 2009). 
 
Tasks that are cognitively effortful, resulting in increased reaction time, also 
result in increased fixation behaviour.  This is because the longer we look at 
something the more eye movements we generate.  The longer the pause the more 
information processing that occurs, signalling an increase in depth of processing and 
cognitive effort (Castelhano & Rayner, 2008; Rayner, 1998; Russo, 2011).  This is 
true not only in the eye movements of individuals who are thinking hard under 
honest circumstances (Griffin & Bock, 2000; Griffin, 2001; Meyer, Sleiderink, & 
Levelt, 1998; Meyer & van der Meulen, 2000) but additionally in the fixations of liars 
during deception.  Changes in fixation behaviour have been observed in deception 
studies when lying during reading based tasks (Baker, Goldstein, & Stern, 1993; 
Baker, Stern, & Goldstein, 1992; Cook, Hacker, Webb, Osher, Kristjansson, Woltz, 
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Kircher, et al., 2012) and when deliberately giving incorrect names to items in line-
drawings (Griffin & Oppenheimer, 2006).  Griffin and Oppenheimer (2006) revealed 
that during a task where participants wrongly reported the relationship between an 
animal and an action in a line drawing, participants looked at items (pictures of 
animals) longer when intentionally giving inaccurate responses to them.  For 
example, participants that reported the drawing showed a horse kicking a dog, 
when in fact it was kicking a cow, displayed longer fixations longer than honest 
participants.  Despite not being an explicit study of deception, the data indicate that 
intentionally giving misinformation affects fixation behaviour during what is 
essentially a lie.  Despite the apparent potential for eye movement behaviour as a 
method to facilitate memory detection, only one very recently published study has 
employed eye movements to determine whether eye movements might serve as a 
reliable indicator of memory when lying about photographs of familiar people 
(Schwedes & Wentura, 2012).   
 
Schwedes and Wentura (2012) developed a modified Concealed Information 
Test (CIT) to extend the work of the original study by Ryan and colleagues (2007).  
Consistent with a CIT protocol, participants lied about recognition of familiar probes 
whilst correctly classifying the familiar targets and unfamiliar irrelevants.  The 
photographic face stimuli in the Schwedes and Wentura study (2012) were 
presented in circular arrays of six-face displays, not sequential single items as in 
typical CITs.  Face stimuli used were all pre-experimentally unfamiliar.  During a 
study phase, prior to experimental trials, familiarisation was conducted for two 
separate groups of previously unfamiliar faces.  Participants were requested to learn 
one set of faces and remember these as their ‘friends’, and another set that they 
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were to memorise as ‘foes’.  Schwedes and Wentura (2012) presented their 
participants with three types of display; a concealed display, a revealed display and 
a neutral display.  In the concealed display, the familiar target was a photograph of a 
face that had been introduced as a friend during a study phase as part of the 
experimental session.  The participant was instructed to conceal knowing the photo 
of their friend and instead deceptively select one of the other five unfamiliar faces as 
the familiar face.  In the revealed display the participant was informed to correctly 
select the photograph of the face previously introduced as their foe and not to 
protect their identity.  In the neutral display all photographs were of unfamiliar 
faces but participants were instructed to select one arbitrarily regardless.   
 
The results of the study supported an effect of memory (longer fixations) in 
the total average fixation duration for concealed targets.  Fixations on concealed 
faces (known but not selected) were longer than fixations on the unfamiliar faces 
that were not selected in the neutral display.  They also found that fixations 
displayed efforts for response intentions such that the average fixation duration on 
a familiar target that was known and selected (revealed display) was longer than a 
familiar target that was known but not selected (concealed display).  Finally, within 
display comparisons of fixation durations on targets compared to distractors 
revealed longer fixations on targets than distractors in revealed and concealed 
displays respectively but not in neutral displays. 
 
Fixation-by-fixation analyses revealed effects of recognition in the first 
fixation but, unlike Ryan and colleagues, this was not significant until the second 
fixation.  There was no effect of response selection efforts, however, in the first three 
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fixations.  The authors propose that finding of a recognition effect in the second 
fixation is perhaps due to the increased complexity of the display screen (six faces 
compared to three).  The lack of evidence of a response intention effect in any of the 
first three fixations was considered partly due to the additional difficulty of the 
friend or foe task.  In the friend or foe task participants have to first determine if 
there is a familiar face and then decide which category it belongs to and then plan 
their decision based on an honest or deceptive response.  It is plausible that the 
extra decision making processes might delay the classification of the face and the 
planning of the response according to truth and lie instructions.  Schwedes and 
Wentura’s (2012) results indicate that eye fixation behaviour is a reliable index of 
both early recognition and the response intentions of liars. They also importantly 
highlight that the additional cognitive demands of the concealment of a subset of 
faces and the complexity of the display alter the temporal dynamics and thus the 
emergence of the effect of memory on eye movement behaviour.  The present 
research further explored the effect of concealment of subsets of faces (newly 
learned, famous celebrities, personally known) using single face displays, consistent 
with display presentations of the classic CIT. 
 
Experiment 1 differs from Schwedes and Wentura’s (2012) study in several 
important respects; Schwedes and Wentura asked participants to lie about 
recognition of newly learned faces by asking them to select an unknown face in a 
six-face display.  Their main aim was also to dissociate the effect of response efforts 
from memory.  However, they did not explore the effect of deceptive load on existing 
memory effects.  They also only explored one fixation measure, fixation duration. 
The present research explores the effect of memory during recognition of three 
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different faces types, and directly examined the effect of deception on memory 
effects during visual inspection of each familiar face type in turn.  The present 
experiment also explored the effect of deception on a range of different fixations 
measures, and predicts opposite effects of deception on fixation quantity and 
fixation durations. 
 
To combine and further explore research findings by Althoff and colleagues 
(1998; 1999) and Ryan et al. (2007) a range of eye movements parameters were 
analysed: to measure the amount and distribution of fixations (number of total 
fixations, the number of times gaze returns to specific areas of interest, the number 
of interest areas visited, and the proportion of fixations made to the inner regions of 
the face).  Fixation duration was selected to further explore the temporal nature of 
memory effects that previous researchers (Ryan et al., 2007; Schwedes & Wentura, 
2012) proposed were a product of both recognition and response intentions.  It is 
important to note that deception has shown to increase fixations quantity (Cook, 
Hacker, Webb, Osher, Kristjansson, Woltz, Kircher, et al., 2012) but also to increase 
fixation durations (Griffin & Oppenheimer, 2006).  Since the effect of deception on 
fixation quantity is the opposite to the effect of memory on number of fixations, then 
it lying might diminish memory effects.  The opposite would be true for fixation 
durations, wherein an increase in fixation durations during lies could potentially 
magnify memory effects. 
 
It is apparent that a number of factors interact in both the CIT and eye 
movement-based memory paradigms.  The most notable here are degree of face 
familiarity and whether the participant is lying or telling the truth about 
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recognition.  A number of eye movement parameters are discussed in the literature 
and each provide different insights to different aspects of cognitions during 
recognition and deceit.  To combine and further explore the work of Althoff and 
colleagues (1998; 1999) and Ryan et al. (2007) a range of eye movement 
parameters are recorded in Experiment 1: number of fixations as a general measure 
of processing effort (Cook et al., 2012), the number of interest areas of the face 
viewed to explore the degree of spatial distribution of fixations patterns, the number 
of return fixations made to the same face region to as a means to explore attempts to 
resolve featural ambiguity to unfamiliar faces (Barton, Radcliffe, Cherkasova, 
Edelman, & Intriligator, 2006), and the proportion of fixation made to informative 
inner regions of the face (Stacey et al., 2005).  Additionally average durations of 
individual fixations were analysed to explore effects of recognition (Hannula, Ryan, 
Tranel, & Cohen, 2007) and cognitive effort required for lying (Zenzi M Griffin & 
Oppenheimer, 2006; Schwedes & Wentura, 2012).  The predictions follow below: 
 
Primary fixation-based predictions for Experiment 1 were that memory for 
familiar faces would result in a reduction in eye movement behaviour when 
reprocessing photographs of known faces compared to those that were unknown.  
This effect of memory on eye movements (fewer fixations of longer durations) for 
familiar faces.  Based on Althoff & Cohen (1999), Experiment 1 predicted a decrease 
in the quantity and distribution of fixations as observed in fewer fixations overall 
(Num. Fixations), fewer regions of interest on the face visited (IAs Visited), fewer 
return fixations to the face (Run Count), and a smaller proportion of fixations made 
to the inner regions of the face (Proportion Inner).   
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Based on Ryan et al. (2007) the current experiment predicted that fixation 
durations would be longer when processing photographs of familiar faces compared 
to unfamiliar.  Consistent with Ryan et al (2007), Experiment 1 also predicted that 
the effect of memory for familiar faces would be observed via longer fixation 
durations in the first fixations (First three fixations analysed) and the effect of 
response intentions just prior to the response selection (1500 ms pre and post 
response analysed). 
 
Secondary familiarity-based predictions were that eye movement-based 
memory effects (less fixations, longer durations when viewing familiar faces) would 
be most distinct for the photographs of well-known faces that have the strongest 
real-world saliency (e.g., personally known faces) (Ryan et al., 2007; van Belle, 
Ramon, Lefèvre, & Rossion, 2010). 
 
Predictions based on the cognitive load theory that lying is harder than telling 
the truth, are that liars might display more fixations and longer durations of 
fixations during concealed recognition than during revealed recognition.  The 
predicted increase in fixation quantity (Cook, Hacker, Webb, Osher, Kristjansson, 
Woltz, Kircher, et al., 2012) during concealed recognition, could potentially decrease 
the difference in eye movement behaviour between the probe (conceal recognition 
of familiar face) and irrelevant faces (reveal unknown faces as unfamiliar), thus 
diminishing the eye movement-based memory effect.  Whereas, longer fixations 
durations during lying (Griffin & Oppenheimer, 2006) would tend to magnify effects 
of memory during recognition.  Consistent with (Meijer et al., 2007), the research 
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predicts that personally known faces will be most robust to changes in cognitive 
load as a consequence of instructions to tell the truth or lie. 
 
To assess whether choosing to lie or being instructed to lie change the fixation 
patterns of liars, a final block was included where participants chose whether to lie 
or not.  A final supplementary prediction was that heightened strategic monitoring 
processes when participants chose to lie might further increase fixation quantity 
and duration as previous research showed than participants were much slower at 
completing deceptive tasks when lies were self-generated compared to directed 
(Johnson et al., 2004). 
 
2.2. Method 
2.2.1. Design 
The research employed a modified Concealed Information Test during which 
participants lied and told the truth about recognising different types of familiar 
faces.  Participants were randomly presented with a series of singly presented 
colour photographs of faces: unfamiliar faces and three different types of familiar 
faces to which they made ‘familiar’ or ‘unfamiliar’ button press responses.  A nested 
within-subjects design independently manipulated Task Instruction (Lie, Truth) and 
Familiar Face Type (unfamiliar, newly learned, famous celebrities, and personally 
known).  There were three lying condition blocks in which participants were asked 
to lie in turn about the three different types of familiar faces: Familiar-learned (Lie-
learned), Familiar-famous (Lie-famous) or Familiar-personal (Lie-personal).  
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Participants did not lie about unfamiliar faces.  In each of these lying blocks, 
participants lied about only one type of familiar face, whilst telling the truth about 
all the others.  For example in the Lie-Personal block, every time the participant saw 
a photograph of a personally familiar face they had to lie and make an unfamiliar 
response by pressing the appointed button on the game port.  When presented with 
newly learned and famous celebrity photographs within this block, however, the 
participant honestly indicated that they were familiar.  Presentations of unfamiliar 
faces always required an honest unfamiliar response.  There were equal numbers (4 
x 10) of each face type in each block of trials.  The Lie-learned, Lie-famous and Lie-
personal blocks were fully counter-balanced.  In the final block the participants 
were permitted to ‘choose’ whether to lie or tell the truth and, if they opted to lie, 
selected which type of familiar face to lie about. This condition was performed as a 
manipulation check to test assertions that directed lies (explicit deception 
instruction) are cognitively different to self-generated lies (spontaneously chosen ad 
executed).  All participants were informed not to disclose their choice to the 
experimenter who was closely monitoring them during the experiment.  
 
2.2.2. Participants 
59 undergraduate students (13 males, 46 females) participated in the 
experiment.  Participant ages ranged from 18 to 44 years (M = 19.6, SD = 3.6).  All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were awarded course 
credit for their participation.  Participants were recruited from psychology 
undergraduate tutor groups.  Participants were specifically recruited from pre-
existing tutor groups so that photographs of tutor group members could be used as 
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personally familiar stimuli in the experiment.  Recruiting from tutor groups 
established a baseline of real-world familiarity. (Tutor groups were established at 
the start of term by random allocation to class lists.  At the time of the first 
experimental trials, participants had been in these tutor groups for at least 5 
months, which meets the criteria for reasonably close familiarity (Wegner, Erber, & 
Raymond, 1991). 
 
2.2.3. Apparatus and Materials 
Eye tracker. 
Participant’s eye movements were tracked while they viewed photos using the 
Eyelink II head mounted eye tracker (SR Research, Canada).  The mean image size 
was approximately 4.03° of visual angle (SD=1.32).  A programme written using 
Experiment Builder controlled the presentation of images on a flat CRT monitor. 
Manual button press responses were collected by a Microsoft Sidewinder Plug-and-
Play game pad.     
 
Photographic stimuli. 
A total of 200 digital colour photographs of faces were presented to each 
participant over five blocks of test trials (40 photos x 5 blocks).  All photographs 
showed the full face of a person against a blue background. The face had a neutral 
expression and gaze was towards the camera.  Forty test photographs were 
presented in each block of trials that comprised 10 Unfamiliar faces (UF), 10 newly 
learned faces (F-L), 10 famous celebrity faces (F-F) and 10 personally known faces 
(F-P). 
 59 
 
Unfamiliar faces were resourced with kind permission from the databases of 
other academic institutions (Burton, White, & McNeill, 2010; PICS; 
http://pics.stir.ac.uk; Weyrauch, Heisele, Huang, & Blanz, 2004) and individuals 
from schools and universities (Taunton College, University of Stirling) who 
volunteered to have their photographs taken to create a new unfamiliar face 
database for the purposes of the present experiment.   
 
Personally known faces were photographs of the student participants. 
Photographs of personally familiar faces were of the class-mate participants and 
were taken against a blue background screen using a SONY Cybershot digital still 
camera (model, DSC-W55), a tripod stand, and spot lamps for studio lighting.  A 
photo-shoot was organised to generate the stimuli for personally familiar faces 
where the opportunity was also taken to further establish personal familiarity 
within each group.  During a team-building activity each participant shared five 
pieces of personal information with their fellow group members; full name, age, 
place of birth, a personality characteristic and favourite pass time.  After this 
process, each team member noted down a secret word they associated with that 
person to act as a cue to remembering each member’s personally relevant 
information.  Participants then recalled, as a group, each person’s details.  Likert 
scales were used to record familiarity ratings (1 = not familiar at all; 7 = very 
familiar) for each team member at the beginning and end of the session and again 
when they returned for the experimental test.  A RM ANOVA performed on the 
familiarity ratings before and after the team building task revealed significant 
differences in familiarity ratings, F(1.67, 69.92) = 68.20, p < 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2   = 0.62.  
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Ratings taken before the team building task revealed a pre-existing level of 
familiarity before the session (M = 3.42, SD  =0.92) that further increased after the 
familiarisation process (M = 4.30, SD = 1.12; t(43) = 5.91, p < 0.001) and again by the 
day of the mCIT (M = 5.16, SD = 0.68; t(43) = 4.88, p < 0.001).   
 
Famous faces were contemporary celebrities faces sourced on the internet.  
During the team-building task, participants had each identified a celebrity that 
similarly matched their own face in terms of hair, eye and skin colour.  In this way, 
group members were familiar with the celebrity faces chosen for the concealed 
recognition test.  The experimenter sourced the appropriate number of images for 
each group.  One celebrity phot for each student (10 in each group) for each block (5 
condition blocks), equally 50 in total for each block of trials for each group. 
 
Newly learned faces became familiar by exposing participants to 
photographs of unfamiliar faces within the experimental session, directly before 
performing the actual mCIT.  Participants were asked to look at the unfamiliar face 
images on the display monitor until they had learned them to memory.  Participants 
were then asked to rate each newly learned face for attractiveness, distinctiveness 
and familiarity of 7-point Likert scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very) before being asked to 
state what feature of the face they thought was most distinctive and to estimate the 
perceived age in years.  This procedure is often used to familiarise participants with 
faces in recognition-based experiments as such psychological judgments represent 
those made in real life when we meet new people (e.g., Osborne & Stevenage, 2013). 
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The appearance of all photographs were standardised using Adobe 
Photoshop Elements (Version 2.0) for the removal of red-eye, accessories and 
jewellery and extracted from their original background to a standardised blue (HEX: 
91BE87) background measuring (666 x 500 px).  Photographs were presented using 
Experiment Builder (Version 1.6.121, SR Research) on a desktop computer linked to 
a 19-inch CRT Monitor (model, G90FB; resolution, 1280 x 1024 pixels; refresh rate 
89Hz).  Images were presented randomly to the left (292, 292) or the right side 
(704, 292) of the screen to minimise anticipatory guessing behaviour of picture 
location.   
 
Deception Strategies Questionnaires 
A simple questionnaire designed to gauge whether participants attempted to 
adopt any behavioural strategies during the task posed the following questions:  
One closed question, Did you adopt any strategies during the task?  Participants 
circled a yes or no answer.  Four open ended questions, What strategies did you 
adopt when lying?  What strategies did you adopt when telling the truth? What 
behaviours do you think are indicative of lying?  What behaviours do you think are 
indicative of telling the truth? 
The final closed question asked, when do you think you displayed more of the 
following behaviours; when lying, telling the truth or no difference (please circle)? 
Twelve statements were listed to which the participant had to circle when they 
thought they displayed more of each behaviour (during lies, truths, or no 
difference).  An example or two of these statements are: Looked at the face, and 
Looked less at the eyes.  No specific hypotheses were generated in relation to 
possible eye movement strategies.  
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2.2.4. Procedure 
Participants were seated in a controlled quiet and dimly lit room at a 
distance of 0.80m from the display screen.   
 
Participants were first shown the ten photographs of personally familiar 
classmates on the display screen in turn.  Participants were asked to look at each of 
these faces and rate each of them for attractiveness, distinctiveness and familiarity 
using seven-point Likert scales (1 = not familiar at all; 7 = most familiar).  There was 
no time limit for the ratings task.  When finished, participants pressed the space bar 
to indicate they were ready for their eye gaze position to be calibrated with the eye 
tracker.   
 
After the rating of the personally known faces, the eye tracker’s 
measurement of gaze was calibrated to the participant’s eye movements prior to the 
study phase using a 3 x 3 dot array. Where necessary, the calibration was repeated 
between condition blocks.  The Eyelink II headband was comfortably secured to the 
participant’s head.  Retinal and corneal reflections induced by an infrared source 
were recorded at a frequency of 250Hz (Pupil-CR mode) to obtain participants’ 
points of fixation on the screen.  
 
To calibrate, a black dot with a white centre was presented in middle of the 
screen.  Upon request, the participant fixated the white centre of the black dot.  Once 
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the participant steadily fixated on the dot, the experimenter accepted the fixation by 
pressing a button on the host computer, positioned behind and to the right of the 
participant.  Once the initial fixation was accepted the same dot was displayed 
randomly, one location at a time, using a 3x3 array.  The experimenter validated that 
eye gaze was being tracked with high spatial resolution (error of resolution: 0.5°-
1.0°) before moving on to the next procedural phase. 
 
Following calibration, and prior to the test phase, participants were exposed to 
ten unfamiliar faces and asked to ‘learn’ these for the purpose of the task.  The 
participants were instructed to study the 10 unfamiliar faces in turn, for as long as 
was required to satisfy that each face had been ‘learned’.  Once the participant 
reported that they had learned the face presented, the experimenter then asked 
them to rate each face on the psychological dimensions of attractiveness, 
distinctiveness and familiarity.  Ratings were made based on 7-point Likert scales; 
‘1’ indicated the face as ‘not at all’ attractive, distinctive or familiar and ‘7’ indicated 
that the face was very attractive, distinctive or familiar.  The participant then 
pressed a button to begin the experimental trials.   Using psychological dimension 
ratings in this way is one procedure used to aide face learning by encouraging 
attention to and processing of the face (Osborne & Stevenage, 2013).  Participants 
were exposed to a new set of ten previously unfamiliar faces before each block of 
trials.   
 
During each block of the CIT, participants were presented with a sequence of 
40 full face colour photographs.  Prior to the display of each face a fixation dot was 
shown in the centre of the screen to correct any drift in eye movements following 
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the initial calibration.  Within each condition block unfamiliar (10), newly learned 
(10), famous celebrities (10) and personally known (10) faces were displayed to the 
participant randomly.  Participants responded by making a dichotomous ‘familiar’ 
or ‘unfamiliar’ button press response.  The button assigned to familiarity was 
counterbalanced for handedness so that approximately half of the participants 
pressed it with their dominant hand (30).  After the button press was made, the face 
remained on the display screen for three seconds, followed by a blank screen for 
two seconds (Figure 2.1).  The rationale for leaving the display on-screen post-
response was driven by previous deception research that investigated blinking as a 
cue to deception.  A compensatory eye blink responses to reveal deception after a lie 
that presumed to be inhibited prior to the lie due to cognitive load (Leal & Vrij, 
2008).  Hannula et al., (2012) also found fixation durations during unintentional 
misidentification to reveal recognition 500ms post response compared to truths 
that occurred prior to response selections.  There was no upper time limit for the 
button press.   
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Figure 2 1.  Sequence order of display screen presentation in test trials. Participants 
made a familiar/unfamiliar (button press) response to each face.  The face remained 
on the screen for 2 secs post response followed by the presentation of a blank 
screen for 2 secs.  Each trial was preceded by the fixation dot to ensure accuracy of 
eye movement monitoring and to correct for any drift in eye movements on a trial-
by-trial basis. 
 
Instructions were different in each of the five blocks of trials.  In the first 
block, participants were required to respond honestly to all trials. This was a 
practice block and responses were not analysed. Then followed three lying blocks in 
which the participants had to lie, in turn, about the three different types of familiar 
faces:  newly learned faces (Familiar-Learned), famous celebrity faces (Familiar-
Famous), and personally known faces (Familiar-Personal).  The Lie-Learned 
condition required that participants lie about the faces that they learned during the 
study phases, whilst telling the truth about all other faces types; the Lie-Famous 
condition, that they lie about famous faces, whilst telling the truth about all other 
face types; and the Lie-Personal condition to lie about personally known faces whilst 
telling the truth about all other face types.  To emphasise, in the lying conditions, 
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participants made both honest and dishonest responses but lied about only one 
specific group of familiar face in each condition block (Familiar-Learned, Familiar-
Famous or Familiar-Personal).  In that way the design was based on the classic CIT 
where participants lied about specific familiar faces (probes) and told the truth 
about other familiar faces (targets).  Participants always told the truth about 
unfamiliar irrelevant faces.  When all five test blocks were completed, participants 
rated the famous faces for attractiveness, distinctiveness and familiarity.  This 
procedure allowed the experimenter to verify that all famous faces had in fact been 
correctly recognised. 
 
 
2.2.5. Data preparation: Defining Interest Areas (IAs) 
The selection and naming of these areas is consistent with other face 
research (Bate et al., 2008; Walker-Smith, Gale, & Findlay, 1977).  After data 
collection, all photographs of faces were marked with a-priori selected areas of 
interest; the right eye (left visual space), the left eye (right visual space), the nose 
and the mouth.  For some data analyses these areas were combined to form the 
‘inner’ region of the face.  The rest of the face, including the hair, ears, cheeks and 
chin, were labelled the ‘outer’ face area.   Interest Areas (IAs) were marked up using 
the ellipse, rectangle and freehand tools in Data Viewer (Version 1.6.121, SR 
Research, Ontario, Canada). 
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Figure 2 2.  Example of Interest Areas (IAs) defined for analyses. 
 
Measures 
Consistent with Althoff and colleagues (1998; 1999), the amount and 
distribution of eye movement behaviour for familiar and unfamiliar faces was 
measured in the total number of fixations made to the face before the recognition 
judgement was made (Num. Fixations), the number of regions of the face sampled 
(IAs Visited), the number of independent clusters of fixations on an interest area, 
defined precisely as the number of times that a series of two or more fixations were 
made on an interest area without any fixations intervening on other interest areas 
(Run Count) and the proportion of fixations directed to the inner regions of the face 
(Proportion Fixations Inner).  These five measures assessed general viewing 
behaviour (Num. Fixations), the distribution of fixation behaviour (IAs Visited), 
apparent attempts to resolved featural ambiguity or uncertainty in recognition (e.g., 
Barton, Radcliffe, Cherkasova, Edelman, & Intriligator, 2006), and more specifically 
the proportions of fixations made to the informative inner regions of the face 
(Proportion Fixations Inner).  Finally, we measured the average fixation duration of 
individual fixations (Ryan et al., 2007; Schwedes & Wentura, 2012). 
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2.2.6. Analysis Strategy 
First all targets (truths about familiar faces) were compared to irrelevants 
(truths about unknown faces) to assess memory effects in fixations during honest 
recognition.  Second, probes (lies about familiar faces were compared to the same 
irrelevants (truths about unknown faces) to assess the presence of memory effects 
when participants lied about recognition.  Third, targets (truths about familiar 
faces) and probes (lies about familiar faces) were compared to assess whether lying 
caused any significant differences between truths and lies for familiar faces alone.  
Each analyses was performed using separate Repeated Measures analyses of 
Variance for each fixation measure; number of fixations, run counts, IAs visited, 
proportion fixations inner, (fixation quantity and distributions as analysed in Althoff 
& Cohen, 1999), fixation-by-fixation analyses for the first three fixations, and time 
course analyses (500 ms time bins) 1500 ms before and after response selections 
(see Hannula et al., 2012; Ryan et al., 2007; Schwedes & Wentura, 2012). 
 
2.3. Results 
Where Mauchley’s Test of Sphericity were violated, RM ANOVAs were 
calculated using Greenhouse Geisser adjustments to degrees of freedom (df).  The 
corrected p value and Greenhouse Geisser epsilon (ε) are reported for F tests.  Post 
hoc tests were performed using paired sample t-tests.  Adjusted p values (α) are 
denoted in each relevant figure caption for the number of post hoc tests conducted.  
The use of Bonferroni comparisons for correcting multiple tests on multiple 
fixations measures is consistent with other eye movement research using similar 
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analyses as the current thesis (Hannula et al., 2012, 2007; Hannula & Ranganath, 
2009). 
2.3.1. Exclusion criteria 
Fifteen of the original 59 participants were removed from the data set for the 
following reasons: corrupted data files (3), not completing the task (3), or failure to 
recognise one or more of the famous faces (9).  Trials were also removed from the 
analyses if the participant presented extreme outliers in the reaction time data 
responded incorrectly to the face.  In the honest trials, incorrect responses were 
recorded if a familiar response was made to an unfamiliar face or an unfamiliar 
response to any of the familiar faces.  In the lie trials, further incorrect response 
were recorded if the participant failed to conceal their knowledge and reported 
familiar faces as familiar instead of the desired unfamiliar response.  Error rates 
were low across all trials: Familiar-Personal (truths, 3%, lies, 10%) Familiar-
Famous (truths, 3%, lies, 1%), Familiar-Learned (truths 8%, lies 13%) and unknown 
faces (truths 92%).  These exclusion criteria resulted in removal of 6.7% of the data 
the Lie-Learned condition, 4.49% and 6.65 % in the Lie-Famous and Lie-Personal 
conditions respectively.  This left 4966 trials out of the original 5280.  Similar to 
previous research (Greenwald, Nosek, Banaji, 2003; Verschuere, Spruyt, Meijer & 
Orgaar, 2011) outliers in the reaction time data were removed if they were faster or 
slower than specific set thresholds (acceptable range for present data, <300 ms or 
>5000 ms).  This removed a further 54 trials (1.09%) leaving a total of 4912 trials 
out of the original 5280.   
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2.3.2. Fixation Quantity 
Truth trials (Irrelevants and Targets) 
Repeated Measures ANOVAs were performed on truth data with four 
independent levels of task instruction; tell the truth about unfamiliar faces 
(irrelevant), tell the truth about recognition of newly learned faces (target), tell the 
truth about recognition of famous celebrity faces (target), reveal recognition of 
personally known faces (target).  Post hoc tests were performed using paired 
sample t-tests to compare means and Bonferroni correction for three multiple 
comparisons (α = 0.017). 
 
There was an effect of task instruction in all four eye movement parameters; 
Num. Fixations, F(2.50, 94.92) = 33.35, p < 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2   = 0.47, Run Count, F(3, 114) = 
31.25, p < 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.45, IAs Visited, F(3, 114) = 22.44, p < 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2   = 0.37, Prop. 
Fixations Inner, F(3,114) = 3.24, p = 0.025,  𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.08, showing substantial medium-
large effect sizes across measures (see Figure 2.3).  When participants truthfully 
identified newly familiar, famous celebrity and personally known faces all four eye 
movement parameters (Num. Fixations, IAs Visited, Runs, Proportion fixations made 
to inner face regions) significantly differed from the quantity of these four measures 
when correctly rejecting recognition of unknown faces. 
 
 
 
Newly learned faces. When participants revealed recognition of newly learned 
faces, a significant decrease in fixation behaviour also distinguished known from 
unknown faces in the one measure Num. Fixations, t(43) = 2.72, p = 0.009, d = 0.28.  
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After Bonferroni corrections trends were observed for IAs Visited, t(43) = 2.12, p = 
0.040, d = 0.25 and Run Count, t(43) = 2.22, p = 0.032, d = 0.22.  No significant effect 
of memory emerged for the measure Prop. Fixations Inner, t(43) = 1.92, p = 0.062, d 
= 0.21.   
 
Famous celebrity faces. When participants revealed recognition of famous 
celebrity faces, a significant reduction in fixation behaviour also identified memory 
for known compared to unknown faces; Num. Fixations, t(43) = 7.220, p < 0.001, d = 
0.82, Run Count, t(43) = 0.24, p < 0.001, d = 0.71, IAs Visited, t(43) = 5.75, p <0.001, 
d = 0.57, Prop. Fixations Inner, t(43) = 3.69, p < 0.001, d = 0.33.   
 
Personally known faces. When participants revealed recognition of personally 
known faces they made significantly less fixations on the personally known 
compared to the unknown face in three parameters; Num. Fixations, t(43) = 9.54, p 
< 0.001, d = 1.12, Run Count, t(43) = 8.56, p < 0.001, d = 0.96, and IAs Visited, t(43) = 
7.86, p < 0.001, d = 0.88.  A trend in the data was observed for the measure, Prop. 
Fixations Inner, t(43) = 2.28, p = 0.027, d = 0.25. 
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Figure 2 3.  RM ANOVAs for fixation measures, Num. Fixations, Run Count, IAs Visited, Prop. Fixations 
Inner (d.f. = 43 in each case, no effect of condition order), with Bonferroni adjustments for multiple 
paired sample t-tests (α=0.017).  The y-axis shows data for unfamiliar faces (UF), newly learned faces 
(F-L), famous celebrity faces (F-F), and personally familiar (F-P) faces.  In each graph, the unfamiliar 
(UF) irrelevants (white bars) are the comparison point for all truth (grey) and lie data (blue).  
p<0.001***, p<0.01**. Error bars represent M±SEM. 
 
 
Lie trials (Irrelevants and Probes) 
RM-ANOVA’s were  performed on the lie data also with four independent 
levels of within subjects task instruction, tell the truth about unknown faces, conceal 
recognition of personally known faces, lie about recognition of celebrity famous 
faces, lie about recognition of newly learned faces.  (Truth-Unknown (Irrelevant), 
Lie-Learned (Probe), Lie-Famous (Probe) and Lie -Personal (Probe)).  Analyses 
reveal significant differences in fixation behaviour in all four parameters measured; 
Num. Fixations, F(2.3, 88.18) = 13.16, p < 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.26,  𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.11, Run Count, 
F(2.34, 12.67) = 12.67, p < 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.25, IAs Visited, F(3, 114) = 19.23, p < 0.001, 
 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.34, Prop. Fixations Inner, F(2.49, 94.43) = 4.51, p = 0.010,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.11, with 
medium to large effects.   Post hoc tests were performed using paired sample t-tests 
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to compare means and Bonferroni correction for three multiple comparisons (α = 
0.017).  (see also Figure 2.3 above). 
 
Newly learned faces. When participants concealed recognition of newly learned 
faces, a trend in the data distinguished between concealed recognition trials and 
honest judgements to unfamiliar faces for Num. Fixations only, t(43) = 2.220, p = 
0.032, d = 0.23.  No significant effects of memory emerged for the remaining three 
measures, Run Count, t(43) = 1.737, p = 0.090, d = 0.16, IAs Visited, t(43) = 1.871, p 
= 0.068, d = 0.21.Prop. Fixations Inner, t(43) = 0.212, p = 0.833, d = 0.03.   
 
Famous celebrity faces. When participants concealed recognition of famous 
celebrity faces, fixation behaviour was also significantly less compared to fixations 
made during honest response to unfamiliar faces; Num. Interest Areas t(43) = 3.75, 
p = 0.001, d = 0.50, Run Count, t(43) = 3.35, p = 0.002, d = 0.42, IAs Visited, 3.28, p = 
0.002, d = 0.40,   No significant effect of memory was found for Prop. Fixations Inner 
t(43) = 1.99, p = 0.054, d = 0.20. 
 
Personally known faces. When participants lied and reported that they did not 
recognise a personally familiar face compared to honestly reporting that they did 
not recognise the unfamiliar face,  a reduction in fixation behaviour consistently 
revealed recognition for the personally known face for all four parameters; Num. 
Fixation, t(43) = 8.58, p < 0.001, d = 0.89, Run Count, t(43) = 6.89, p < 0.001, d = 0.72, 
IA Visited, t(43) = 7.45, p < 0.001, d = 0.87, Prop. Fixations Inner, t(43) = 3.60, p = 
0.001, d =  0.45. 
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Targets and Probes. To explore if fixation behaviour for familiar faces 
significant differed between truth and lie tries of familiar faces (excluding unfamiliar 
irrelevants),  multiple 2 (WS: Deception Instruction: Truth, Lie) x 3 (WS: Familiar 
Face type: Familiar-Learned, Familiar-Famous, Familiar-Personal) RM-ANOVAs 
revealed no significant interactions between Deception Instruction and Familiar 
face type for any of the four eye movement measures: Num. Fixations, F(2,86) = 
0.09, p = 0.910,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.00, IAs Visited, F(2, 86) = 0.60, p = 0.551,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.43, Run 
Count, F(2, 76) = 0.17, p = 0.840,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.00.  Proportion Fixations Inner, F(2, 76) = 
2.21, p = 0.120,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.05, Average Fixation Duration, F(2, 76) = 1.36, p = 0.260,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 
0.03. 
 
Comparing Directed to Self-Generated Lies. 
In the first three lying blocks participants were instructed to lie about a 
specific group of familiar face (Directed Lie) whilst telling the truth about others.  In 
the final condition block participants were given a choice whether to lie or tell the 
truth and, if lying, to choose which group of faces to lie about (Self-Generated Lie).  
Out of 44 participants, 25 chose to lie (57%).  Five chose to lie about the Familiar-
Learned faces, eight about the Familiar-Famous faces, and twelve about the 
Familiar-Personal faces. 
 
RM ANOVAs (WS: Deception: Directed; Self-Generated) x (BS: Face Type: 
Familiar-Learned, Familiar-Famous, Familiar-Personal) performed on the data 
Proportion Fixations Inner, IAs Visited, Run Count, AFD revealed that there was no 
main effect of Directed or Self-Generated Lies.  Overall there were no interactions 
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between deception and face type for the eye movement variables Num. Fixations, 
Prop. Fixation Inner, Run Count, AFD, with one exception (IAs Visited).  Paired 
sample t-tests, however, reveal that these do not occur at the comparisons of 
interest; Choice-Learned v. Instructed-Learned, t(4) = 2.05, p = 0.110, Choice-
Famous v Instructed-Famous, t(7) = 1.25, p = 0.252, Choice-Personal v Instructed-
Personal, t(11) = 1.30, p = 0.221.  
 
2.3.3. Fixation Durations 
 
Irrelevants and Targets: RM-ANOVA’s conducted on truth data with four 
independent levels of Task Instruction (Irrelevant, Target-Learned, Target-Famous 
and Target-Personal) revealed significant differences between Task Instruction 
conditions, F(3, 114) = 4.39, p = 0.006,  𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.10.  Post hoc tests revealed no 
significant different in fixation durations between irrelevants and newly learned 
targets faces, t(43) = 1.24, p = 0.220, d = 0.13 or irrelevants and famous targets, 
t(43) = 0.24, p = 0.815, d = 0.03.  There was also a clear difference in fixation 
duration between irrelevants and personally familiar targets, t(43) = 3.11, p = 0.003, 
d = 0.22.   
 
Irrelevants and probes: The pattern was consistent in lie trials, F(2.24, 85.15) = 
5.52, p = 0.004,  𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.13.  No significant differences were found between 
irrelevants and newly learned faces, t(43) = 0.71, p = 0.480, d = 0.11, or irrelevants 
and famous probes, t(43) = 1.07, p = 0.293, d = 0.14.  However, fixation durations 
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were significantly longer to personally familiar probes than irrelevants, t(43) = 2.92, 
p = 0.006, d = 0.46.   
 
Because overall RM ANOVAs indicated that significant differences between 
irrelevants versus targets and irrelevants versus probes were evident only for 
personally known faces, additional analyses of the first three fixations and 1500 ms 
pre and post response were restricted to personally familiar faces. 
 
First three fixations 
To explore the emergence of a memory effect early in viewing behaviour, a 
RM-ANOVA was performed on fixation duration for responses to irrelevants, targets 
and probes in the first three fixations.  The factors Task Instruction (Truth- 
Irrelevant, Truth-Target, Lie-Probe) and Fixation (First, Second, Third) were 
entered into the analysis.  Main effects were found for Task Instruction, F(1.85, 
62.82) = 4.70, p = 0.014, 𝜂𝑝
2  < 0.12, and Fixation, F(1.68, 57.04) = 27.28, p < 0.001, 𝜂𝑝
2  
< 0.45, but no interactions between these factors emerged, F(2.19, 74.70) = 0.80, p = 
0.463, 𝜂𝑝
2  < 0.02) (Figure 2.4a and b). 
 
Post hoc tests performed on the main effect of Task Instruction revealed that 
fixation duration was not significantly longer for targets than irrelevants, t(34) = 
5.84, p = 0.560.  However, fixation durations were longer for probes than 
irrelevants, t(34) = 2.58, p = 0.015, d = 0.29, and targets and probes, t(34) = 2.64, p = 
0.012, d = 0.25 (Figure 2.4a). 
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The main effect of fixation (first, second, third): fixation duration significantly 
increases from the first to the second fixation, t(34)=7.61, p < 0.001, d = 1.14 and the 
first to the third fixation, t(34)=5.07, p < 0.001, d = 1.00.  There was no significant 
difference in fixation duration between second and third fixations, t(34)=0.67, p = 
0.506, d = 0.09 (Figure 2.4b).  
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Figure 2 4. RM ANOVAs for fixation duration data are presented according to (a) task 
instruction condition (Truth-Unfamiliar, Truth-Personal, Lie-Personal) for the first three fixations 
combined to show a main effect of task instruction, (b) the main effect of fixation for the first three 
fixations with all three task instruction conditions combined (df = 43 in each case), with Bonferroni 
corrections for three multiple comparisons (α = 0.017), p<0.001***, p<0.017*. Error bars represent 
M±SEM. 
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Response locked analyses (1500 ms pre and post response) 
To assess the time bins in which differences in fixation duration emerged, a 3 
(Task Instruction: Truth-Irrelevant, Truth-Target, Lie-Probe) x 6 (Time bin (ms): -
1500, -1000, -500, +500, +1000, +1500) was performed on the data for irrelevants, 
targets and probes.  Significant main effects were found for Task Instruction, F(1.64, 
70.58) = 9.94, p < 0.001, 𝜂p2 = 0.19, Time Bin, F(4.00, 172.10) = 40.79, p < 0.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
0.49, and a significant interaction between Familiarity and Time Bin, F(10, 43) = 
4.82, p < 0.001, 𝜂𝑝
2  < 0.10 (Figure 2.5).   
 
The main effect of task instruction revealed that fixation durations were 
significantly longer during recognition of familiar faces during both truths, t(43) = 
2.82, p = 0.007, d = 0.22 and lies, t(43) = 3.87, p < 0.001, d = 0.41 compared to honest 
responses to unknown faces.  Lies about recognition of probes also produced longer 
fixations than truths about familiar targets, t(43) = 2.24, p = 0.031, d = 0.21. 
 
A main effect of time bin was observed for each of the three conditions: AFD 
data plotted from -1500 before the response until 1500 after consistently show a 
sharp significant increase in mean fixation duration from -1000 to -500msecs for 
each of the conditions, Truth-Irrelevant, t(43) = 3.92, p < 0.001, d = 0.57, Truth-
Target, t(43) = 5.54, p < 0.001, d = 0.82, Lie-Probe, t(43) = 7.36, p < 0.001, d = 1.11. 
 
Next, post hoc tests were performed to compare fixation durations between 
irrelevants versus targets, irrelevants versus probes, and targets versus probes 
within each time bin. 
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Irrelevants and Targets: Comparing data from six time bins, post hoc tests 
revealed a trend in fixation duration in the 500 ms time bin before the button-press 
familiarity judgement, t(43) = 2.62, p = 0.012 , d = 0.36.  The effect of increased 
longer fixation durations for targets compared to irrelevants remained significant 
until 500 ms after the response was made, t(43) = 4.45, p < 0.001, d = 0.48. 
 
Irrelevants and Probes: Lies to familiar probes revealed significantly longer 
fixation durations compared to irrelevants also 500 ms prior to the familiarity 
judgement, t(43) = 4.90, p = 0.001, d = 0.85.  Interestingly longer fixation durations 
were still observed 1500 ms post lie response; +500, t(43) = 3.42, p = 0.001; +1000, 
t(43) = 2.43, p = 0.019; + 1500, t(43) = 2.92, p = 0.006. 
 
Targets and Probes: Fixation durations when lying about probes were longer 
than truths about targets also 500 ms before response selection, t(43) = 3.96, p < 
0.001, d = 0.39.  The data suggest that additional effort experienced directly before 
making a deceptive response increased load beyond the cognitive efforts required 
for recognition and response selections for personally familiar faces.  No differences 
in fixation duration were found between targets and probes post response. 
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Figure 2 5. Fixation duration time course analysis, response locked 1500 ms pre and post button 
response.  Data are presented in 500 ms time bins (error bars represent M±SEM).  Bonferroni 
corrections for 33 pairwise comparisons (α = 0.002), **p<0.002, ***p<0.001. 
 
2.3.4. Questionnaire Data: Deceptive Strategies 
Less than a third of all participants (32%, all female) reported attempting to 
use some sort of eye movement strategy when lying about recognising faces of 
people they knew.   These strategies fell into three basic categories; trying to look 
less at the face when lying compared to truth telling (50% gaze aversion), 
attempting to look more at the face on the screen when lying (43%, deliberate gaze), 
trying to engage in the same viewing behaviour when both lying and telling the 
truth (consistent gaze, 7%). 
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2.4. Discussion 
Experiment 1 aimed to determine whether participants’ eye movement 
behaviour displayed memory effects (less fixations, longer durations) that identified 
recognition between familiar and unfamiliar faces that varied in degree of 
familiarity.  Overall, effects of memory were observed in multiple fixations 
behaviours when participants viewed and correctly identified faces that varied in 
familiarity.  
 
The fixation data for honest recognition of familiar faces are consistent with 
Althoff & Cohen’s (1999) previous findings that effects of memory are observed in 
number of fixations, number of face regions viewed, and proportion of fixations to 
the inner face regions.  Additionally, memory were found in the measure run count 
for all familiar face types.  Furthermore, the findings in the present experiment 
reveal a memory effect for familiar face viewing in the number of fixations (and a 
trend in the data for run counts and number of interest areas visited) after only one 
brief exposure.  This finding for singly presented faces is new compared to previous 
findings that memory effects for newly familiar faces were only evident after at least 
three exposures  (Althoff, 1998; Althoff et al., 1999; Heisz & Ryan, 2011; Heisz & 
Shore, 2008).  The prediction that viewing of familiar faces would also produce 
longer fixation durations compared to unfamiliar faces (Hannula et al., 2007) was 
partially supported by the present data.  Longer fixation durations were found for 
personally known faces, but not for famous or newly learned faces.  A possible 
reason why an effect of memory was not observed in fixation durations for lesser 
known faces (famous and newly learned) in the present experiment might be a 
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consequence of the different display compositions presented in the different 
experiments (see Flowe & Cottrell, 2011; Flowe & Ebbesen, 2007).  Multiple three-
face displays were used in Ryan et al.’s (2007) experiments whereas single face 
displays in the present experiment.  Future research should directly explore the 
effect of sequential versus simultaneous face displays on memory effects for faces 
that vary in degree of familiarity. 
 
Although memory effects were observed in multiple fixation behaviours for 
honest identification of faces that vary in familiarity.  However, cognitive efforts 
required for lying predicted further increases in fixation number, distribution, as 
well the mean durations of individual fixations.  It is important to highlight that the 
effect of lying on fixation quantity (number of fixations, run counts, interest areas 
visited and proportion of fixations inner) is the opposite to the effect of memory 
(fewer fixations), and thus fixation-based markers of memory might be diminished 
during lies.  In contrast, the effect of lying on fixation durations is a further 
increase in the length of fixation, and thus should not diminish an effect of memory 
but serve to make lie detection easier.  To date, only Schwedes & Wentura (2012) 
have explored fixations during concealed recognition of faces and, even so, their 
investigations solely focussed on one measure (fixation duration) using one type of 
familiar face (newly learned).  The data discussed below examine the effect of lying 
on both fixation quantity and duration for three different face types: personally 
known, famous celebrities and newly learned faces. 
 
 Overall, the present research found memory effects in multiple fixation 
measures which, in most cases, were robust in the face of lying.  Consistent with the 
 84 
results for honest identifications of familiar targets, effects of memory were also 
reliable during concealed recognition of personally known probes compared to 
unknown irrelevants.  Large effects of memory were observed in the number of 
fixations and number of face regions viewed, and an effect size approaching large 
was for run counts.  This finding is almost identical to results for the same three 
fixation measures during honest identifications, except that the number of face 
regions visited took second place as the second largest indicator of memory.   
 
Notably, the proportion of fixations made to inner face regions during 
concealed recognition of personally familiar probes were fewer than observed 
during honest identification of targets. This decrease in proportion of fixations 
increased resulted in a larger difference between irrelevants and probes, thus 
suggesting a larger, albeit misleading, effect of memory.  This decrease was contrary 
to predictions that lying would be harder and thus increase fixation quantity.  
Although this decrease was not significant when comparing truth (targets) and lie 
(probes) trials directly, it did increase the effect size of the irrelevant-probe 
difference making it appear that there was a larger effect of memory on fixation 
behaviour during lies.  This exception in fixation behaviour was contrary to the 
patterns in the other measures of fixation quantity (number of fixations, run counts 
or number of face regions visited).  In those measures, numerical increases 
(presumably as a result of increased load as predicted) were observed when lying 
about probes and, although negligible, had a tendency to reduce effect sizes between 
irrelevants and probes, compared to effect sizes observed between irrelevants and 
targets. 
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It is difficult to determine if any particular factor caused the numerical 
decrease in proportions of fixations to the inner regions of the face between 
revealed and concealed recognition trials.  Or indeed if it was simply a spurious 
result.  We might speculate that lying about recognition of personally known faces is 
particularly conflicting and that this might have automatically triggered a gaze 
aversion response that resulted in less proportions of fixation being directed to the 
inner regions of the face.  Given that the inner portions of the face are particularly 
important to the processing of a face and that well known faces can be recognised 
based on one or two fixations to the inner face regions (Hsiao & Cottrell, 2008; van 
Belle et al., 2010), it might be that participants were better able to execute deceptive 
responses by visually disengaging from these regions.  The current study, however, 
is not able to answer this question although it is an interesting question for future 
research.  The present findings on proportion of fixations, however, do suggest that 
it may not be the most reliable measure for memory detection during deceit. 
 
The second notable finding was that the mean fixation duration was 
numerically longer during concealed recognition of probes, compared to honest 
identification of familiar targets.  Although the difference in fixation duration did not 
significantly increase when viewing targets compared to probes, the numerical 
increase did serve to augment the effect size of the fixation duration difference 
between irrelevants and probes as compared to irrelevants and targets.  This 
particular property of fixation duration makes it appealing for a measure of memory 
detection since lying does not diminish the effect of memory as it did with fixation 
quantity.  However it is advisable to note that fixation duration differences were not 
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found between irrelevants and targets or irrelevants and probes for lesser known 
faces when analysed for the full trial period, as reported below. 
 
Also consistent with predictions and results for honest identification of famous 
targets, memory effects were observed during concealed recognition of famous 
faces in three fixation measures:  number of fixations, run counts, number of face 
regions visited.  The effect sizes of the differences calculated between the means for 
irrelevant and probes were smaller during concealed recognition than for 
irrelevants and targets during honest identifications.  From truth to lies trials the 
effect sizes dropped as follows: Number of fixations, from large to medium, Run 
Counts, from approaching large to approaching medium, Number of face regions 
viewed, from medium to approaching medium.  Furthermore, the difference 
between irrelevants and probes for the proportion of fixations to inner face regions 
emerged only as a trend in probe trials as significance values did not reach 
significance after corrections (although the calculated effect size still reached 
criteria for a small effect as defined by Cohen’s d).  This results confirm that this 
latter measure is less suitable as a marker of memory and even less so when 
memory is being intentionally concealed during lies. Again, no differences in average 
fixation duration were found between irrelevants and probes for famous faces.  
When comparing effects and significance across eye movement measures from truth 
to lie trials, effects sizes were smaller and p values slightly less significant.  Most 
importantly, despite small numerical decreases in effect sizes from truth to lie trials, 
three of the five eye movement measures validly indicated memory for famous faces 
in lie trials. 
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Notably, in trials where participants lied about newly learned faces only a 
trend emerged in the data for number of total of fixations, although the calculated 
effect size was similarly small to honest responses to targets.  No other evidence of 
memory effects were found in any of the other measure for learned faces.  Although 
small, the discovery that memory exerts an effect on the number of fixation to a 
newly learned face (after only one exposure) in both truth and lie trials suggests 
that this variable is the most reliable for memory detection across different types of 
familiar faces.  It is also the most simple to analyse, a practical asset for potential 
field uses of fixation behaviour for memory detection. 
 
The finding that few differences were found in the eye movement variables for 
newly learned faces is most likely due to the procedure employed for learning.  The 
procedure for learning was specifically chosen to explore memory effects for faces 
that were only familiar via brief exposure.  Schwedes & Wentura (2012) previously 
found that longer fixation durations exposed recognition of newly familiar faces 
during attempts to conceal memory, however they employed a more extensive study 
phase that required correctly classifying faces according to groups over at least 
three presentations.  Schwedes and Wentura’s (2012) experiment also used six face 
displays.  Other research using multiple face displays (Hannula et al., 2012; Ryan et 
al., 2007)  have revealed memory effects in longer fixation durations after only one 
brief five-second exposure to a previously unfamiliar face.  In the present 
experiment, it is encouraging that an effect of memory was observed in at least one 
fixation measure also after only one brief exposure but future research should 
address the limitations of different display types in generating useful fixation 
behaviour for memory detection. 
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A final but important point relating the lack of memory effects for newly 
familiar faces; it is possible that a lack of certainty for recognition of newly learned 
faces during lie trials was compounded by the difficulty of concealing recognition 
that resulted in guessing behaviour.  Because the response required only a 
dichotomous button press response, it is possible that in some of these trials that 
the participants were guessing correctly as a matter of chance (errors were 
removed).  Guessing behaviour could most certainly explain the lack of memory 
effects for newly learned faces.  Thus, additional load in lie trials might have 
increased task difficulty resulting in more guesses that might explain the lack of a 
significant memory effects in lie trials for newly learned faces.  It should also be 
noted that the statistics reported here are extremely conservative due to the 
number of analyses conducted and would unlikely be applied in real-world data 
analysis where data analysis selections would be more refined. 
 
In sum, fixations observed over the full trial period during both truth and lie 
trials suggest that number of fixations most consistently reveals memory for known 
faces.  The number of fixations made to familiar faces produces largest effect sizes 
for personally familiar faces (as observed in truth and lie trials) but also reveals an 
effect of memory (although small) when the face is only familiar from one brief 
study exposure.  The proportions of fixations to inner face regions appeared to be 
the most inconsistent measure of memory showing inconsistent patterns of results 
dependent on degree of familiarity and veracity.  Lying trials tended to produce less 
significant results and slightly smaller effect sizes suggesting a degree of cognitive 
interference during concealed recognition.  In most cases, however, memory effects 
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were still evident albeit slightly smaller.  Finally, average fixations duration 
indicated a small effect of memory when comparing irrelevants to familiar targets, 
but a medium effect when comparing irrelevants to probes.  The data support 
predictions that lying further increases fixation durations that serves to augment 
effect size differences between irrelevants and probes.  It is important to note the 
opposite effect that lying has on fixation quantity and its implications for specific 
fixation measures employed for memory detection.    
 
In the final two sets on analyses, the data was explored to further investigate 
the emergence of memory effects and deceptive efforts in the first three fixations 
and the last 1500 ms respectively.  This analysis was limited to irrelevants and 
personally familiar faces only.  To attempt to identify the effect of memory distinct 
from deceptive intentions, fixation durations were first compared for irrelevants 
and targets.  Since both unfamiliar irrelevants and familiar targets both require a 
dichotomous button selection, the main difference between irrelevants and probes 
is recognition for the familiar target.  To attempt to identify the additional effort 
required for deception in fixation durations, targets and probes were directly 
compared.  Since targets and probes are both familiar, and in both trials, a response 
selection was made, the main difference between the two should be addition of 
effort required for response suppression of the truth, and execution of the lie. 
 
Predictions that an effect of memory between irrelevants and targets would be 
revealed in the first three fixations was not supported by the data.  The length of 
mean fixation duration was not significantly different when comparing for honest 
identifications of familiar target faces to honest responses to unknown irrelevant 
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faces.  No distinct effect of memory was observed for targets (compared to 
irrelevants) in the first, second or third fixation.  This result was particularly 
surprising considering that differences in fixation durations between irrelevants 
and targets were observed when analysing the data for the full trial period.  The 
results suggest that the effect observed between irrelevants and targets in the data 
for the full trial period was largely driven by effort required for the planning and 
execution of response selections.   
 
Collapsing the data over the first three fixations revealed significantly longer 
fixation durations for irrelevants compared to probes, and targets compared to 
probes.  These findings suggest that efforts for response intentions significantly 
impact fixation durations from trial onset and not just prior to a response.  These 
results are inconsistent with previous research that found effects of memory in the 
first fixations (Althoff & Cohen, 1999; Ryan et al., 2007).  The present experiment, 
however, was far more complex in design.   Participants had to classify face types 
according to four different categories unfamiliar, newly learned, famous celebrities, 
and personally known as well as remembering whether the to tell the truth or lie 
about recognition, according to instruction.  The studies by Althoff and Cohen 
(1999) and Ryan and colleagues (2007), however, only required identification of 
one familiar face type amongst a series of unfamiliar faces and did not require any 
deceptive responses to conceal recognition.  The present result, however, is also not 
consistent with Schwedes & Wentura (2012) who found an effect of recognition in 
the second and third fixations when comparing fixation durations made to known 
(but not selected faces) during concealed recognition and unknown faces (also not 
selected) in an unknown condition.  It is unclear why a recognition response was not 
 91 
revealed in any of the first three fixations for the present experiment when 
Schwedes and Wentura’s (2012) found a recognition effect in the first three 
fixations for less personally significant faces.  This finding is inconsistent with our 
predictions considering that personally familiar faces should theoretically produce 
larger recognition effects.  A possible reason for the different results, as noted 
earlier, is the number of faces in the displays in the two experiments and thus the 
nature of decision making processes differed in the two experiments (absolute 
decisions in the present experiment and relative decision making in the latter).  The 
effect of task difficulty is also commented on in Schwedes and Wentura’s discussion 
on why they identified an effect of recognition in the second and third fixations and 
not the first, as in Althoff and Cohen (1999) and Ryan et al (2007). 
 
A final analysis performed on the 1500 ms before and after participants’ 
response selections investigated the effect of cognitive load when lying about 
recognition to probes, compared to correct identifications of familiar targets.  Initial 
analyses revealed that fixation durations generally increased 500 ms directly prior 
to making explicit response selections (familiar or unfamiliar) in all conditions 
(honest responses to unknown irrelevants, identification of familiar targets, and 
concealed recognition of familiar probes).  In the 500 ms prior to a response 
selection, fixations durations during concealed recognition of probes was 
significantly longer than honest responses to familiar targets.  The difference in 
fixations duration during concealment of probes support predictions that lying is 
more difficult that telling the truth and this effect of load is observed here in just 
prior to (500ms) to making a deceptive response selection (refs).  The effect of load 
during lie trials was still evident 500 ms post response and fixation durations for 
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probes were still higher than targets in the +100 ms and +1500 time bins after a 
response was made.  A trend in the data 500 ms before response selections also 
indicated that fixations durations to targets tended to be longer than to irrelevants, 
but the result was not significant after corrections for multiple comparisons. 
 
 
In sum, Experiment 1 supports that a number of different fixation behaviours 
present markers of memory during both truthful and deceptive recognition 
responses.  Results were most clear and reliable for personally familiar faces where 
memory effects were observed in the direction predicted for all fixation measures.  
One particular eye movement measure, number of fixations, most consistently 
displayed effects of memory (less fixations) for all face types with large effect sizes 
for personally known faces, but small effects for newly learned faces.  Caution is 
advised, therefore, in the use of fixation count to infer concealed memory in liars 
when faces are newly familiar (after only one brief exposure).  Although, it is likely 
that in most cases that an individual who intentionally lies about knowing a person 
involved in a crime is most likely to be more familiar with them than one brief 
exposure.  Furthermore, the proportion of fixations made to inner face regions 
appeared to be a less stable measure of memory.  The findings in the present 
experiment suggest that, although the processing of inner face regions is 
particularly important for the processing of faces (Stacey et al., 2005), it does not 
appear to be a particularly reliable measure for the purpose of memory detection.  
The analysis of fixation duration analysed across different time bins (1500 ms pre 
and post response divided into 500 ms time bins) suggested that increases in 
cognitive demands required for deceptive responses occur 500 ms before the 
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selection was made.  No early effect of memory was observed in the first fixation, or 
in the first, second and third fixations combined.  An explanation as to why no early 
effect of memory is unclear.  It is, however, apparent that the emergence of memory 
effects depend on the interaction of a number of variables that contribute to the 
overall task load and thus characteristics of fixation behaviour during the task; 
learning procedure, face familiarity and task instruction (tell the truth or lie), Future 
research should address these factors to determine designs best to reveal fixation 
that could be potentially used for memory detection in applied settings. 
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CHAPTER 3.   
 
 
 
Emphasising memory confidence and eye 
movement monitoring: 
Effects on the detection of concealed 
person recognition. 
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3.1. Introduction 
 The aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate and extend Experiment 1.  An 
entirely novel strand of Experiment 2 was to evaluate memory-based confidence 
judgements whilst participants told the truth and lied about recognition of faces that 
varied in familiarity (unfamiliar, newly learned, and personally known).  The 
current experiment explicitly emphasised the monitoring of memory confidence and 
eye movements during truths and lies about recognition.  With this manipulation it 
was intended that liars would manipulate their confidence to appear convincing 
(e.g., Tetterton, 2005) and also would be more likely to attempt control of eye 
movements during lies (Mann et al., 2013).   
 
 No research to date has explored using patterns of confidence to distinguish 
lies from truths.  Confidence in eyewitness identifications of persons involved in a 
crime remain the most common way to assess witness credibility, most likely 
because confident witnesses are very convincing to jurors (Wells & Olson, 2003).  
The legal system is painfully aware that reports of high confidence often lead to false 
incriminations and wrongful convictions (Wells et al., 1998) as well as an impaired 
ability to detect deception (Tetterton, 2005).  Neither lay people (jurors) nor 
professionals (judges, customs inspectors) are particularly skilled at distinguishing 
when others are lying (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Vrij, Mann, Kristen, & Fisher, 2007), 
particularly with respect to the confidence-accuracy relationship (DePaulo, 
Charlton, Cooper, Lindsay, & Muhlenbruck, 1997).  Liars often appear to exploit the 
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belief that high confidence reports are convincing by providing well-rehearsed, 
consistent and confident memory reports when questioned.  The present research 
attempts to turn this confidence-lie relationship around (high confidence equals 
credible witness) and assess patterns of confidence in liars to determine whether 
stereotypical patterns of confidence ratings during lies might actual distinguish 
them from truths to reveal deception. 
 
 To  examine patterns of confidence during lies and truths, the present 
experiment recorded multiple confidence indices (Sauer, Brewer, & Weber, 2008) to 
a series of singly presented faces that varied in familiarity (unfamiliar, newly 
learned, personally known).  Based on Craik & Lockhart's (1972) levels of processing 
framework (stronger memory traces equal higher confidence) we predicted that 
confidence ratings would be highest for recollection of personally known faces, and 
lower for newly learned faces and unfamiliar faces, respectively.  Patterns of 
confidence ratings for honest judgements to faces would, therefore, display 
variation depending on how well each face was remembered within and across 
groups of faces.  It is predicted that liars’ patterns of confidence ratings would not 
display the same variation as truth tellers and that an over-inflation of confidence 
ratings during lies might well reveal liars attempts to manipulate lie-detectors 
(Prediction 1a).  The second prediction was that participants’ eye movements 
during honest trials would also display variations representative of genuine 
confidence decisions that would not be evident in the eye movement patterns of 
liars (participants are presented with an on-screen scale during the request for a 
confidence rating).  Eye movements as a process tracing methodology propose that 
eye movements during decision making reflect deliberations and evaluations of 
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decision outcomes (Chua, Hannula, & Ranganath, 2012; Glaholt & Reingold, 2011; 
Russo, 2011).  The specific prediction was that fixation behaviour during lies about 
confidence would display less eye movement variability and thus distinguish lies 
from truths (Prediction 1b). 
 
Eye movements and Recognition 
 The present experiment revisited the assessment of eye movements as a 
marker of recognition with an important emphasis on the monitoring of memory 
and fixation behaviour.  In Experiment 1, no task instructions or financial incentives 
were used to manipulate participant motivation.  The post-experiment Deception 
Strategy Questionnaire revealed that few participants attempted to monitor and 
control their eye movements based on a specific strategy.  When participants were 
asked what behaviours they thought were indicative of lying, the majority (64%) of 
participants reported that they thought liars would avert their gaze.  This finding is 
consistent with previous research that lay people and professionals generally 
believe and expect that liars look away (Strömwall, Granhag, & Hartwig, 2004; 
Taylor & Hick, 2007; Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Akehurst, & Knight, 2006; Vrij, 2004).  
Surprisingly less than a third of the participants (32%) in Experiment 1 reported 
trying to employ any eye movement strategy to control their eye movements, 
suggesting that participants were treating the task as somewhat abstract.  Half of 
these participants reported trying to look less at the photograph of the face when 
lying, which was unexpected considering that the majority reported gaze aversion 
as an indicator of deceit.  This inconsistency in reported beliefs about gaze when 
lying and reports of attempted strategies by liars highlight conflicts in resolving how 
to control eye movement behaviour when the task is not interpersonal but based 
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mainly on the processing of information ( DePaulo et al., 2003; Doherty-Sneddon & 
Phelps, 2005). 
 
 The patterns of eye movement data from Experiment 1 were generally 
consistent across truth and lie trials and showed no obvious attempts to control eye 
movements, this is perhaps not surprising considering that few participants 
reported attempts to monitor and control their eye movements.  From the 
information reported by participants in Experiment 1 it is difficult to determine 
whether they were not particularly task-focused to evade deception detection or 
simply did not know how to attempt control of eye movement patterns.  Attempted 
eye movement strategies based on how an honest person might inspect a 
photograph of a known or unknown person are not intuitive, and may be 
inconsistent with beliefs about gaze in general.  Experiment 2 emphasised eye 
movement monitoring and control processes to explore whether participants in the 
present experiment would actively attempt to manipulate their eye movement 
patterns when incentivised to do so.  In laboratory-based deception studies, task 
instructions and incentives designed to motivate participants sometimes increase 
cognitive effort resulting in changes in behaviour that make lie detection easier 
(Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003; Davidson,  1968). 
 
 The ability to successfully monitor and control behaviour during a lie is a key 
component to its success (Zuckerman & Driver, 1985; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & 
Rosenthal, 1981).  The mere act of deception is demanding because liars have to 
suppress the truth in order to successfully execute the lie (Spence et al., 2001; Vrij, 
Fisher, et al., 2006).  Lying is made further difficult by attempts to monitor and 
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control behaviours consistent with beliefs about how liars behave and strategies 
employed to counteract these (DePaulo et al., 2003).  Experiment 1 suggested that 
mere cognitive load during concealed recognition of newly learned faces interfered 
with eye movements patterns and thus reduced the difference in fixation behaviour 
between irrelevants and probes on which memory detection is typically based.  The 
eye movement data for personally known faces however appeared less vulnerable 
to effects of load when lying.  By motivating people to consciously think about their 
behaviour, the present research increased the cognitive load of lying and 
investigated whether that increased cognitive load impacted evidence for concealed 
recognition.  
 
In the present experiment participants were instructed that, in both 
recognition and confidence judgements, the task was to appear honest during truths 
and lies and that verbal, button press and eye movement responses would be 
monitored.  Participants were advised that the experimenter-examiner would assess 
their guilt based on patterns of eye movements (where they looked, for how long, 
and distribution of fixations) and, if they successfully evaded lie detection, they 
would receive a £5 reward.  Only one eye-movement-based mock crime study has 
explored the effect of eye movement monitoring and motivation on fixation 
behaviour (Cook, Hacker, Webb, Osher, Kristjansson, Woltz, Kircher, et al., 2012).   
 
 It is difficult to predict how, and indeed, if, examinees might try to control 
their oculomotor behaviour under the very specific set of circumstances posed in 
the present experiment.  Eye movement research suggests that demand on working 
memory slows down task performance and thus leads to an increase in fixation 
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behaviour (Cook, Hacker, Webb, Osher, Kristjansson, Woltz, Kircher, et al., 2012; 
Zenzi M Griffin & Oppenheimer, 2006; Zenzi M Griffin, 2004; J M Henderson, 1992; 
Meyer & van der Meulen, 2000; Rayner, 1998).  Research on cognitive load and 
interpersonal gaze supports that people often automatically avert their gaze 
(visually disengage) when they experience cognitive load in a bid to free up working 
memory process (Doherty-Sneddon, Bruce, Bonner, Longbotham, & Doyle, 2002; 
Doherty-Sneddon & Phelps, 2005).  However, if metacognitive strategies for 
problem solving (such as evading lie detection) are based on knowledge about social 
gaze (e.g., liars look away; Stromwall et al, 2004; Taylor and Hick, 2007; Vrij, 2004, 
2008; Vrij et al, 2006, 2010), then participants might try to regulate their eye 
movements based on these beliefs (i.e., stay focussed on screen, maintain consistent 
responding).  It is possible, however, that efforts to control eye movement 
behaviour might incur further cognitive demands that result in more visual 
disengagement.  Such ironic effects of attempted mental control over action, in that 
behaviours sometimes represent the opposite of what they intended to do, are 
neatly outlined by Wegner’s ironic processing theory (Wegner, 1994; Wegner, 
Ansfield, & Pilloff, 1998).  In the field of eye movement monitoring there is a lack of 
information concerning the extent to which people have volitional control over their 
eye movements and under what conditions.  Hence, the question in the present 
experiment was whether participants attempted to control their eye movements 
during lies and whether their selected strategy impacted on patterns of recognition 
in eye movement behaviour.   
 
 Both Althoff and Cohen (1999) and Ryan and colleagues (2007) propose that 
memory effects for familiar faces  are an obligatory consequence of previous 
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exposure.  Rayner also proposed that the ability to consciously control or 
manipulate individual fixations during processing of visual information is physically 
difficult, if not impossible (Henderson, 1992; Rayner, 1998).  However, it is well 
established that eye movements are not only based upon cognitive factors such as 
previous experience (Antes, 1974; Buswell, 1935; Henderson et al., 1999; Loftus & 
Mackworth, 1978; Mackworth & Morandi, 1967; Parker, 1978), they are also subject 
to shifts in attention driven by explicit task instructions (e.g., Yarbus, 1967). 
 
 In one experiment, Althoff and Cohen (1999) explicitly instructed 
participants to adopt specific eye movement strategies when viewing both familiar  
(famous) and unfamiliar faces.  The intentional strategies included a reading-like 
strategy (move eyes across the face from left to right, starting at the top and 
finishing at the bottom) and a features strategy (fixate features in a particular order; 
i.e., top of head, left ear, left eye, right eye, right ear, nose, mouth, chin).  Eye 
movement patterns were compared during intentional strategies compared to free 
viewing of the faces.  Intentional strategies significantly increased viewing 
behaviour similar to optimal extraction eye movement patterns observed during 
processing of unfamiliar faces (i.e., number of fixations, number of regions).  The 
proportion of fixations directed to the inner regions of the face, however, still 
distinguished famous from unfamiliar.  The finding suggest that some eye movement 
variables are more resistant to manipulations than others.  The research however 
did not explore intentional gaze strategies during concealed recognition of known 
faces. 
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 One eye-movement-based deception study elaborated task instructions to 
guide participants’ behaviour (Cook et al., 2012).  Guilty participants took part in a 
mock crime whereas innocents were given a general description of the crime but did 
not enact it.  Participants made true/false mouse click responses to single 
statements presented on a computer screen related to their involvement in the 
crime.  The task brief explicitly instructed that all participants should respond to 
test statements as quickly and accurately as possible because delays in responding or 
errors could be taken as indicators of deception.  Guilty and innocent participants’ 
reading behaviours were recorded while they responded to statements about a 
mock crime via a computerized questionnaire.   
 
 As a general measure of processing difficulty the researchers measured the 
overall number of fixations made to the statement before making their response.  In 
addition, they analysed the time spent fixating on the text during the first reading of 
it (ms per character) and then the re-reading of it after looking away from the text.  
These analyses allowed consideration of cognitive effort overall during the first 
reading of the statement and subsequently any delayed difficulty associated with the 
task during re-reading.  Consistent with predictions based upon the cognitive 
workload hypothesis, guilty participants made more fixations per character than did 
innocent participants.  Guilty participants also displayed longer first pass reading 
times on average than did innocent participants.  No main effect of guilt was found 
in the analysis of second pass, re-reading times.   
 
 Surprising results, however, were found in the interaction between guilt and 
statement type in the reading and re-reading data.  Contrary to the hypotheses, 
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guilty participants’ first pass reading times for crime related probe items where 
shorter than when they responded to neutral fillers.  As expected, innocents’ first 
pass durations did not vary as a function of statement type.  In addition, second pass 
rereading times were shorter for guilty participants when re-reading critical probe 
items as compared to neutral (irrelevant) items.  The data suggest evidence of 
strategic monitoring and control of reading and re-reading behaviours in the eye 
movements of guilty participants.  Consistent with the task instruction regarding 
speed and honesty, guilty participants appeared to intentionally read faster and 
minimise re-reading to appear honest.  The data suggest increased cognitive effort 
partly as a consequence of response inhibition in the main effect of guilt.  
Furthermore, the interactions reveal quite novel data patterns suggesting an ability 
to monitor and control eye movement behaviour based on the instruction to 
respond quickly and as accurately as possible so as not to appear guilty.  Finally, the 
researchers also varied financial incentive ($30 vs. $1) as a means to manipulate 
motivation.  Results suggested that motivation interacted with guilt and number of 
fixations, such that there was less difference between guilty and innocent 
participants’ fixation behaviour in the low motivation condition than the high 
motivation condition.  The authors also note that the financial incentive 
manipulation had a greater effect on innocent participants than guilty participants 
suggesting that guilty participants were already motivated to manipulate fixation 
behaviour to a degree more than less motivated innocent participants. 
 
 The present research differed from the Cook et al. (2012) study in several 
important respects.  First and foremost, Experiment 2 generally emphasised 
monitoring of memory and fixation behaviour during truths and lies and that these 
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would be used to assess deception (compared to specifically instructing participants 
that innocence was associated with speed and accuracy).  The effect of cognitive 
load on multiple fixation behaviours was examined during presentation of 
photographs of people that varied in familiarity (compared to statements that 
varied in complexity).  The assessment of memory during revealed (truths) and 
concealed (lies) information was analysed as using the following measures and 
stimuli comparisons: 
 
 As in Experiment 1, predictions were that the quantity of fixations would be 
fewer and distribution of viewing less dispersed during reprocessing of a familiar 
face compared to first-time processing of an unfamiliar face.  The familiar-unfamiliar 
(Target-Irrelevant) difference would display a memory effect as manifested in fewer 
fixations to fewer regions of the face during processing (Althoff & Cohen, 1999; 
Heisz & Shore, 2008) (Prediction 2a).  Second, this Target-Irrelevant difference 
would be largest for personally known compared to newly learned faces  making the 
memory effect more reliable for highly familiar faces (Meijer et al., 2007; Ryan et al., 
2007) (Prediction 2b).   
 
 Prediction based on cognitive load during concealed recognition are also 
subdivided into two parts: Increased cognitive load during concealed recognition 
will increase fixation behaviour and potentially weaken/interfere with the memory 
effect, as a result of a smaller Probe-Irrelevant difference (compared to the Target-
Irrelevant difference) (Prediction 3a).  Consistent with the predictions that the 
memory effect will be strongest for well-known faces, it was predicted that 
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concealed recognition of personally known faces would be less susceptible to 
cognitive interference compared to newly learned faces (Prediction 3b).  
 
 Predictions based on fixation durations were also the same as Experiment 1 
(Ryan et al., 2007; Schwedes & Wentura, 2012).  Participants’ fixation durations 
would be longer when viewing familiar faces compared to unfamiliar faces (Target-
Irrelevant difference) (Prediction 4a).  The Target-Irrelevant difference would be 
larger between personally known and unknown faces, compared to newly-learned 
and unknown faces (Prediction 4b).  Fixation duration-based effects will be 
observed in two different analyses (Ryan et al., 2007; Schwedes & Wentura, 2012).  
Recognition effects will be observed in the First Three Fixations of each trial, 
whereas effect of response intentions will be observed in the Last 1500 ms before 
the response is made (Prediction 4c).  An increase in cognitive load during 
concealed recognition of the familiar face would increase fixation duration and thus 
the Probe-Irrelevant difference for fixation duration would be greater than for 
Target-Irrelevant comparisons, potentially making the Probe-Irrelevant distinction 
in deceptive trials easier than the Target-Irrelevant distinction in honest trials 
(Prediction 3d).     
 
 No single prediction was made in relation to the effect of intentional 
strategies on eye movements.  Predictions based on the beliefs that liars look away 
might result in liars deliberately trying to look more at the faces when they conceal 
recognition of (Mann et al., 2012, 2013; Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 2010).  Whereas 
predictions based on the beliefs that liars experience cognitive difficulty and thus 
take longer to respond (Walczyk et al., 2003), might result in liars intentionally 
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averting their gaze so as not to give anything away in their on-screen gaze 
behaviour.  Either way, ironic effects of mental strategies on actions may result in 
behaviour counter to that intended (Wegner et al., 1998).   
 
 In sum, the predictions are that liars will display less variability in their 
verbal confidence judgements (1a) and associated eye movements (1b), which will 
expose their deceit when they lie, stating that they do not recognise a known face.  
Recognition of familiar faces will produce a decrease in the quantity and distribution 
of fixation behaviour that will be consistent with revealed recognition of familiar 
faces, but that will betray explicit denial of recognition (2a).  Eye movement-based 
memory effects will be most pronounced for personally known faces (2b).   
 
 Fixation data will be similar for both truths and lies but increased cognitive 
load during lies might increase fixation behaviour and potentially diminish the 
ability of eye movements to distinguish actual unknown faces from those the liar 
declared they do not know (3a).  Eye movement-based memory effects for 
personally familiar faces will be most resilient to cognitive interference during lies 
(3b).  An increase in mean fixation durations will also indicate recognition of 
familiar faces during truths and expose lies (4a).  Fixation durations will be longest 
for personally known faces (4b).  Increased fixation durations will be observed 
during recognition in the first three fixations and response inhibition in the last 
1500 ms respectively, before the recognition judgement is made (4c).  Cognitive 
load experienced during lies might increase fixation duration and serve to augment 
the recognition effect for memory detection during lies (Griffin & Oppenheimer, 
2006).  
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3.2. Method 
3.2.1. Participants 
33 undergraduate students (26 females, 7 males) participated in the 
experiment.  Participant ages ranged from 19 to 21 years (M = 20.3, SD = 1.9).  All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were awarded £5 
remuneration for their participation.  Participants were specifically recruited from 
the same pre-existing tutor groups as Experiment 1 (established at the start of term 
by random allocation to class lists) to ensure a baseline of real world familiarity.  At 
the time of Experiment 2, participants had been personally acquainted with fellow 
tutees for approximately five months. 
 
3.2.2. Design 
The research used a modified Concealed Information Test during which 
participants lied and told the truth about recognising different types of familiar 
faces (newly learned, personally known).  In a sequential presentation, participants 
were randomly presented with a series of singly presented colour photographs of 
faces: unfamiliar faces and three different types of familiar faces to which they made 
‘familiar’ or ‘unfamiliar’ button press responses.  A nested within-subjects design 
independently manipulated Task Instruction (2 levels: Lie, Truth) and Familiar Face 
Type (4 levels: Unfamiliar, Familiar-Learned, Familiar-Famous, and Familiar-
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Personal).  Instructions varied by three different blocks of trials.  In the first block, 
participants were required to respond honestly to all trials.  The honest block 
served as a practice session and was not analysed for the purpose of this 
experiment.  Two lying condition blocks followed: In the lying blocks participants 
were asked to lie in turn about the two different types of familiar faces: Familiar-
learned (Lie-learned), or Familiar-personal (Lie-personal).  In these lying blocks, 
participants lied about only one type of familiar face, whilst telling the truth about 
all the others.  For example in the Lie-Personal block, every time the participant saw 
a photograph of a personally familiar face they had to lie and make an unfamiliar 
response by pressing the appointed button on the game port.  When presented with 
Familiar-Learned photographs within this block, however, the participant honestly 
indicated that they were familiar.  Presentations of unfamiliar faces always required 
an honest unfamiliar response.  To reduce the length of the present experiment, 
participants did not complete a block where they were asked to lie about celebrity 
famous faces.  Familiar-Famous faces were included in the presentation trials so that 
the number of test trials in each block (N=40) was consistent in Experiments 1 and 
2.  There were equal numbers (4 x 10) of each face type in each block of trials.  Lie-
learned and Lie-personal blocks were counter-balanced.  
 
 
3.2.3. Apparatus and Materials 
Apparatus  
As in Experiment 1, participant’s eye movements were tracked using the 
Eyelink II head mounted eye tracker (SR Research, Canada).  The mean image size 
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was 5.53° of visual angle (SD = 6.83; mean image size taken from a sample of 24 
representative images from all face types).  Manual button press responses were 
collected by a Microsoft Sidewinder Plug-and-Play game pad and relayed back to the 
host computer.  The button assigned to familiarity was counterbalanced for hand 
dominance.  Sixteen out of 27 participants used their dominant hand for familiarity, 
11 used their non-dominant hand (25 were right handed and 2 left-handed).  
 
Photographs 
A total of 120 digital colour photographs of faces were presented to each 
participant over three blocks of test trials (40 photos x 3 blocks).  All photographs 
were portraits showing the full face of a person with a neutral expression and eye 
gaze towards the camera.  Forty test photographs were presented in each block of 
trials that comprised 10 Unfamiliar faces (UF), 10 Familiar- Learned (F-L), 10 
Familiar- Famous (F-F) and 10 Familiar- Personal (F-P).   
 
As in Experiment 1, the appearance of all photographs were standardised 
using Adobe Photoshop Elements (Version 2.0) and Adobe Photoshop CS4 on a blue 
background (HEX: 377BE8) measuring (640 x 480 px).  Photographs were 
presented using Experiment Builder (Version 1.6.121, SR Research) on a desktop 
computer linked to a 19-inch CRT Monitor (model, G90FB; resolution, 1280 x 1024 
pixels; refresh rate 89Hz).  Images were presented randomly to the left (292, 292) 
or the right side (704, 292) of the screen to minimise anticipatory guessing 
behaviour of picture location.   
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Unfamiliar faces (UF) were sourced from the unfamiliar face database 
created for Experiment One (see Section 2.2.3).  Familiar- Learned (F-L) faces were 
familiarised using a learn-to-criterion procedure (Schyns, Bonnar, & Gosselin, 2002) 
directly before performing the actual mCIT (see procedure).  Familiar- Famous (F-F) 
faces were contemporary celebrities faces sourced on the internet, Familiar- 
Personal faces were photographs of the student participants from Experiment 1.  
 
 
3.2.4. Procedure 
Participants were seated in a controlled, quiet and dimly lit room at a 
distance of 0.80m from the display screen.  Light levels were carefully controlled for 
all participants.  The Eyelink II headband was comfortably secured to the 
participant’s head.  Retinal and corneal reflections induced by an infrared source 
were recorded at a frequency of 250Hz (Pupil-CR mode) and 500Hz (Pupil only) to 
obtain participants’ points of fixation on the screen (error of resolution: 0.5°-1.0°). 
 
Rate personally known faces: Prior to the CIT, participants were presented 
with photographs of personally familiar classmates on a paper hand out.  
Participants were asked to look at each face in turn and to indicate, yes or no, if they 
recognised the person in the photograph.  The participant also rated each 
photograph for familiarity (1 = not at all familiar; 7 = most familiar), to note from 
where the person was originally known, and, if possible, to note down their name.  
To encourage re-processing of the image they were also asked to record the gender, 
eye colour and hair colour as they appeared in the photograph.  Rating taken prior 
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to the experiment confirmed personally known group members as familiar (M = 
4.90, SD = 0.82) and that mean familiarity did not significantly different to ratings 
taken at the time of experiment one, t(26) = 1.56, p = 0.131. 
 
Study Phase: Prior to the CIT, participants were shown ten photographs of 
unfamiliar faces and asked to learn them to memory for the purpose of the task.  
Unfamiliar faces were presented on ten individual colour photographs cards 
(dimensions).  These were laid out on the table in front of the participant who was 
asked to study them until they had learned them to memory.  A name was then 
placed below each photograph and participants were then instructed to learn which 
name belonged to each face.  Once the participant indicated that they had learned 
the face-name pairings the face and name cards were shuffled and handed back to 
the participant.  The participant had to match each face to each name correctly.  The 
criterion for learning was that participants pair all faces and names correctly 100% 
twice consecutively. This learn-to-criterion procedure was based on previous face 
research (Schyns et al., 2002).  The learn-to-criterion procedure was introduced in 
the present experiment to ensure learning and to meet the conditions of previous 
experiments that documented robust effects of memory after three exposures to 
previously unfamiliar faces (Althoff et al., 1999; Althoff, 1998).  There was no time 
limit for the successful completion of the study phase.  Upon completion, 
participants’ eye movements were calibrated for accurate eye movement 
monitoring by the eye tracker.  
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Calibration: Eye position was calibrated prior to each test block using a 3 x 3 
dot array and, where necessary, in between condition blocks.  To calibrate, a black 
dot with a white centre was presented in middle of the screen.  Upon request, the 
participant fixated the white centre of the black dot.  Once the participant steadily 
fixated on the dot, the experimenter accepted the fixation by pressing a button on 
the host computer.  Once the initial fixation was accepted the same dot was 
displayed randomly, one location at a time, using a 3x3 array.  The host computer 
was operated by the experimenter and was positioned behind the participant and 
the display computer. 
 
Following calibration, and directly prior to the test phase, participants were 
informed that eye movements were carefully monitored by the experimenter-
observer with the explicit purpose of detecting their deception.  They were advised 
that the experimenter would be recording a number of eye movement behaviours 
such as, where they looked on the screen, for how long, how often they looked away 
and looked back, and that this was being done from a separate host computer 
behind them.  They were not advised at any point at what eye movement behaviours 
might indicate deception or to adopt any specific eye movement strategies.  The 
emphasis on the monitoring of eye movements aimed to increase awareness of the 
monitoring process to explore whether this triggered any specific strategies to avoid 
detection.   
 
 
Test Phase: During the mCIT, participants were presented with a sequence of 
40 full face colour photographs.  Prior to the display of each face a fixation dot was 
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shown in the centre of the screen to correct any drift in eye movements following 
the initial calibration.  Within each condition block Unfamiliar (10), Familiar-
Learned (10), Familiar-Famous (10) and Familiar-Personal (10) faces were displayed 
to the participant randomly.  Participants responded by making a dichotomous 
‘familiar’ or ‘unfamiliar’ button press response whilst at the same time verbalising 
their response.  After the button press was made, a confidence scale was presented.  
Participant were instructed to look at the scale (0-100%) and decide how confident 
they were about their previous familiarity judgement.  Participants indicated their 
confidence judgement by pressing a trigger button on the game pad (any) whilst 
verbalising there rating (numerators of ten, i.e., “ninety”).  There was no upper time 
limit for recognition or confidence judgements.  The sequence was repeated for each 
of the 40 trials over the three condition blocks. 
 
 
Figure 3. 1. The display sequence for each trial commenced with the presentation of a fixation dot 
followed by a photograph of an unfamiliar or familiar face until the participant made a 
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familiar/unfamiliar response.  After each face recognition trial a confidence scale was presented 
during which the participant had to provide a confidence rating ranging from 0-100% in numerators 
of 10 (e.g., fifty). 
 
Instructions varied by three different blocks of trials.  In the first block, 
participants were required to respond honestly to all trials.  Then followed two lying 
blocks during which participants lied, in turn, about the two different types of 
familiar faces.  The two lying conditions were named Lie-Learned and Lie-Personal.  
The Lie-Learned condition required that participants lie about the faces that they 
learned during the study phases, whilst telling the truth about all other faces types; 
during the Lie-personal to lie about personally known faces whilst telling the truth 
about all other face types.  To emphasise, in the lying conditions, participants made 
both honest and dishonest responses but lied about only one specific group of 
familiar face in each condition block (Familiar-Learned or Familiar-Personal).  After 
the completion of all trials, participants were administered with a Deception 
Strategies Questionnaire to record whether participants tried to evade detection by 
employing specific eye movement strategies. 
 
3.2.5. Data preparation: Defining a-Priori Interest 
Areas (IAs) 
 
Faces: Consistent with previous research (i.e., Walker-Smith, Gale & Findlay, 1977; 
Bate, Haslam, Tree & Hodgson, 2008) and Experiment 1, five areas of interest were 
defined: right eye (left side of visual space), left eye (right side of visual space), nose, 
mouth, and outer.  The eyes, nose and mouth were grouped for analysis of the 
proportion of fixations made to the inner region of the face.   
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Confidence Screens: To analyse the sampling distribution of eye movements during 
confidence judgements, boxes were drawn around each confidence decision box to 
created 11 interest areas: 0%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90%, 
100%.  This allowed calculation of the number of interest areas (IAs) fixated on 
viewed during deliberation of each confidence rating.  
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Figure 3. 2. The display sequence for each trial commenced with the presentation of a fixation dot 
followed by a photograph of an unfamiliar or familiar face until the participant made a 
familiar/unfamiliar response.  After each face recognition trial a confidence scale was presented 
during which the participant had to provide a confidence rating ranging from 0-100% in numerators 
of 10 (e.g., fifty). 
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3.2.6. Analysis Strategy 
 
Confidence judgements: Verbal confidence ratings ranged from 0-100% in 
multiples of ten, such that each participant selected one out of eleven possible 
confidence judgements for each trial (0%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 
80%, 90%, 100%).   
 
Eye movement variability behaviour was defined according to how many IAs 
of the confidence scale were fixated before the verbal rating.   The possible number 
of IAs visited ranged from one to eleven (see Figure 3.2).  As with the chosen 
confidence being less variable when a person is lying, we would expect the number 
of IAs looked at during this time also to be less variable, thus the variance of IAs 
visited was analysed.  Variability in mean verbal confidence and eye movements 
were analysed by entering SDs as the unit of analysis in RM ANOVAs (see also 
Johnson et al., 2003; Leongómez et al., 2014).  Multiple RM ANOVA were performed 
on the verbal and eye movement data.  (1) Truth data with 1 within subjects task 
instruction manipulation (3 levels: Truth-Unfamiliar, Truth-Learned, Truth-
Personal).  (2) Lie data with 1 within subjects task instruction manipulation (3 
levels: Truth-Unfamiliar, Lie-Learned, Lie-Personal).  (3)  Truth and Lie data were 
analysed with 2 within subjects factors, Task Instruction (2 levels: Truth, Lie) and 
Face Type (2 levels: newly learned, personally known).  The condition order of trial 
block presentation was entered as a between subjects factor into each analysis, no 
main effects were found. 
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 Fixation quantity and distribution were analysed with multiple RM ANOVAs 
on four different fixation measures: the number of total fixations made to the face 
(Num. Fixations), the number of runs made on the face (Run Count), the number of 
interest areas on the face visited (IAs Visited), and the proportion of fixations made 
to the inner regions of the face (Prop. Inner).  Separate RM ANOVAS were performed 
first on the truth data (Irrelevants and Targets) with 1 x within subjects factor, Task 
Instruction (3 levels: Truth-Unfamiliar, Truth-Learned, Truth-Personal), then on the 
lie data (Irrelevants and Probes) also with 1 x with subjects factor (3 levels: Truth-
Unfamiliar, Lie-Learned, Lie-Personal).  Further RM-ANOVAs were performed on the 
same four fixation measures with 2 within subjects factors, Task Instruction 
Condition (2 levels: conceal recognition, reveal recognition) and Familiar Face Type 
(2 levels: Familiar-Learned and Familiar-Personal) (Targets and Probes). 
   
 
 Fixation Durations: Fixation durations were analysed for the (1) First Three 
Fixations and (2) Last 1500 ms of the decision making process to differentiate 
cognitive load factors linked to recognition and response intentions respectively.  For 
each set of analyses, post hoc paired sample t-tests tests were performed on the 
same comparisons as those for fixation quantity and distribution; Target-Irrelevant, 
Probe-Irrelevant, and Probe-Target. 
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3.3. Results 
As in Experiment 1, where Mauchley’s Test of Sphericity were violated, RM 
ANOVAs were calculated using Greenhouse Geisser adjustments to degrees of 
freedom (df).  The corrected p value and Greenhouse Geisser epsilon (ε) are 
reported for F tests.  Post hoc tests were performed using paired sample t-tests.  
Adjusted p values (α) are denoted in each relevant figure caption for the number of 
post hoc tests conducted.  The use of Bonferroni comparisons for correcting 
multiple tests on multiple fixations measures is consistent with other eye movement 
research using similar analyses as the current thesis (Hannula et al., 2012, 2007; 
Hannula & Ranganath, 2009). 
 
3.3.1. Exclusion Criteria 
Data was analysed for 27 participants.  Six (4 females, 2 males) of the original 
33 participants were removed from the data set for the following reasons; technical 
difficulties that resulted in loss of data (4) and failure to complete the task according 
to instructions (2).  As in Experiment 1, individual trials were also removed from the 
analyses if the participant responded incorrectly to the face or presented outliers in 
the reaction time data (less than 300 ms or more than 5000 ms).   
 
Error rates were low across all trials: Familiar-Learned (truths, 4.07%, lies, 
1.48%) Familiar-Personal (truths 1.85%, lies 4.07%) and unknown faces (truths 
7.04%).  This left 3040 trials out of the original 3240.  Similar to previous research 
(Greenwald, Nosek, Banaji, 2003; Verschuere, Spruyt, Meijer & Orgaar, 2011) 
outliers in the reaction time data were removed if they were faster or slower than 
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specific set thresholds (acceptable range for present data, <300 ms or >5000 ms).  
This removed a further 30 trials (0.93%) leaving a total of 3010 trials out of the 
original 3240.   
 
3.3.2. Confidence Ratings 
 
Truths: (Irrelevants and Targets). Task instruction manipulation had no effect 
on mean variability in verbal confidence ratings across honest trials, F(2,50) = 1.74 
p = 0.186, ηp2 = 0.01 (see Figure 3.3).   
 
Lies: (Irrelevants and Probes). Task instruction manipulation had a significant 
effect on mean variability of confidence ratings, F(2,50) = 5.14, p = 0.009, ηp2 = 0.17.  
Lies about personally known probe faces produced less variability (M = 4.79, SEM = 
1.12) than truths about unknown, irrelevant faces (M = 8.16, SEM = 1.62), t(26) = 
2.99, p = 0.006, d = 0.46; the effect size was medium.  A non-significant trend 
between newly learned probes and irrelevants, t(26) = 1.98, p = 0.058, d = 0.24 also 
revealed less variability in confidence during lies about newly learned faces (M = 
6.21, SEM = 1.48); the effect size was small (see Figure 3.3).   
 
Truths and Lies (Targets and Probes).  There was no main effect of task 
instruction, F(1,25) = 4.19, p = 0.051, ηp2 = 0.14, face type, F(1,25) = 0.09, p = 0.766, 
ηp2 < 0.01, or any interaction between the two, F(1, 25) = 0.25, p = 0.595, ηp2 = 0.01 
(see Figure 3.3). 
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In sum, it appear that liars displayed less variability in their verbal 
confidence ratings when lying about recognising personally known faces compared 
to honest judgements of unknown faces.  A non-significant trend also suggests that 
liars display less variability, albeit a small effect, in patterns of confidence ratings for 
newly learned compared to unknown faces.  Variability in truth data did not differed 
significantly to the degree that liars’ confidence ratings did. 
 
 
Figure 3. 3. RM ANOVAs for variability in verbal confidence ratings (SD), (d.f. = 26 in each case with 
Bonferroni adjustments for multiple paired sample t-tests (α=0.017).  The y-axis shows data for 
unfamiliar faces (UF), newly learned faces (F-L) and personally familiar (F-P) faces.  In each graph, 
the unfamiliar (UF) irrelevants (white bars) are the comparison point for all truth (grey) and lie data 
(blue).  P<0.01**. 
 
3.3.3. Eye Movements (Inspection of confidence scale) 
 
Truths: (Irrelevants and Targets).  Task instruction condition had a significant 
effect on viewing of the confidence scale across truth trials, F(2,50) = 7.60, p = 0.001,  
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ηp2 = 0.23.  Recognition of personally known faces produced less variability in 
number of IAs visited (M = 0.62, SEM = 0.04) than classification of unknown faces (M 
= 0.79, SEM = 0.05), t(3.73, p = 0.009, d = 0.84), with a large effect size.  Recognition 
of newly learned faces did not produce less variability (M = 0.74, SEM = 0.05) in eye 
movements compared to unknown faces, t(26) = 1.13, p = 0.267 (Figure 3.4). 
 
Lies: (Irrelevants and Probes).   A trend in the data suggest task instruction 
manipulation had a medium sized effect on eye movement variability, F(2, 50) = 
2.73, p = 0.075, ηp2 = 0.10.  Exploratory t-tests indicated that mean variability was 
lower for lies about personally known faces (M = 0.65, SEM = 0.05) than for correct 
rejection of unknown faces (M = 0.79, SEM = 0.05), t(26) = 2.23, p = 0.035, d = 0.57, 
with a medium effect size.  Mean variability was also lower during lies about newly 
learned faces (M = 0.70, SEM = 0.04) than unknown faces, t(26) = 2.54, p = 0.017, d = 
0.41, also with an effect size approaching medium (Figure 2.4). 
 
Truths and Lies (Targets and Probes).  There were no main effects of task 
instruction, F(1, 25) = 0.16, p = 0.691, ηp2 = 0.01, or face type, F(1, 25) = 4.10, p = 
0.05, ηp2 = 0.14,  nor an interaction between the two, F(1, 25) = 1.91, p = 0.179, ηp2 
= 0.07 (Figure 3.4). 
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Figure 3. 4. RM ANOVAs for variability in eye movements during inspection of the confidence scale 
(d.f. = 26 in each case with Bonferroni adjustments for multiple paired sample t-tests (α=0.017)).  
The y-axis shows data for unfamiliar faces (UF), newly learned faces (F-L), and personally familiar (F-
P) faces.  In each graph, the unfamiliar (UF) irrelevants (white bars) are the comparison point for all 
truth (grey) and lie data (blue).  p < 0.01**, p < 0.05*. 
 
 
3.3.4. Fixation Quantity (face recognition task) 
 
Truths: (Irrelevants and Targets).  
There were significant, large effects of task instruction manipulation on all four 
measures: Num. Fixations, F(1.54, 38.37) = 17.03, p < 0.001,  ηp2 = 0.41, Run Count, 
F(2,50) = 29.99, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.55, IAs Visited, F(2,50) = 23.18, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 
0.48, Prop. Fixations Inner, F(2,50) = 8.12, p = 0.001, ηp2 = 0.25 (see Figure 3.5). 
 
Newly Learned.  There was no significant difference on any of the four 
measures during recognition of newly learned faces compared to irrelevants; Num. 
Fixations, t(26) = 1.66, p = 0.108, d = 0.21, Run Count, t(26) = 0.88, p = 0.387, d = 
 124 
0.11, IAs Visited, t(26)=0.27, p = 0.79, d = 0.03, Prop. Fixations Inner, t(26)=1.30, p = 
0.206, d = 0.26.   
 
Personally known.  There was a reduction in fixation quantity on all four 
measures during recognition of personally known probes compared to irrelevants; 
Num. Fixations, t(26) = 4.74, p < 0.001, d = 0.88, Run Count, t(26) = 5.62, p <  0.001, 
d = 1.05, IAs Visited, t(26)=5.23, p <  0.001, d = 1.01, Prop. Fixations Inner, 
t(26)=3.39, p =  0.002, d = 0.62.  Effect sizes were large overall, with the exception of 
a medium sized effect for Prop. Inner.  
 
 
Figure 3. 5. RM ANOVAs for fixation measures, Num. Fixations, Run Count, IAs Visited, Prop. Fixations 
Inner (d.f. = 26 in each case, no effect of condition order), with Bonferroni adjustments for multiple 
paired sample t-tests (α=0.017).  The y-axis shows data for unfamiliar faces (UF), newly learned faces 
(F-L), and personally familiar (F-P) faces.  In each graph, the unfamiliar (UF) irrelevants (white bars) 
are the comparison point for all truth (grey) and lie data (blue).  p<0.001***, p<0.01**. Error bars 
represent M±SEM. 
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Lies: (Irrelevants and Probes).  
Significant effects of task instruction manipulation were found in all eye four 
measures; Num. Fixations, F(2,50) = 25.55, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.51, Run Count, F(2,50) 
= 18.90, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.43, IAs Visited, F(2,50) = 17.82, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.42 and 
Prop. Fixations Inner, F(1.49,37.26) = 7.32, p = 0.004, ηp2 = 0.23.  Effect sizes varied.  
Largest effects were found for Num. Fixations and smallest for Prop. Inner (see 
Figure 3.5). 
 
Personally known.  There were large, significant decrease in fixation quantity 
during recognition of personally familiar faces also during lie trials: Num. Fixations, 
t(26) = 6.37, p < 0.001, d = 0.85 and Run Count, t(26) = 5.80, p < 0.001, d = 0.93, IAs 
Visited, t(26) = 5.31, p < 0.001, d = 1.03.  Medium sized effects of memory were also 
found in the measure Proportion Fixations Inner, t(26) = 1.93, p = 0.065, d = 0.41, 
but this did not meet criteria for typical levels of significance (p < 0.05) despite 
effect size calculations that approached a moderate effect size. 
 
Newly learned.  There were significant differences in two of the fixation 
measures; Num. Fixations, t(26) 4.43, p < 0.001, d = 0.53, and Run Counts, t(26) = 
2.72, p = 0.011, d = 0.36 were significantly fewer during recognition of newly 
learned faces.  Significant differences were found for Prop. Inner, t(26) = 2.88, p = 
0.008, d = 0.48 but in the direction opposite to predicted.  A larger proportion of 
fixations were directed to the inner face regions when lying about newly learned 
faces compared to telling the truth about unknown faces.  There was no significant 
difference for IAs Visited, t(26) = 0.85, p = 0.402, d = 0.12.  Effect size was largest for 
Num. Fixations (medium). 
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Truths and Lies (Targets and Probes) 
The interaction between task instruction (2 levels: truth, lie)  x 2 face type (2 
levels: Familiar-Learned, Familiar-Personal) revealed significant differences in Num. 
Fixations, F(1,26) = 7.30, p = 0.012, ηp2 = 0.22, and Run Counts, F(1,26) = 9.60, p = 
0.005, ηp2 = 0.27 (see Figure 3.5). 
 
Participants made less fixations, t(26) = 4.03, p < 0.001, d = 0.41, and less 
runs, t(26) = 3.77, p = 0.001, d = 0.53 during concealed recognition of newly learned 
faces, compared to honest, revealed recognition.  No such effects were present in 
comparisons of concealed and revealed recognition of personally known faces in 
either Num. Fixations, t(26) = 0.90, p = 0.376, d = 0.13, or Run Count, t(26) = 0.50, p 
= 0.623, d = 0.10. 
 
3.3.5. Fixation Duration 
Separate RM ANOVAs were performed on the fixation data for (1) The First 
Three Fixations and (2) The Last 1500 ms.  Within subjects factors for the first three 
fixations were Task Instruction (3 levels: Truth-Irrelevant, Truth-Target, Lie-Probe) 
x Fixation (3 levels: First, Second, Third).  Within subjects factors for the last 1500 
ms were Task Instruction (3 levels: Truth-Irrelevant, Truth-Target, Lie-Probe) and 
Time Bin (-1500, -1000, -500) (see Figure 3.6). 
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First three fixations  
 
Newly learned.  Analyses revealed no main effect of Task Instruction 
condition, F(2,52) = 0.42, p = 0.657, ηp2 = 0.02, a significant main effect of Fixation, 
F(2,52) = 17.28, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.40), but no interaction, F(2.27,59.10) = 2.26, p = 
0.107, ηp2 = 0.08).  The main effect of fixation revealed that fixation two was longer 
than both fixation one, t(26) = 6.94, p < 0.001, d = 1.34, and fixation three, t(26) = 
2.66, p = 0.013, d = 0.55,  suggesting most cognitive processing occurred in the 
second fixation. 
 
Personally known.  Analyses revealed a main effect of task instruction, F(2,52) 
= 3.20, p = 0.049, ηp2 = 0.11, a main effect of Fixation, F(2.52) = 20.35, p < 0.001, ηp2 
= 0.44), but no interaction, F(3.43,89.19) = 1.22, p = 0.307, ηp2 = 0.05).  Significantly 
shorter fixations on Irrelevants than on Probes, t(26) = 2.58, p = 0.016, d = 0.41, 
suggest that response intentions were more effortful for lies than truth.  There were 
no significant differences between Irrelevants and Targets, t(26) = 0.74, p = 0.467, d 
=0.16).  The main effect of fixation revealed that fixation two was longer than both 
fixation one, t(26) = 6.78, p < 0.001, d = 1.50 and fixations three, t(26) = 2.77, p = 
0.010, d = 0.47.     
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Figure 3. 6. Fixation duration data are presented for honest responses to familiar targets (Truth) and 
concealed recognition of familiar probes (Lie).  Both Truth and Lie conditions are compared to the 
unknown irrelevant items (Truth-Unfamiliar).  Fixation durations are presented according to task 
instruction condition (Truth-Unfamiliar, Truth-Familiar, Lie-Familiar) (a) for newly learned faces and 
(c) personally known faces.  Figures (b) and (d) illustrate fixation durations each of the first three 
fixations individually, collapsed across task instruction conditions.  Bonferroni Correction, α 0.017. 
Error bars represent M±SEM. 
 
 
Last 1500 ms before response.  
 RM ANOVAs with two independent within subjects factors were entered for 
analyses: Task Instruction condition (3 levels: Truth-Irrelevant, Truth-Target, Lie-
Probe) x Time Bin (3 levels: -1500, -1000, -500) (see Figure 3.7). 
 
Newly learned faces.   
Analyses performed on the data for newly learned faces revealed main 
effects of task instruction, F(1.53,39.84) = 25.18, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.49, and time bin, 
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F(1.54,39.93) = 42.47, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.62), but no interaction, F(2.85,74.19) = 
2.11, p = 0.109, ηp2 = 0.08).   
 
The main effect of task instruction revealed longer fixation durations during 
truthful recognition of newly learned targets, t(26) = 8.16, p < 0.001, d = 1.48) 
compared to unfamiliar irrelevants.  Lies about newly learned faces also produced 
significantly longer fixations compared to unfamiliar irrelevants, t(26) = 5.44, p < 
0.001, d = 1.14.  There was no difference in fixation duration during recognition of 
newly learned faces between truths about familiar targets and lies about familiar 
probes, t(26) = 0.79, p = 0.439, d = 0.13).  The data suggest a recognition effect 
between targets and irrelevants, but no further cognitive load effect of response 
intention between truths and lies for this lesser known face type. 
 
Personally known faces.   
Analyses performed on the data for personally known faces also revealed a 
main effect of task instruction, F(2,52) = 18.61, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.42, a main effect of 
time bin, F(1.38,35.81) = 44.33, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.63), but no interaction, F(2,50) = 
1.52, p = 0.201, ηp2 = 0.06).    
 
Similar to the truth data, fixation durations were significantly longer in 
duration during recognition of personally known targets compared to unfamiliar 
irrelevants, t(26) = 3.65, p = 0.001, d = 0.86).  There was also a trend to suggest that 
fixation durations were longer when lying about recognition of personally known 
probes compared to telling the truth about recognition of personally known targets, 
t(26) = 2.16, p = 0.040 d = 0.42).  The data suggest that increased fixation durations 
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indicate effects of recognition and response intention separately contribute to 
changes in fixation duration during recognition of personally known faces. 
 
Significant main effects of time bin (3 levels; -1500, -1000, -500) on fixation 
duration were observed for newly learned, F(1.54,39.93) = 42.47, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 
0.62), personally known faces, F(1.37,35.81) = 44.33, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.63).  
Fixation durations increased in each 500 ms time bin prior to the familiarity 
judgement (Time bin 1; -1500>-1000, Time bin 2; -1000>-500, Time bin 3; -500>0).  
For newly learned faces, AFD significantly increased from the first to the second 
time bin, t(26) = 8.06, p < 0.001, d = 0.94,  and again from the penultimate to the last 
time bin prior to the familiarity judgement, t(26) = 2.90, p = 0.008, d = 0.36.  The 
same pattern of results emerged in the time bins for personally known faces, t(26) = 
6.20, p < 0.001, d = 0.99, and t(26) = 4.80, p < 0.001, d = 0.44 respectively. 
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Figure 3. 7. Fixation duration data are presented for the last 1500 ms before recognition response 
(500 ms time bins) for each task instruction condition (Truth-Unfamiliar, Truth-Familiar, Lie-
Familiar) (a) for newly learned faces and (c) personally known faces.  Figures (b) and (d) illustrate 
fixation durations each 500 ms time bin individually in the last 1500 ms before the recognition 
response (collapsed across task instruction conditions). Bonferroni corrections for three multiple 
comparisons (α = 0.017), p<0.001***, p<0.017*. Error bars represent M±SEM.  
 
3.3.6. Deception Strategies Questionnaire 
Confidence reporting. 
The majority of liars (70%) specifically reported using a high confidence 
strategy when concealing recognition of known faces, six reported that they tried to 
vary their confidence ratings and two simply reported trying to do the same during 
both revealed and concealed recognition. 
 
Mean confidence ratings were high for all stimuli for all conditions; 
irrelevants, M = 91.95 (10.14), newly learned targets, M = 93.58 (7.78), newly 
learned probes, M = 92.36 (9.57), personally known targets, M = 96.18 (7.61) and 
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personally known probes, M = 94.16 (1.46).  RM ANOVAs performed on the mean 
verbal confidence judgements did not reveal significant differences between task 
instruction conditions for irrelevants and targets, F(2,50) = 2.88, p = 0.066, ηp2 = 
0.10, or irrelevants and probes, F(2,50) = 2.27, p = 0.114, ηp2 = 0.08. 
 
Face viewing strategies.  Out of 27 participants, three reported trying to look 
more at the face when lying, six reported trying to look less and the remainder 
reported trying to maintain similar eye movement behaviour during concealed and 
revealed recognition trials.  Strategy reported during deception (Look more, N = 3; 
Look less, N = 6, Look the same, N = 18) was entered as a between subjects factor for 
the analyses for Num. of Fixations and Run Count to explore if eye movement 
behaviour was explained by the explicit strategy adopted.   
 
There was no between subjects effect of strategy on number of fixations, 
F(2,24) = 1.30, p = 0.294, ηp2 = 0.10, no interaction with task instruction condition 
(2 levels: conceal recognition, reveal recognition), F(2,24) = 0.23, p = 0.796, ηp2 = 
0.02, and no interaction with face type (2 levels: newly learned, personally known), 
F(2,24) = 0.39, p = 0.68, ηp2 =0.03.  The data consistently revealed that less fixations 
were made during concealed recognition trials irrespective of reported strategy 
(Look less; truth, M = 4.81 (0.68), lie, M = 4.39 (0.76), look more; truth, M = 3.88 
(0.68), lie, M = 3.39 (0.26); maintain same, truth, M = 4.93 (1.126), lie, M = 4.46 
(1.38).  
 
There was also no effect of strategy on run counts, F(2,24) = 0.28, p = 0.760, 
ηp2 = 0.02, no interaction with task instruction (2 levels: conceal recognition, reveal 
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recognition), F(2,24) = 0.03, p = 0.971, ηp2 = 0.00, and no interaction with face type, 
F(2,24) = 0.08, p = 0.928, ηp2 = 0.01.  The data consistently revealed that less runs 
were made during concealed recognition trials irrespective of reported strategy 
(gaze aversion; truth, M= 4.74 (1.03), lie, M = 4.35 (0.60), deliberate gaze; truth, M= 
4.27 (0.77), lie, M = 4.13(0.12); maintain same, truth, M = 4.73 (0.94), lie, M = 4.21 
(0.91). 
 
Face most difficult to lie about. Participants were also asked which group of 
faces posed most effort for concealed recognition; newly learned or personally 
known.  The majority (70%) of participants reported finding it hardest to conceal 
recognition of personally known faces.  The overall consensus was that recognition 
was stronger and more automatic for personally known faces, making concealment 
a more conflicting process.  Participants also reported that the ‘lie’ seemed more 
real for persons whom they knew and interacted with in real life.  The remaining 
participants reported that concealed recognition of newly learned faces was 
hardest.  For example, one participant reported that more cognitive effort was 
required to actively recall memories of newly learned faces and that this effort was 
further increased by remembering which face to conceal recognition and correctly 
execution the appropriate response.  
 
3.3.7. Discussion 
 
Experiment 2 aimed to assess the impact of emphasising cognitive awareness 
of meta-memory and eye movement monitoring on fixation behaviour during 
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recognition-based and confidence judgements.  The experiment was novel and 
exploratory in two aspects: (1) No other published work has explicitly explored how 
liars might manipulate confidence reports based on lies about person recognition.  
(2) No deception based research has explored whether emphasising eye movement 
monitoring during recognition of known persons might interfere with memory 
effects in eye movement behaviour.  The experiment also was a replication of the 
evaluation of the effect of lying on eye-movement behaviour in Experiment 1. 
 
Confidence judgements 
Predictions that liars would exhibit less variation in confidence ratings (0-
100%) when lying about a known face compared to an unknown face were 
supported by the data.  Confidence judgements based on lies about personally 
known faces clearly displayed less variation than the patterns of confidence to 
correct rejection of unknown faces.  There was a similar but not quite significant 
trend for the same pattern of responses for newly-learned faces.  No significant 
differences were found in verbal confidence ratings when comparing identification 
of known target faces compared to unknown, irrelevant faces.   
 
The data suggest that patterns of verbal confidence ratings might present a 
novel way to identify concealed memory of well-known faces when individuals 
explicitly deny recognition of them.  Interestingly, the Deception Strategy 
Questionnaire revealed that 70% of participants explicitly reported using a high 
confidence strategy to appear convincing when lying about recognition (six 
reported that they tried to vary their confidence ratings and two simply reported 
trying to do the same during truths and lies).  The present data suggests that 
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participants were utilising a simplistic strategy to appear convincing, typical of real-
world liars (DePaulo et al., 1997; Tetterton, 2005) and that they did not or could not 
calibrate their confidence ratings to represent the variations in confidence displayed 
when correctly rejecting unknown faces.  The present finding is a novel addition to 
existing research that has explored distributions or patterns in responses over 
multiple tests rather than single response data only  (Morgan, Rabinowitz, Leidy, & 
Coric, 2014; Shaw, Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Hillman, 2014). 
 
The eye movement data also showed less variability in the mean number of 
areas on the confidence scale viewed when lying about recognition-based memory 
confidence.  Less variability in fixation behaviour was observed in confidence 
ratings for personally known and newly learned faces, both with moderate effect 
sizes.  Additionally, less variability in eye movement behaviour was also evident 
when participants revealed recognition of personally known faces compared to 
unknown irrelevants.  This finding is the first to report differences in eye movement 
behaviour associated with manipulated confidence judgements during concealed 
person recognition.   
 
Replication of results of Experiment 1 
Consistent with predictions about the effect of recognition, there were fewer 
fixations, fewer interest areas visited, fewer runs and less time spent fixating inner 
features when participants lied about recognising personally known faces compared 
to unknown faces.  The same pattern of results emerged when comparing honest 
recognition of personally known faces to rejection of unknown faces.  Effect sizes 
were large for both irrelevant-target and irrelevant-probe differences in all but one 
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fixation measure; the proportion of fixations made to the inner region of the face 
(moderate effect size).  The results were consistent with the fixation data from 
Experiment 1, which also found large irrelevant-target and irrelevant-probe 
differences in all but one fixation measure, the exception also being the proportion 
of fixations made to inner face regions.  Overall, the results suggest that recognition 
of personally known faces produces large effects of memory of fixation behaviour 
that can be used to identify memory for well-known faces in spite of cognitive 
efforts required to suppress truthful responses (Experiment 1 and 2) and attempts 
to control eye movement behaviour as reported in the present experiment 
(Experiment 2).   
 
Although, overall effect sizes were numerically smaller for irrelevant-probe 
comparison during lies, compared to the equivalent irrelevant-target comparisons 
for truths, personally known faces produced large and consistent effects of memory 
in multiple eye movement behaviours potentially making it a robust method for 
memory detection.  The results support that memory changes the nature of visual 
processing as reflected in fixation behaviour, that these effects are most robust for 
well-known faces (Althoff et al., 1999; Althoff & Cohen, 1999; Althoff, 1998; Hannula 
et al., 2010; Heisz & Shore, 2008), and that fixation behaviour can be used to reveal 
recognition when individuals deny recognition of known faces (Schwedes & 
Wentura, 2012).  Experiments 1 and 2 extend the work of Schwedes & Wentura 
(2012) by demonstrating that fixation behaviour reveals recognition despite 
intentional efforts to control eye movements to evade detection. 
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Experiment 1 and 2, however, highlight caution in the use of proportion of 
fixations to the inner regions of the face as a measure of memory detection.  This 
fixation measure produced smaller effect sizes that appeared vulnerable to change 
between truths and lie conditions.  These changes were also inconsistent in 
Experiments 1 and 2 (probe numerically smaller than target in Experiment 1, but 
larger than probe in Experiment 2).  Although the increase in the proportion of 
fixations during concealed recognition of the personally familiar probe impacted the 
Irrelevant-Probe difference such that the p value was no longer significant, the 
proportion was still smaller than the irrelevant with a medium effect size.  A 
possible explanation might be that the conditions of Experiment 2 produced an 
increase in load that resulted in increased fixation behaviour (Cook, Hacker, Webb, 
Osher, Kristjansson, Woltz, Kircher, et al., 2012; Zenzi M Griffin & Oppenheimer, 
2006) and that the measure proportion of fixations was more vulnerable to this 
change than the other fixation measures.  In support of this assertion, the Deception 
Strategies Questionnaire revealed that 70% of participants reported finding it 
hardest to conceal recognition of a personally known face.  A number of participants 
explicitly stated that cognitive difficultly during concealed recognition of personally 
known faces was due to the automatic nature of recognition for these well-known 
faces and the conflict in rejecting them as familiar as they had real-world 
significance.  The data suggest that the proportions of inner fixations may be a less 
stable measure for memory detection (albeit an important region for information 
extraction during face recognition in general; Clutterbuck & Johnston, 2002) than 
the other eye movement measures recorded.   
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The finding that the proportion of fixations was more vulnerable to 
differences in task demands is not consistent with Althoff and Cohen (1999) who 
found that the proportion of fixations directed to inner face regions was a consistent 
measure of memory. This was true whether the task was recognition-based (famous, 
not famous), emotion-based (happy, not-happy) or whether participants were 
instructed to engage in specific eye movement strategies (e.g., move eyes across the 
face from left to right, starting at the top and finishing at the bottom).  The 
difference in the present data may be a consequence of cognitive difficulties that are 
specific to lying about recognising a person known in the real-world as reported in 
the Deception Strategies Questionnaire. (Althoff & Cohen’s research used famous 
celebrity faces).  As in experiment 1, the data suggest that proportion of fixations 
made to the inner face regions are not a reliable measure for memory detection. 
 
The findings for newly learned faces were partly consistent with predictions.  
Significant less fixations and run counts were recorded during concealed 
recognition of newly learned faces compared to unknown faces, with moderate and 
small effects sizes.  This result is initially encouraging given that differences in 
fixation behaviour for newly learned faces compared to unknown faces in 
Experiment 1 only revealed a small effect size difference between newly learned 
probes and unknown irrelevants in one fixation measure, number of fixations.  At 
first look, the clear distinction between newly learned probes and irrelevants in the 
present experiment may be attributed to the more intensive learn-to-criterion 
procedure used in the study phase for face learning.  The interpretation becomes 
more complicated, however, when we observe that there are no significant 
differences between newly learned targets and unknown irrelevant, to both of 
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which participants both responded honestly.  This pattern is the opposite to that 
found in Experiment 1 where significant decreases were observed in multiple 
fixation measures during revealed recognition of newly learned faces compared to 
correct rejection of unknown faces.  It appears that some other executive processing 
demands are interfering with the pattern of results as observed in Experiment 1. 
 
One possible explanation is that participants’ efforts to exert control over 
their eye movements and to continuously monitor memory during recognition and 
confidence judgements produced a cognitive carry-over effect that emerged during 
recognition of newly learned faces during honest trials.  The data suggest clear 
differences in mental efforts and attempted control between truth and lie trials, 
observed in significant target-probe differences.   
 
The Deception Strategy Questionnaire Reports revealed that, out of 27 
participants, 22 participants (81%) reported attempting to employ a strategy to 
maintain similar responding in both truth and lie trials.  Two reported trying to look 
less when lying (gaze aversion) and three reported trying to look more (deliberate 
gaze).  The questionnaire data suggest the modified instruction brief that 
emphasised and incentivised the monitoring and control of eye movements to evade 
detection was effective.  Approximately a third of participants in Experiment 1 
reported attempting to employ an eye movement strategy, whereas all participants 
in Experiment 2 reported attempts to control eye movements.  The lie data seem to 
support that participants were trying to manipulate fixation patterns during 
concealed recognition.  Although additional analyses revealed no differences in the 
fixation according to reported strategies the data suggest the attempts of the 
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majority to maintain similar eye movement behaviour in both truth and lie trials 
resulted in the opposite effect of that intended, and served to further augment the 
difference between probes and irrelevants (Wegner et al., 1998).  For example, if 
participants believed that liars hesitate (taking longer to respond and generating 
more eye movement behaviour) they might try to reduce this behaviour in 
comparison to genuine unfamiliar responses made to actual unknown faces.  In a bid 
to maintain similar behaviour they might over compensate whilst failing to realise 
that reprocessing effects for familiar faces already result in reductions in sampling 
behaviour compared to unknown irrelevant items.  However, as the number of 
participants for each strategy was small future research should directly examine the 
effect of specific strategies on fixations with equal numbers of each strategy to draw 
more confident conclusions on the effect of specific strategies on fixation patterns. 
 
The fact that significant reductions in the number of fixations are present 
only in the data for newly learned faces, and not for personally known faces, is likely 
a consequence of the nature of familiarity and recollection as defined by Yonelinas’ 
(2002) dual process model of memory.  According to this model, active recollection 
of less familiar faces is a slower, more conscious process, requiring more cognitive 
effort in terms of working memory.  It may be that this more conscious experience 
(as opposed to fast, automatic recognition of highly familiar faces) may render eye 
movements more vulnerable to intentional control in relation to strategies.  And 
that the intention of maintaining similar patterns of eye movement behaviour 
resulted, ironically, in the augmentation of the reprocessing effect during concealed 
recognition of newly learned faces.   
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Finally, an explanation why this augmenting effect appeared in the data for 
fixation count are likely due to the measure being a more global measure of memory 
and, as such, may be more susceptible to general strategies such as look less (Rayner, 
1998).  The measure run count is closely linked to fixation count and thus it is not 
surprising that a reduction in run count would follow a decrease in mean number of 
fixations made.  The idea that some eye movement measures might be more 
vulnerable to strategic control than others is suggested in two particular eye 
movement studies (Althoff & Cohen, 1999; Cook et al., 2012).   
 
Althoff and Cohen (1999) revealed that some measures (i.e., number of 
fixations) were more sensitive to intentional eye movement strategies chosen to 
mimic pattern of eye movement similar to those engaged during viewing of 
unfamiliar faces.  Although the effects of memory were no longer present in some 
eye movements (number fixations, number of regions, first return fixations) during 
intentional strategies, the reprocessing effect was still intact for one particular eye 
movement measure (proportion internal) when viewing famous faces.  The 
proposition that average fixation duration might be an obligatory and possibly 
involuntary measure of recognition memory is particularly supported by the work 
of Ryan and colleagues (Ryan et al., 2007) who found a recognition effect for fixation 
duration within the first fixation, and often irrespective of changes in task demands.  
This lack of conscious control (perhaps particular to fixation duration) suggests the 
potential for eye movements to objectively measure memory during revealed and 
concealed recognition.   
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The first three fixations revealed very little about processes of recognition 
and response intention for the different task instruction conditions.  Only one 
significant result emerged for the three different task instruction conditions; an 
increase in AFD when comparing truths (targets) and lies (probes) to personally 
known faces suggested an effect of response intentions that was higher for 
concealed recognition. 
 
Collapsing task instruction conditions, we find that average fixation 
durations are longest during the second fixation, suggesting that information 
processing is most active in the second fixation (reflecting a combination of efforts 
for both recognition and response intentions).  This present data is partially 
consistent with Experiment 1, which found an effect of response intention (but not 
recognition) in the second fixation, and previous research (Schwedes & Wentura, 
2012), which found an effect of recognition (but not response intention) in the 
second fixation.  The data highlight that changes in task demands in different 
experimental designs and procedures impact fixation durations in subtle ways.  
Future research might benefit from analysing the data in more finite time bins to 
better dissociate processes of recognition and response intentions. 
 
Consistent with predictions, comparisons of eye movements for irrelevants 
and targets revealed recognition effects for both newly learned and personally 
known faces in the 1500 ms prior to the execution of recognition response.  A 
comparison of eye movements for targets and probes revealed a significant effect of 
cognitive load for personally known faces but not for newly learned faces.  Because 
the recollection of less familiar faces is more likely to be a more involved and 
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conscious process, it may be that cognitive effort was already high such that the 
additional effect of lying were not significantly detected.  The relative difference in 
effort between fast and automatic recognition of well-known faces, and the 
concealment of these likely required a greater increase in cognitive effort and thus a 
larger difference in fixation durations compared to that for newly learned faces. 
 
A main effect of time bin also indicated that AFD significantly increased in 
each 500 ms time bin in the 1500 ms preceding the familiarity response, when task 
instruction conditions were collapsed for in turn newly learned and personally 
familiar faces.  In the present data there was no clear interaction between task 
instruction and time bin, and this we did not observed the steep increase in AFD 
from irrelevants to targets to probes as we observed in Experiment One.  The fact 
that participants were made aware that they might want to control eye movements 
when lying likely activated high load working memory demands from the onset.  In 
contrast, in Experiment 1 participants were not so conscious of the monitoring 
component of the task and thus an increase in fixation duration (cognitive load) 
required for concealed recognition did not appear until directly before a manual 
button response was required action planning. 
 
 
In conclusion, the data suggest that monitoring both confidence choices and 
behaviour during the ratings has the potential to distinguish deceitful from honest 
patterns of confidence in relation to person recognition.  Further research might 
develop more sophisticated ways of tapping into cognitive processing via 
monitoring of associated eye movements during deliberation of confidence reports.  
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The data also further supports the potential usefulness of eye movements for 
identifying memory for well-known (personally familiar) faces even in the face of 
high cognitive demands when lying.  Multiple eye movement measures indicate 
reprocessing effects for personally known faces that are robust irrespective of the 
differences in cognitive demands between revealed and concealed recognition.  The 
eye movement records highlight, however, that at least one measure (proportion of 
fixations inner) might be particularly vulnerable to cognitive interference during 
lies, resulting in diminished reprocessing effects during concealed recognition.  In 
the present experiment, increases in proportion of fixations were observed during 
concealed recognition of both newly learned and personally know faces. This 
resulted in no significant reprocessing effect that distinguished between unknown 
and known faces.  The indication that proportion of fixations directed to inner 
regions of the face may be sensitive to changes in load is also consistent with 
Experiment 1 that found a compromised reprocessing effect (smaller effect size) for 
concealed recognition of newly learned faces  (as a result of increased eye 
movement behaviour perhaps due to load).  Although the inner regions of the face 
are particularly sensitive to intricacies in face processing and recognition (and thus 
highly informative to experts that wish to learn more about the subtleties of face 
perception), they made not be the most reliable eye movement measure for the 
identification of reprocessing effects as means of memory detection. 
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CHAPTER 4.   
 
The effect of deception on fixation-based 
memory effects during concealed 
recognition of objects and scenes. 
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4.1. Introduction 
 
Extending Experiment 1 and 2, which examined whether memory effects 
were observed during concealed recognition of faces, Experiment 3 also explored 
the effect of deception on fixation-based memory effects.  The aim of Experiment 3 
was to establish whether markers of recognition in eye moments during recognition 
of objects and scenes might also expose concealed recognition, as was found for face 
recognition in Experiments 1 and 2.   
 
The identification of objects connected to a crime (such as a weapon or stolen 
bank card), or knowledge of a particular crime scene, is just as important as 
detecting knowledge of persons linked to that crime.  Memory detection researchers 
have successfully identified concealed recognition of  photographs of objects that 
were encountered during mock crime scenarios via autonomic based measures of 
arousal such as increased skin conductance responses (e.g., Ambach, Stark, Peper, & 
Vaitl, 2008) and incremental discriminative ability for crime objects using combined 
SCR and ERP-P300’s (Ambach et al., 2010).  Furthermore, research that combined 
SCR and ERP has observed that SCR were larger for central crime details, whereas 
the P300 was stable for both central and peripheral crime details (Gamer & Berti, 
2012).  Recent research has also explored fixation behaviour as a potential indicator 
of memory for concealed recognition of objects other than faces with varying 
success (Peth et al., 2013; Twyman, Moffitt, Burgoon, & Marchak, 2010). 
 
 147 
The present experiment explores whether memory effects found in fixation 
patterns for familiar faces that varied in familiarity, might also be found for objects 
and scenes that also vary in depth of encoding.  The assumption that humans 
possess specialist skills for recognising familiar faces (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & 
Tanaka, 1998; Farah, 1996; Robbins & McKone, 2007) might suggest less consistent 
memory reprocessing effects during recognition of familiar object and scenes 
compared to faces.  Indeed, elements that comprise whole objects and scenes tend 
to be more variable than for faces, which have common components, such as the 
eyes, nose, mouth, ears etc.  Although the processing of faces and more general 
objects are not necessarily processed in a qualitatively different manner, face 
features are thought to be recognised in a more holistic fashion (Burton, Jenkins, & 
Schweinberger, 2011; Farah, Levinson, & Klein, 1995; Farah et al., 1998; Farah, 
1996; Hancock et al., 2000; Tanaka & Farah, 1993)  that also might rely more heavily 
on local spatial relations known as configurations (Leder & Bruce, 2000; Helmut 
Leder & Carbon, 2006; Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987), whereas non-face object tend 
to be recognised using part-based representations.   
 
Despite alleged differences in processing of faces compared to objects in 
general, consistent memory reprocessing effects have been documented in eye 
movements during viewing of familiar and non-familiar buildings by Althoff and 
colleagues as well as for faces.   Consistent with changes in viewing behaviour for 
familiar faces, participants made fewer fixations to fewer regions and with less 
constrained (more random) viewing to photographs of familiar buildings (own 
campus buildings) than to unfamiliar buildings (unknown campus); (Althoff, 1998; 
Althoff et al., 1999).  It is interesting, however, that in Althoff and colleagues (1998, 
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1999) studies the mean number of fixations made before recognition of familiar  
buildings were fewer than for recognition of famous faces, which is consistent with 
the idea that we are better and faster at face recognition than for other objects.  
Nevertheless, the difference in number of fixations when viewing familiar and 
unfamiliar items was significant for both famous versus non-famous faces and 
personally familiar buildings versus unfamiliar buildings.  Research that explored 
eye movements during viewing of scenes also observed a decrease in sampling of 
previously viewed scenes compared to those that were novel (Ryan, Althoff, 
Whitlow, & Cohen, 2000; Ryan, Hannula, & Cohen, 2007).  Taken together, the 
findings presented in these elementary eye movement studies suggest that eye 
movement reprocessing effects observed for faces are generalisable to non-face 
stimuli. 
 
In more applied research, two deception-based studies (Peth et al., 2013; 
Twyman et al., 2010) explored fixation-based markers of memory during concealed 
recognition of familiar objects following a mock crime scenario.  Twyman et al. 
(2010) recorded number of fixations to crime critical photographs of objects as part 
of an enacted mock crime (e.g., a key was removed from a cup on a desk that was 
used to open a cash box from which a ring was taken.  During the crime a cordless 
phone also rang).  The results, however, revealed that only the cup received fewer 
fixations when viewed by guilty participants compared to innocents and, even then, 
effect size calculations were small.  The authors suggest these findings were a 
possible consequence of probe saliency, such that the guilty participant had more 
exposure time to the cup as it was visible on the desk during the full course of the 
crime.  This is a plausible explanation given that the effect of memory on eye 
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movements for previously unfamiliar faces scales with amount of exposure (at least 
three exposures to produce a robust effect of memory; Althoff et al., 1999; Heisz & 
Shore, 2008).  Experiment 1 in the present thesis also showed that recognition of 
faces after only one brief exposure produced the weakest (but observable) memory 
effects than more familiar faces.  The authors also remark that their lack of 
significant results may be a consequence of viewing patterns for objects being more 
variable than that for faces (which all share the same general features).  It is perhaps 
more informative to note that the photographs of each object presented in Twyman 
et al.’s (2010) study were markedly different in size.  For example, the proportion of 
space taken by the ring or key in the photographic images presented at test were 
quite noticeably smaller than that of the cup.  The lack of results, therefore, may 
present more of a methodological issue in the preparation of stimulus materials as 
opposed to an issue with detecting recognition of objects in general.  Furthermore, 
because the researchers only measured number of fixations, it is possible the effect 
of lying diminished memory effects for less salient objects as was observed in the 
Experiments 1 and 2 in the current thesis.   
 
More recent research has successfully documented memory effects in 
participants’ fixations when viewing photographs of objects that they previously 
experienced as part of a mock crime scenario that had taken part in.  Peth and 
colleagues (2013) measured number of fixations and fixation durations to ten 
photographs of crime critical objects that were incidentally encoded by guilty 
participants during an enacted mock crime.  The ten objects were classified by the 
experimenters as either central or peripheral to the crime dependent on whether 
guilty participants physically handled them during the crime (central) or if there 
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were only located close by (peripheral).  Consistent with memory effects in eye 
movement behaviour, the fixation data revealed fewer fixations of longer durations 
when guilty participants viewed crime critical objects that were central to the crime 
(handled) but not for objects that were only peripheral to the crime.  The results of 
Peth et al. (2013) suggest a lack of sensitivity of fixations to reveal memory for items 
for which strength of encoding is weaker.  This is somewhat consistent with the 
experiments presented in the current thesis where results for visually exposed or 
newly learned faces were less evident in number of fixation and fixation durations. 
 
In a design similar to Experiment 2, Experiment 3 examines fixation 
behaviours during concealed recognition of objects and the effect of familiarity 
(newly learned versus personally known) on a larger range of fixation measures 
than previously studied.  The present experiment also explores the effect of memory 
on fixation behaviours during concealed recognition of whole scenes.  Twyman et al. 
(2010) and Peth et al (2013) explored memory effects in fixations during concealed 
recognition of objects from a mock crime scene, but concealed recognition of whole 
scenes are as yet unexplored.  The present research also takes a closer look at the 
impact of deception on memory effects using three different time course analyses: 
(1) the full trial period, the first three fixations, the last 1500 ms.   The main aim of 
the study was to determine whether fixations exposed concealed recognition of 
objects and scenes that varied in familiarity. 
 
Based on the extant literature, the main predictions were that memory 
effects would be observed in fewer fixations (number of fixations, run counts, 
interest areas viewed, proportion of fixations inner) and longer fixation durations 
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during viewing of familiar objects (Peth et al., 2013) and scenes (Althoff et al., 1999; 
Ryan et al., 2007).  Also consistent with previous research, we predicted that 
memory effects would be strongest and most reliable for more  familiar objects and 
scenes (personally familiar) compared to those that were less richly encoded 
(learned-to-criterion during a study phase before test) (see Althoff, 1998; Peth et al., 
2013; Ryan et al., 2007). 
  
 
4.2. Method 
4.2.1. Participants 
 38 undergraduate students (36 females, 2 males) from The University of 
Portsmouth participated in the experiment.  Participant ages ranged from 19 to 27 
years (M = 20.31, SD = 1.59).  All participants had normal or normal-to-corrected 
vision.  All participants received £5 remuneration for taking part. 
 
4.2.2. Design 
 In a within subjects design, participants were instructed to lie and tell the 
truth about recognising different types of familiar objects.  Each participant 
completed one block of practice trials followed by two lying blocks (lie about newly 
learned photographs, lie about personally known photographs).  In each block 
participants viewed 30 single photographs of objects and scenes, with equal 
numbers of unfamiliar, newly learned and personally familiar photographs.  In the 
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two different lying blocks participants were instructed to lie about a specific group 
of familiar photographs whilst telling the truth about all other photographs.  In one 
block, participants were instructed to lie when presented with photographs of 
newly learned objects and scenes, whilst telling the truth about personally familiar 
and unfamiliar photographs (irrelevants).  In the other block, participants were 
instructed to lie about recognition of personally familiar photographs whilst telling 
the truth about photographs that were newly familiar or unfamiliar (irrelevants).  
Because concealed recognition is specific to familiar photographs, participants were 
only instructed to lie in turn about recognition of photographs that were newly 
learned and personally known.  All participants completed both lying blocks.  
Participants were instructed to always tell the truth about unfamiliar photographs 
(control).  The eye movement data from viewing of unfamiliar photographs served 
as a baseline to identify different patterns of viewing behaviour during recognition 
from familiar targets (honest responses to familiar photographs) and probes (lies 
about recognition of familiar photographs).  The design, therefore, represents a 
nested within subjects design wherein veracity (truth, lie) is nested within newly 
learned and personally familiar objects and scenes. 
 
4.2.3. Apparatus and Materials 
 A total of 90 colour photographs of scenes and objects were presented to each 
participant over 3 blocks of trials.  Each set of 30 photographs were unique to each 
block of trials.  In each block of 30 trials, there were 10 unfamiliar photographs, 10 
newly learned photographs and 10 personally known photographs.  Personally 
known photographs were specific to The University of Portsmouth Psychology 
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students (who were participants in this experiment) and comprised Portsmouth 
City Guildhall, entrance to psychology department, entrance to student Union, 
entrance to university library, coursework submission point, university logo, log-in 
to electronic resources webpage, coursework submission cover sheet, university 
hoodie, student ID card.  The first five items represented scenes, whereas the last 
five more generally represented objects, all of which would be immediately 
recognisable to participants.  For consistency, the photographs for irrelevant and 
newly learned categories followed the same structure (e.g, photographs of libraries 
and sweatshirts from other universities).  All images were taken with a SONY 
Cybershot camera specifically for the purpose of the experiment.  Photographs were 
re-sized to 640 x 480 pixels and presented on a blue background (HEX: #5DBCD2) 
using Adobe Photoshop CS5.1. 
 
4.2.4. Procedure 
 The procedure was the same as Experiment 2, except that 30 photographs 
were presented in each block of trials (10 unfamiliar, 10 newly learned, 10 
personally known).   
 
Prior to each study block, participants completed a study phase where they 
learned-to-criterion 10 photographs of previously unfamiliar objects and scenes 
(matched to personally familiar items).  Participants were first shown 10 unfamiliar 
photographs of objects and scenes and asked to view them until they had committed 
them to memory.  The experimenter than placed a name label (e.g. Ellerman library) 
next to the appropriate photograph and participants were then instructed to learn 
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the correct label for each photograph.  The photographs and name labels were then 
shuffled and given to the participant for matching.  The participant had to match all 
photograph and labels 100% correct, twice consecutively to satisfy the learn-to-
criterion  
In each test block, each set of 30 photographs were presented randomly on 
the Eyelink II display monitor (SR Research, Ontario, Canada) using a sequential 
presentation.  Participants made dichotomous button press responses to familiar 
and unfamiliar photographs of objects and scenes at the same time as verbalising 
their response selection (e.g., familiar).  Participants made a confidence rating (0-
100%) after each scene/object identification by pressing any button on the selection 
pad whilst vocalising their chosen confidence rating (e.g., fifty).  Confidence ratings 
were chosen from a scale presented on the display screen that range from 0-100% 
in numerators of ten.  For an illustration of the sequence display see Figure 4.1 
below).  The button assigned to a familiar responses was counterbalanced so that 
approximately half pressed the left button for a familiar response (N = 17).  30 
participants were right handed and 5 left handed.  Condition blocks were 
counterbalanced and all trials fully randomised. 
 
The Eyelink II (SR Research, Ontario, Canada) recorded retinal and corneal 
reflections induced by an infrared source at a frequency of 250Hz (Pupil-CR mode, N 
= 34) and 500Hz (Pupil only, N = 1) to obtain participants points of fixation on the 
screen (error of resolution: 0.5°-1.0°).  The Pupil only mode was used when Pupil-
CR modes could not be successfully tracked.  17 participants’ eye movements were 
tracked using their left eye and 18 with the right eye.  The degree of visual angle was 
11.06. 
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Figure 4. 1. Display sequence of for each trial. 
 
4.2.5. Data preparation: Defining a-Priori Interest 
Areas (IAs) 
Objects and Scenes: Using a method consistent with previous research on 
visual processing of scenes and objects (e.g., Smith & Squire, 2008), a fixed 4 x 4 grid  
was applied to each photograph to create 16 equally sized interest areas.  The 
central 4 sections of the grid (top left, top right, bottom left, bottom right) formed 
the inner 4 inner regions of the photograph.  The 12 remaining sections that 
surrounded the inner regions were grouped and merged to create one outer region.  
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Each image therefore presented 5 interest areas for analyses, consistent with the 
defining of interest areas for faces in Experiments 1 and 2 (see Figure 4.2a). 
Confidence Screens: As in Experiment 2, interest areas on the confidence 
screens were defined by marking a box around each confidence option (0%, 10%, 
20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90%, 100%) to created 11 interest areas: 
This allowed calculation of the number of interest areas (IAs) fixated on viewed 
during deliberation of each confidence rating (see Figure 4.2b). 
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Figure 4. 2. Illustration the defining of interest areas applied to (a) scenes and objects, and (b) the 
interest areas defined for analyses of viewing during confidence judgements. 
 
 
4.2.6. Dependent Measures and Analysis Strategy 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, the dependent measures were number of fixation, 
run counts, number of interest areas visited, and proportion of fixations to the inner 
region of the image (as defined in figure 4.2).  Fixation durations were also analysed 
for the first three fixations and the last 1500 ms before response selections (500 ms 
time bins). 
 
Also the same as Experiments 1 and 2, RM ANOVAS were first performed on 
irrelevant and truth data with one within subjects factor (3 levels: tell the truth 
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about irrelevants, tell the truth about newly learned targets, and tell the truth about 
personally known targets).  RM ANOVAs performed on irrelevant and probe data 
also had one within subjects factor (3 levels: tell the truth about irrelevants, lie 
about newly learned probes, lie about personally familiar probes).  To explore 
interactions between familiar targets and familiar probes a 2 x Task Instruction (2 
levels: truth, lie) by 2 x (Familiarity: newly learned, personally familiar) was 
performed. 
 
Further analyses were performed on Fixation Durations for the first three 
fixations with 2 within subjects factors, Task instruction (2 levels: tell the truth 
about irrelevants, tell the truth about targets and lie about probes) and Fixation (3 
levels: first, second, third). 
 
Analyses were also performed on Fixation Durations for the last three time 
bins before the response with 2 within subjects factors, (2 levels: tell the truth about 
irrelevants, tell the truth about targets and lie about probes), and Time Bin (3 levels: 
-1500, -1000, -500). 
 
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Exclusion Criteria 
Data was analysed for 35 (33 females, 2 males) participants.  Three of the 
original 35 participants (all female) were removed from the data due to technical 
difficulties that resulted in loss of data and failure to complete all trial blocks.  As in 
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Experiment 1, individual trials were also removed from the analyses if the 
participant responded incorrectly to the face or presented outliers in the reaction 
time data (less than 300 ms or more than 5000 ms).   
 
Error rates were low across all trials: Familiar-Learned (truths, 10%, lies, 
1.14%) Familiar-Personal (truths 1.14%, lies 2.57%) and unknown faces (truths 
7.04%).  This left 2028 trials out of the original 2100.  Similar to previous research 
(Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003; Verschuere, Spruyt, Meijer, & Otgaar, 2011) 
outliers in the reaction time data were removed if they were faster or slower than 
specific set thresholds (acceptable range for present data, <300 ms or >5000 ms).  
This removed a further 174 trials (8.29%) leaving a total of 1858 trials out of the 
original 2100.   
 
 
4.3.2. Fixation Quantity 
Truth trials (Irrelevants and Targets) 
Omnibus Repeated Measures ANOVAs were performed on truth trials with 
three independent levels of task instruction; tell the truth about unfamiliar 
irrelevants, tell the truth about newly learned targets, and tell the truth about 
personally known targets.  Analyses revealed a main effect of task instruction for all 
four eye movement parameters; Number of Fixations, F(2,66) = 46.29, p < 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2   
= 0.58, Run Counts, F(2,66) = 15.52, p < 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2   = 0.32, IAs Visited, F(2,66) = 4.84, 
p = 0.011,  𝜂𝑝
2   = 0.13, Proportion Inner, F(1.57,51.93) = 18.72, p < 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2   = 0.36 
(see Figure 4.3).  There was no effect of the order in which lying blocks were 
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presented for any of the four measures; Number of Fixations, F(1,33) = 0.08, p = 
0.775,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.003, Run Counts, F(1,33) = 0.30, p = 0.591,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.01, IAs Visited, 
F(1,33) = 0.24, p = 0.629,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.01, Proportion Inner, F(1,33) = 0.44, p = 0.511,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 
0.01. 
 
Irrelevants and Newly Learned Targets.  There were no significant differences 
in fixation measures when participants revealed recognition of newly learned 
targets compared to unknown irrelevants on any of the four fixation quantity 
measures, Number of Fixations, t(34) = -0.25, p = 0.806, d = -0.03, Run Counts, t(34) 
= -0.60, p = 0.552, d = -0.09, IAs Visited, t(34) = 0.15, p = 0.884, d = 0.03, Proportion 
Inner, t(34) = -1.74, p = 0.091, d = -0.03. 
 
 
Irrelevants and Personally Known Targets.  When participants revealed 
recognition of personally known targets they made significantly less fixations 
compared to unknown irrelevants for three out of four parameters, Number of 
fixations, t(34) = 8.37, p < 0.001, d = 1.26, Run Counts, t(34) = 4.84, p < 0.001, d = 
0.79, IAs Visited, t(34) = 3.36, p = 0.002, d = 0.51.  Contrary to predictions, 
proportion of fixations inner were significantly higher when viewing personally 
familiar targets compared to irrelevants, t(34) = 5.84, p < 0.001, d = 0.99. 
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Figure 4. 3. RM ANOVAs for measures of fixation quantity; Num. Fixations, Run Counts, IAs Visited, 
Proportion Fixations Inner (d.f. = 34 in each case, no effect of condition order), with Bonferroni 
adjustments for multiple paired sample t-tests (α=0.017).  The y-axis shows data for objects and 
scenes for three categories of familiarity, Unfamiliar (UF), Familiar-Learned (F-L), Familiar-Personal.  
In each graph, the unfamiliar irrelevants (UF) data (white bar) are the comparison point for all truth 
targets (grey) and lie probes (blue).  P<0.001***, p<0.01**.  Error bars represent M±SEM. 
 
 
Lies trials (Irrelevants and Probes) 
Omnibus Repeated Measures ANOVAs were also performed on lie trials with 
three independent levels of task instruction; tell the truth about unfamiliar 
irrelevants, lie about newly learned targets, lie about personally known targets.  The 
order in which the lying condition blocks were administered was also entered as a 
between subject factor (2 levels: lie about learned faces first, lie about personally 
known faces first).  Analyses revealed a main effect of task instruction for all four 
eye movement parameters; Number of Fixations, F(2,66) = 46.29, p < 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2   = 
0.58, Run Counts, F(2,66) = 10.53, p < 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2   = 0.24, IAs Visited, F(2,66) = 9.95, p 
= < 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2   = 0.23, Proportion Inner, F(2,66) = 29.41, p < 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2   = 0.47 (see 
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Figure 4.3).  There was no effect of the order in which lying blocks were presented, 
Number of Fixations, F(1,33) = 0.50, p = 0.483,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.02, Run Counts, F(1,33) = 
1.10, p = 0.302,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.03, IAs Visited, F(1,33) = 1.70, p = 0.201,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.05, 
Proportion Inner, F(1,33) = 0.03, p = 0.862,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.001 (see also Figure 4.3). 
 
Irrelevants and Personally Known Probes.  When participants concealed 
recognition of personally known probes they made significantly less fixations 
compared to unknown irrelevants in only one eye movement measures, Number of 
fixations, t(34) = 7.67, p < 0.001, d = 1.05.  Run Counts, t(34) = 2.32, p < 0.026, d = 
0.37 and IAs Visited, t(34) = 0.89, p = 0.381, d = 0.17 were not significantly reduced 
when comparing irrelevants and personally known probes.  Although the Run Count 
data show a trend for reduced fixations with a small effect size this does not meet 
significance after Bonferroni corrections for three multiple comparisons.  Also 
contrary to predictions, proportion of fixations inner were significantly higher when 
viewing personally familiar targets compared to irrelevants, t(34) = -6.12, p < 0.001, 
d = -1.26. 
 
Irrelevants and Newly Learned Probes.  When participants concealed 
recognition of newly learned probes they made significantly less fixations compared 
to unknown irrelevants in three out of four eye movement measures, Number of 
Fixations, t(34) = 5.23, p < 0.001, d = 1.05, Run Counts, t(34) = 4.14, p < 0.001, d = 
0.37, IAs Visited, t(34) = 5.08, p < 0.001, d = 0.86.  There was no significant 
difference in the proportion of fixation made to the inner regions between 
Irrelevants and newly learned probes, t(34) = 0.27, p = 0.790, d = 0.05. 
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Targets and Probes.  Repeated Measures ANOVAS with the factors Task 
Instruction (2 levels: truth, lie) and Familiarity (2 levels: Newly Learned, Personally 
Known) were performed on the dependent measures Number of Fixations, Run 
Counts, IAs Visited, Proportion Inner (see also Figure 4.3).       
 
Analyses of Number of fixations revealed a main effect of Task Instruction, 
F(1,33) = 22.52, p < 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.41, a main effect of Familiarity, F(1,33) = 48.18, p 
< 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.60 and a significant interaction between Task Instruction and 
Familiarity, F(1,33) = 46.31, p < 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.58.  The main effect of Task 
Instruction revealed that fewer fixations were made during lie trials (M = 5.10, SEM 
= 0.24, SD = 1.40) than truth trials (M = 5.56, SEM = 0.21), t(34) = 4.50, p < 0.001, .  
The main effect of Familiarity revealed that fewer fixations were made during 
viewing of personally familiar objects and scenes (M = 4.74, SEM = 0.17) than those 
that were newly learned (M = 5.92, SEM = 0.28), t(34) = 7.14, p < 0.001, d = 0.86.  
The interaction between Task Instruction and Familiarity revealed that fewer 
fixations were made when lying (M = 5.39, SEM = 0.29) about recognition of newly 
learned objects and scenes compared to truthful trials (M = 6.45, SEM = 0.29), t(34) 
= 7.24, p < 0.001, d = 0.62.  There was no significant different between lie trials (M = 
4.81, SEM = 0.21) and truth (M = 4.66, SEM = 0.15) for personally familiar objects 
and scenes, t(34) = 1.24, p = 0.224, d = 0.14. 
 
Analyses of Run Counts revealed a main effect of Task Instruction, F(1,33) = 
4.97, p = 0.033,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.13 with fewer Run Counts during lie trials (M = 3.19, SEM = 
0.12) than truth trials (M = 3.36, SEM = 0.09).  There was no significant effect of 
familiarity, F(1,33) = 4.00,  p = 0.054,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.11.  A significant interaction between 
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Task Instruction and Familiarity, F(1,33) = 43.75, p < 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.29, revealed that 
Run Counts were fewer during lies about newly learned objects and scenes (M = 
3.09, SEM = 0.13) than truth trials (M = 3.61, SEM = 0.12), t(34) = 5.58, p < 0.001, d = 
0.70.  There was no significant difference between lie trials (M = 3.29, SEM = 0.13) 
and truth trials (M = 3.11, SEM = 0.08) when viewing personally familiar objects and 
scenes, t(34) = 1.81, p = 0.079, d = 0.30. 
 
Analyses of IAs Visited revealed no main effect of Task Instruction, F(1,33) = 
2.59, p = 0.117,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.07, or Familiarity, F(1,33) = 0.51, p = 0.482,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.02.  
However, a significant interaction between Task Instruction and Familiarity, F(1,33) 
= 15.30, p < 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.32, revealed that the fewer interest areas of newly learned 
scenes and objects were viewed during lie trials (M =  2.70, SEM = 0.05) than truth 
trials (M = 2.95, SEM = 0.06).  There was no significant difference in the number of 
interest areas viewed of personally familiar objects and scenes between lies (M = 
2.89, SEM = 0.07) and truths (M = 2.81, SEM = 0.05). 
 
Analyses of Proportion of Fixations Inner revealed no main effect of Task 
Instruction, F(1,33) = 0.02, p = 0.89,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.00.  There was, however a main effect of 
Familiarity, F(1,33) = 51.66, p < 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.61 that a smaller proportion of 
fixations were made to the inner areas of objects and scenes when viewing newly 
learned objects and scenes (M = 50.48, SEM = 0.90) than those that were personally 
familiar (M = 58.37, SEM = 1.31).  The was no significant interaction between Task 
Instruction and Familiarity, F(1,33) =2.96, p = 0.095,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.08. 
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 In sum, significant interactions between task instructions and familiarity 
reveal that liars tend to reduce their viewing behaviour when they lie about 
recognising newly learned objects and scenes.  This reduction in viewing behaviour 
emerged in the number of fixations, run counts and number of interest areas visited.  
Interestingly, no such reduction in viewing was observed during lies about 
personally familiar objects and scenes.  The data suggest that liars might be trying to 
control or reduce fixation behaviour to evade lie detection.  It is possible that the 
effect of attempted control is more evident when viewing newly learned objects and 
scenes that require more effortful recollection.  Whereas recognition of more 
familiar objects and scenes are likely more automatic in nature and thus fixations 
might be less vulnerable to attempted control. 
 
4.3.3. Fixation Durations 
First three fixations 
Newly learned objects and scenes.  A Repeated Measures ANOVA performed 
on fixation durations with the factors Task Instruction (3 levels: tell the truth about 
unknown irrelevants, tell the truth about newly learned targets, lie about newly 
learned probes) and Fixation (3 levels: first, second, and third) revealed a main 
effect of Task Instruction, F(2,68) = 5.26, p = 0.007,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.13, a main effect of 
Fixation, F(1.61,54.94) = 70.92, p < 0.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.68, and a significant interaction 
between Task Instruction and Fixation, F(2.5,85.03) = 3.12, p = 0.039,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.08 
(Figure 4.4). 
The main effect of task instruction revealed that, over the first three fixations, 
fixations durations were longer when lying about recognition of newly learned 
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probes (M = 261.49, SEM = 6.55) than unknown irrelevants (M = 238.32, SEM = 
4.40), t(34) = 3.84, p = 0.001, d = 0.70.  Fixation durations did not significantly differ 
when comparing honest identification of newly learned targets (M = 249.06, SEM = 
7.45) to unknown irrelevants (M = 238.32, SEM = 4.40), t(34) = 1.56, p = 0.13, d = 
0.41).  Honest identification of newly learned targets (M = 249.06, SEM = 7.45) also 
did not differ in fixation duration to lies about newly familiar probes (M = 261.49, 
SEM = 6.55), t(34) = 1.50, p = 0.144, d = 0.30. 
 
The main effect of fixation revealed that fixation durations did not differ from 
the first to the second fixations, t(34) = 1.64, p = 0.11, d = 0.31.  Fixation durations 
did significantly increase, however, from the second to the third fixations, t(34) = 
9.00, p < 0.001, d = 1.65.  The third fixation was also longer than the first, t(34) = 
9.43, p < 0.001, d =  1.98. 
 
Investigation of the interaction between Task Instruction and Fixation 
revealed that there were no significant differences in fixation duration in the first 
fixation between irrelevants and targets, t(34) = 0.89, p = 0.382, d = 0.12, irrelevants 
and probes, t(34) = 0.71, p = 0.480, d = 0.14, or targets and probes, t(34) = 1.36, p = 
0.182, d = 0.24.  In the second fixation, there were also no significant differences in 
fixation durations between irrelevants and targets, t(34) = 0.37, p = 0.71, d = 0.06.  
There was, however, a trend in the data to suggest that fixation durations were 
longer when lying about newly learned probes compared to irrelevants, t(34) = 
2.62, p = 0.013, d = 0.44.  Fixation durations were not significantly different when 
comparing honest identification of newly learned targets to lies about recognising 
newly learned probes, t(34) = 0.85, p = 0.400, d = 0.32.  In the third fixation, there 
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was a trend in the data towards longer fixation durations during recognition of 
newly familiar targets compared to irrelevants, t(34) = 2.04, p = 0.049, d = 0.43.  
Also in the third fixation, fixation durations to probes were significantly longer than 
to irrelevants, t(34) = 3.55, p = 0.001, d = 0.75.  There was no significant difference 
in fixation durations between targets and probes, t(34) = 0.85, p = 0.400, d = 0.18. 
 
 
Figure 4. 4. RM ANOVAs performed on average fixation durations recorded during viewing of 
unfamiliar and newly familiar objects and scenes (d.f. = 34 in each case), with Bonferroni adjustments 
for nine paired samples t-tests (α=0.006).  The y-axis shows data for the first three fixations 
individually.  In each graph, the irrelevant data (white bar) are the first comparison point for all truth 
targets (grey) and lie probes (blue).  Further t-tests were performed to compare fixation durations 
between targets and probes to assess if deception significantly increased fixation duration when 
viewing familiar faces only.  P<0.001***, p<0<006**.  Error bars represent M±SEM. 
  
 
Personally familiar objects and scenes.  A Second Repeated Measures ANOVA 
performed on fixation durations with the factors Task Instruction (3 levels: tell the 
truth about unknown irrelevants, tell the truth about personally familiar targets, lie 
about personally familiar probes) and Fixation (3 levels: first, second, and third) 
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revealed a main effect of Task Instruction, F(2,68) = 11.22, p < 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.25, a 
main effect of Fixation, F(1.59,54.07) = 49.57, p < 0.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.59, and a significant 
interaction between Task Instruction and Fixation, F(2.79,94.79) = 4.06, p = 0.011, 
 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.11 (Figure 4.5). 
 
The main effect of task instruction revealed that, over the first three fixations, 
fixation durations were longer during honest identification of personally known 
targets (M = 255.97, SEM = 7.53) compared to correct rejection of unknown 
irrelevants (M = 238.32, SEM = 4.40), t(34) = 2.54, p = 0.016, d = 0.48).  Fixations 
durations were also longer when lying about recognition of personally familiar 
probes (M = 279.19, SEM = 10.80) compared to unknown irrelevants (M = 238.32, 
SEM = 4.40), t(34) = 4.08, p < 0.001, d = 0.84.  Trials where participants lied about 
recognition of personally familiar probes (M = 279.19, SEM = 10.80) also produced 
longer fixation durations compared to honest recognition of personally familiar 
targets (M = 255.97, SEM = 7.53), t(34) = 2.66, p = 0.012, d = 0.42. 
 
The main effect of fixation revealed that a trend towards a significant 
increase in fixation durations from the first to the second fixation, t(34) = 2.18, p = 
0.036, d = 0.38.  Fixation durations did significantly increase, however, from the 
second to the third fixations, t(34) = 6.80, p < 0.001, d = 1.28.  The third fixation was 
also longer than the first, t(34) = 8.46, p < 0.001, d =  1.76. 
 
 Paired sample t-test performed to explore the interaction between Task 
Instruction and Fixation revealed no significant differences in the first fixation 
between irrelevants and targets, t(34) = 0.10, p = 0.920, d = 0.02.  There was, 
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however, a trend revealing an increase in fixation duration when lying about 
personally familiar probes (M = 230.36, SEM = 5.69) compared to correct rejection 
of unfamiliar irrelevants (M = 220.03, SEM = 4.21), t(34) = 2.06, p = 0.047, d = 0.35. 
There was no significant difference in fixation duration during responses to targets 
and probes, t(34) = 1.34, p = 0.190, d = 0.27.   
In the second fixation, there were also no significant differences in fixation 
durations between irrelevants and targets, t(34) = 0.10, p = 0.277, d = 0.23.  There 
was, however, a trend in the data to suggest that fixation durations were longer 
when lying about personally familiar probes (M = 258.76, SEM = 14.41) compared to 
irrelevants, t(34) = 2.74, p = 0.010, d = 0.56.  Fixation durations were not 
significantly different when comparing honest identification of personally familiar 
targets to lies about recognising personally familiar probes, t(34) = 1.96, p = 0.059, d 
= 0.34.   
In the third fixation, there was a trend in the data towards longer fixation 
durations during recognition of personally familiar targets (M = 313.79, SEM = 
14.50) compared to irrelevants (M = 272.59, SEM = 8.55), t(34) = 2.82, p = 0.008, d = 
0.59.  Also in the third fixation, fixation durations to probes (M = 348.45, SEM = 
20.09) were significantly longer than to irrelevants (M = 272.59, SEM = 8.55), t(34) = 
3.52, p = 0.001, d = 0.83.  There was also a trend towards a significant difference in 
fixation durations between targets (M = 313.79, SEM = 14.50) and probes (M = 
348.45, SEM = 20.09), t(34) = 0.2.10, p = 0.044, d = 0.33. 
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Figure 4. 5. RM ANOVAs performed on average fixation durations recorded during viewing of 
unfamiliar and personally familiar objects and scenes (d.f. = 34 in each case), with Bonferroni 
adjustments for nine paired samples t-tests (α=0.006).  The y-axis shows data for the first three 
fixations individually.  In each graph, the irrelevant data (white bar) are the first comparison point 
for all truth targets (grey) and lie probes (blue).  Further t-tests were performed to compare fixation 
durations between targets and probes to assess if deception significantly increased fixation duration 
when viewing familiar faces only.  P<0<006**.  Error bars represent M±SEM. 
 
In sum, longer fixation durations were observed during recognition of 
familiar objects and scenes in the third fixation (compared to unfamiliar irrelevants) 
after presentation of the test display.  Results were clearest during lies about 
familiar objects and scenes for both newly learned and personally familiar objects 
and scenes.  Increases in fixations observed during trials in which participants 
honestly identified targets, statistically speaking, only produced a trend in the data 
after Bonferroni corrections for multiple nine comparisons (α = 0.005).  It should 
also be noted that a trend in the data revealed a tendency for fixations durations 
also to be longer in the first and second fixation during trials in which participants 
lied about recognition of personally familiar objects and scenes.  A similar trend was 
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observed in fixations durations when lying about newly familiar probes, but not 
until the second fixation. 
 
Last 1500 ms 
Newly learned familiarity. A Repeated Measures ANOVA was performed on 
fixation duration with the factors, Task Instruction (3 levels: tell the truth about 
unknown irrelevants, tell the truth about newly learned targets, lie about newly 
learned probes) and Time Bin (3 levels: -1500>-1000, -1000>500, and -500>0).  The 
results revealed no main effect of Task Instruction, F(2,68) = 1.60, p = 0.209,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 
0.05.  There was, however, a main effect of Time Bin, F(2,68) = 31.34, p < 0.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
0.48, and a significant interaction between Task Instruction and Time Bin, F(4,136) 
= 3.14, p = 0.017,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.09 (see Figure 4.6). 
 
The main effect of Time Bin revealed that fixation durations increased across 
bins as time approached response selections, [-1500 to -1000], t(34) = 5.36, p < 
0.001, d = 0.79, [-1000 to -500], t(34) = 3.09, p = 0.004, d = 0.59.  Fixation Duration 
was also longer in Time Bin -500 compared to -1500, t(34) = 7.22, p < 0.001, d = 
1.45. 
 
The interaction between Time Bin and Task Instruction revealed that, in the 
time bin farthest from the response selection [-1500 to -1000], there were no 
significant differences in fixation duration between irrelevants and targets, t(34) = 
0.07, p = 0.946, d = 0.01, irrelevants and probes, t(34) = 0.94, p = 0.354, d = 0.13, or 
targets and probes, t(34) = 0.69, p = 0.49, d = 0.13.  In the penultimate time bin 
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before response selection [-1000 to -500] there were also no significant differences 
in fixation duration between irrelevants and targets, t(34) = 0.98, p = 0.34, d = 0.17, 
irrelevants and probes, t(34) = 0.24, p = 0.813, d = 0.04, or targets and probes, t(34) 
= 0.68, p = 0.50, d = 0.11.  However, in the last 500 ms time bin before the response 
selection was made [-500 to 0] there was a trend in the data that indicated longer 
fixation durations during recognition of newly familiar targets (M = 268.93, SEM = 
8.06) compared to unknown irrelevants (M = 250.71, SEM = 5.43), t(34) = 2.05, p = 
0.048, d = 0.45.  Fixation durations were significantly longer when lying about 
recognition of newly familiar probes (M = 280.07, SEM = 8.45) compared to correct 
rejection of unknown irrelevants (M = 250.71, SEM = 5.43), t(34) = 0.69, p = 0.002, d 
= 0.70.  There was no significant difference in fixation duration between newly 
familiar targets and probes, t(34) = 1.10, p = 0.280, d = 0.23. 
 
 
Figure 4. 6. RM ANOVAs performed on average fixation durations recorded during viewing of 
unfamiliar and newly familiar objects and scenes (d.f. = 34 in each case), with Bonferroni adjustments 
for nine paired samples t-tests (α=0.006).  The y-axis shows data for the last three time bins (500 ms) 
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before a response selection; -at 1500, -1000, -500 ms.  In each graph, the irrelevant data (white bar) 
are the first comparison point for all truth targets (grey) and lie probes (blue).  Further t-tests were 
performed to compare fixation durations between targets and probes to assess if deception 
significantly increased fixation duration when viewing familiar faces only.  P<0.001***, p<0.006**.  
Error bars represent M±SEM. 
 
 
Personally known familiarity. A Repeated Measures ANOVA was performed on 
fixation duration with the factors, Task Instruction (3 levels: tell the truth about 
unknown irrelevants, tell the truth about personally known targets, lie about 
personally known probes) and Time Bin (3 levels: [-1500>-1000], [-1000>500], and 
[-500>0]).  The results revealed no main effect of Task Instruction, F(2,68) = 2.53, p 
= 0.087,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.07.  There was, however, a main effect of Time Bin, F(2,68) = 49.40, p 
< 0.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.59, and a significant interaction between Task Instruction and Time 
Bin, F(2.96,100.70) = 10.06, p < 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.29 (see Figure 4.7). 
 
The main effect of Time Bin revealed that fixation durations increased across 
time bins as the time neared response selections, each time bin, [-1500 to -1000], 
t(34) = 5.13, p < 0.001, d = 0.83, [-1000 to -500], t(34) = 5.88, p < 0.001, d = 0.98.  
Fixation Duration was also longer in Time Bin -500 compared to -1500, t(34) = 8.50, 
p < 0.001, d = 1.83. 
 
The interaction between Time Bin and Task Instruction revealed that, in the 
time bin farthest from the response selection [-1500 to -1000], there was an 
unexpected trend in the data to suggest that fixation durations were shorter during 
recognition of personally familiar targets (M = 197.06, SEM = 8.19) compared to 
unfamiliar irrelevants (M = 219.29, SEM = 6.84), t(34) = 2.78, p = 0.009, d = 0.50.  
Also contrary to predictions, there was a trend in the data that suggested fixations 
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were shorter when participants lied about recognising personally familiar probes 
(M = 202.57, SEM = 9.46) compared to correct rejection of unfamiliar irrelevants (M 
= 219.29, SEM = 6.84), t(34) = 0.2.24, p = 0.032, d = 0.34.  There was no significant 
difference in fixation duration between targets and probes, t(34) = 0.61, p = 0.544, d 
= 0.11.  In the penultimate time bin before response selection [-1000 to -500] there 
was an unexpected trend in the data that suggested fixation durations were shorter 
when participants made honest recognition judgements to personally familiar 
targets (M = 225.83, SEM = 6.73) compared to unfamiliar probes (M = 243.85, SEM = 
7.03), t(34) = -2.58, p = 0.014, d = -0.44.  Also unexpectedly, fixations were no longer 
in duration when participants lied about recognition of personally familiar probes 
compared to correct rejection of unfamiliar irrelevants, t(34) = 0.41, p = 0.682, d = 
0.06.  However, fixation durations were longer during lies about recognition of 
personally familiar probes (M = 246.58, SEM = 8.78) compared to honest recognition 
responses to personally familiar targets (M = 225.83, SEM = 6.73), t(34) = 0.3.07, p = 
0.004, d = 0.45.   
 
Consistent with predictions, in the last 500 ms time bin before the response 
selection was made [-500 to 0] fixation durations were significantly longer during 
recognition of personally familiar targets (M = 283.75, SEM = 7.75) compared to 
unfamiliar irrelevants (M = 250.71, SEM = 5.44), t(34) = 4.12, p < 0.001, d = 0.83.  
Also consistent with predictions, fixation durations were significantly longer when 
lying about recognition of newly familiar probes (M = 289.24, SEM = 9.58) compared 
to correct rejection of unknown irrelevants (M = 250.71, SEM = 5.44), t(34) = 3.07, p 
= 0.001, d = 0.84.  There was no significant difference in fixation duration between 
newly familiar targets and probes, t(34) = 0.67, p = 0.507, d = 0.11. 
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In sum, analyses revealed that fixation durations were longer during the 500 
ms that preceded participants’ response selection during honest identification of 
familiar targets as well as during lies about familiar probes.  Results were similar for 
both newly familiar and personally known objects and scenes, with the exception 
that the increase in fixation durations observed during honest identification of 
newly familiar targets, statistically speaking, only produced a trend after correction 
for multiple comparison (α = 0.005).   
 
 
 
Figure 4. 7. RM ANOVAs performed on average fixation durations recorded during viewing of 
unfamiliar and personally familiar objects and scenes (d.f. = 34 in each case), with Bonferroni 
adjustments for nine paired samples t-tests (α=0.006).  The y-axis shows data for the last three time 
bins (500 ms) before a response selection; -at 1500, -1000, -500 ms.  In each graph, the irrelevant 
data (white bar) are the first comparison point for all truth targets (grey) and lie probes (blue).  
Further t-tests were performed to compare fixation durations between targets and probes to assess if 
deception significantly increased fixation duration when viewing familiar faces only.  P<0.001***, 
p<0<006**.  Error bars represent M±SEM. 
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4.3.4. Verbal Confidence Ratings 
 
Truth trials (Irrelevants and Targets) 
Repeated Measures ANOVAs were performed on truth trials with three 
independent levels of task instruction; tell the truth about unfamiliar irrelevants, tell 
the truth about newly learned targets, and tell the truth about personally known 
targets.  Analyses revealed a main effect of task instruction, F(2,66) = 15.22, p < 
0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2   = 0.32 (Figure 4.8).  There was no effect of the order in which lying blocks 
were presented, F(1,33) = 0.00, p = 0.997,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.00 (see Figure 4.8). 
 
Post hoc tests revealed no significant differences in confidence rating 
variability between irrelevants (M = 8.03, SEM = 1.11) and newly familiar targets (M 
= 7.22, SEM = 0.89), t(34) = 0.73, p = 0.470, d =  0.14.  However verbal confidence 
ratings displayed less variability when participants correctly identified personally 
familiar faces (M = 2.55, SEM = 0.69) compare to unfamiliar irrelevants (M = 8.03, 
SEM = 1.11), t(34) = 5.08, p < 0.001, d = 1.00. 
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Figure 4. 8. RM ANOVAs performed on variability in confidence ratings (SD) recorded during viewing 
of unfamiliar, newly familiar and personally familiar faces (d.f. = 34 in each case), with Bonferroni 
adjustments for three paired samples t-tests for each RM ANOVA (α=0.017).  The y-axis shows data 
for objects and scenes for three categories of familiarity, Unfamiliar (UF), Familiar-Learned (F-L), 
Familiar-Personal.  In each graph, the unfamiliar irrelevant (UF) data (white bar) are the first 
comparison point for all truth targets (grey) and lie probes (blue).  p < 0.001***, p < 0.01**, p < 
0.017*.  Additional t-test were performed on confidence variability between targets and probes.  
Error bars represent M±SEM. 
 
 
Lie trials (Irrelevants and probes). 
Repeated Measures ANOVAs were performed on truth trials with three 
independent levels of task instruction; tell the truth about unfamiliar irrelevants, lie 
about newly learned probes, and lie about personally known probes.  Analyses 
revealed a main effect of task instruction, F(2,66) = 3.78, p = 0.028,  𝜂𝑝
2   = 0.10 
(Figure 4.8).  There was no effect of the order in which lying blocks were presented, 
F(1,33) = 0.03, p = 0.862,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.00 (see Figure 4.8). 
Post hoc tests revealed that revealed no significant difference in variability of 
verbal confidence ratings between irrelevants (M = 8.03, SEM = 1.11) and newly 
familiar probes (M = 8.13, SEM = 1.42), t(34) = 0.10, p = 0.923, d = 0.01.  However, 
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when participants lied about recognition of personally familiar probes their 
confidence ratings displayed less variability (M = 5.74, SEM = 1.06) than when 
correctly rejecting irrelevant faces that were actually unknown (M = 8.03, SEM = 
1.11), t(34) = 2.73, p = 0.10, d = 0.36. 
 
A final RM ANOVA was performed to determine if there were significant 
differences in variability without the inclusion of the irrelevant items.  Two within 
subjects factors were entered for analyses, Task Instruction (2 levels: Truth-Targets, 
Lie-Probes) and Familiarity (2 levels: Newly learned, Personally familiar).  A main 
effect of Task Instruction revealed that variability in verbal confidence ratings were 
higher when lying about familiar probes (M = 6.94, SEM = 1.10) than telling the truth 
about targets (M = 4.88, SEM = 0.61), t(34) =  2.47, p = 0.019, d = 0.39.  A main effect 
of Familiarity revealed that variability in verbal confidence ratings were lower when 
rating personally familiar faces (M = 4.14, SEM = 0.74) compared to newly learned 
faces (M = 7.68, SEM = 1.02), t(34) = 4.18, p < 0.001, d = 0.67.  A significant 
interaction between Task Instruction and Familiarity revealed that variability in 
verbal confidence ratings for newly learned familiarity did not significantly differ 
between truths (M = 7.22, SEM = 0.89) and lie trials (M = 8.13, SEM = 1.42), t(34) = 
0.76, p = 0.455, d = 0.13.  However, variability on verbal confidence ratings for 
personally known probes were higher during lie trials (M = 5.74, SEM = 1.06) 
compared to ratings for targets during truth trials (M = 2.55, SEM = 0.69), t(34) = 
3.20, p = 0.003, d = 0.60 (see Figure 4.8). 
 
In sum, less variability was displayed during verbal confidence ratings during 
honest recognition of personally familiar targets, and during lies about personally 
 179 
familiar probes, compared to unknown irrelevants.  Thus lower variability in verbal 
confidence ratings expose memory strength for personally familiarity when liars 
claim that they do not recognise well known faces.  Unexpectedly lairs increased 
variability in their verbal confidence ratings of probes compared targets which was 
opposite to predictions, although variability for probes was still lower than 
irrelevants. 
 
4.3.5. Variability in number of regions of the 
confidence scale viewed. 
 Irrelevants and Targets: A RM ANOVA was performed on the variability in the 
number of regions of the confidence scale viewed with one within subjects factors, 
Task Instruction (3 levels: tell the truth about unfamiliar irrelevants, tell the truth 
about newly learned targets, and tell the truth about personally familiar targets).  
The order of block counterbalancing was also entered as a between subjects factor.  
There was no main effect of Task Instruction, F(2,66) = 1.22, p = 0.157,  𝜂𝑝
2   = 0.06, or 
of block counterbalancing order, F(1,33) = 2.10, p = 0.702,  𝜂𝑝
2   = 0.00. 
 
 Irrelevants and Probes: A RM ANOVA performed on the variability in the 
number of the regions viewed on the confidence scale with one within subject 
factor, Task instruction (3 levels: tell the truth about unknown irrelevants, lie about 
newly learned probes, lie about personally familiar probes) revealed no main effect 
of Task Instruction, F(2,66) = 2.67, p = 0.077,  𝜂𝑝
2   = 0.08, or of block 
counterbalancing order, F(1,33) = 0.36, p = 0.552,  𝜂𝑝
2   = 0.01. 
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 Targets and Probes: A RM ANOVA performed with two within subjects factors, 
Task Instruction (2 levels: Truth, Lie) and Familiarity (2 levels: Newly learned, 
Personally familiar) revealed no main effect of Task Instruction, F(1,33) = 0.13, p = 
0.723,  𝜂𝑝
2   = 0.00, Familiarity, F(1,33) = 0.16, p = 0.695,  𝜂𝑝
2   = 0.00, or any interaction 
between Task Instruction and Familiarity, F(1,33) = 0.58, p = 0.452,  𝜂𝑝
2   = 0.01.  
There was also no effect of block counterbalancing order, F(1,33) = 1.36, p = 0.252, 
 𝜂𝑝
2   = 0.04. 
 
4.3.6. Deception Questionnaires. 
Face viewing strategies.  28 out of 35 (80%) participants reported trying to 
use some sort of eye movement strategy when they were lying about recognition.  
However, 14 out of 28 (50%) reported that they simply tried to look at the 
photographs in the same way during both truths and lies, but they did not explicitly 
state how.  10 out of 28 (36%) said that they explicitly tried to look less when lying 
about recognition.  Three participants explicitly reported trying to keep their 
fixations focussed to the centre of the photographic image during lie trials, which 
might also be indicate a reduction in viewing behaviour.  One remaining participant 
reported trying to look more at the photographs during lie trials. 
 
Verbal confidence rating strategies.  All 35 participants reported some 
sort of strategy when lying about confidence ratings.  Forty-three per cent of 
participants said that they intentionally reported high confidence ratings to appear 
convincing when lying about recognition.  14 (40%) said they tried to keep 
confidence ratings the same during truths and lies.  Four participants reported 
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trying to vary confidence ratings during lies so as not to appear too obvious to the 
experimenter, and two participants said they reported lower confidence ratings 
during lies. 
 
Only 40% of liars thought they were successful in evading lie detection during 
recognition trials and confidence ratings.  Two participants explained why they 
thought they failed at evading lie detection: 1. It is very difficult to moderate eye 
movements, and 2. I do not believe myself to be conscious of my eye movements whilst 
lying so I wouldn't know what to do in a natural situation thus I could not apply real 
experience to my attempt at deceit.  Furthermore, the majority of participants 
reported that they found it hardest to lie about recognition of photographs of 
personally familiar objects and scenes.   
 
Examples of why participants found it hard to lie about personally familiar 
photographs generally referred to the automatic nature of recognition for well-
known scenes and objects:  
 
“Because I naturally recognised them and had to consciously switch the 
answer in my head, then tell my hands and voice to do the opposite of 
what they did instinctively.  3. You couldn’t just forget them, they were 
encoded in my LTM, learned objects were still in my working memory, I 
attempted to scrap them.”   
 
“Harder to lie about things you know so well.”   
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One example of one participant’s reason for finding it most difficult to lie about 
newly learned objects and scenes: 
“Because I was having to think about them more during the experiment 
because I had only just learnt them so took longer to identify them as 
familiar and in turn longer to figure out whether to lie or not.” 
 
4.3.7. Discussion 
The present experiment tested whether fixation quantity and duration would 
expose memory for recognised scenes and objects that varied in familiarity despite 
explicit denial of recognition.  It also explored whether patterns of confidence 
ratings would reveal memory for familiar scenes and objects despite explicit 
confidence reports indicating that they were unfamiliar. 
 
During lies, a significant decrease in the number of fixations, with a large 
effect size, indicated memory for personally familiar scenes and objects despite 
explicit denial of recognition via button presses and verbal reports.  A trend in the 
data also revealed a reduction in run counts that suggested memory for familiar 
scenes and objects, with a small to medium effect size.  These results support 
predictions that a decrease in fixation quantity would reveal memory for personally 
familiar scenes and objects.  These results are also consistent with basic eye 
movement research that also found a decrease in number of fixations when viewing 
photographs of personally familiar buildings during a standard recognition task 
(Althoff et al., 1999).  These findings support and extend evidence of memory effects 
found by Althoff et al. (1999) to include the measure run count and most 
 183 
importantly provide new evidence that memory effects can reveal recognition when 
liars attempt to conceal recognition of personally familiar scenes and objects.  The 
results are also consistent with mock crime studies that found memory effects 
observed in fewer fixations for objects that were central to a mock crime event 
(Peth et al., 2013). 
 
The present research also found a decrease in number of fixations, run 
counts and number of interest areas visited (large effect sizes for fixation count and 
IAs visited) during lies about newly learned photographs of scenes and objects.  
However, comparison of the same fixation measures for honest recognition of newly 
learned scenes and objects do not reveal the same pattern in fixations which 
suggests that the reduction in fixations during lies might be a result of participants 
attempting to control their eye movements during lies.  This is a very similar result 
to that found for faces in Experiment 2.  Thus, although lying produces significant 
difference in fixations to newly familiar photographs compared to fixations to 
photographs that were actually unfamiliar it would be presumptuous to assume that 
these were a product of recognition for the newly familiar scenes and objects.  They 
are, however, an indirect effect of memory considering that participants would have 
to remember the scene or object in order to suppress the response to that item.   
 
Considering that previous mock crime research has failed to uncover memory 
effects for photographs of objects that were only peripheral to the mock crime task.  
The results suggest that participants may be exerting volitional control over eye 
movements.  Consistent with this idea, 80% percent of the participants in the 
present experiment reported attempts to adopt strategies that involved control of 
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eye movements although these strategies varied with half of the participants 
reporting that they simply tried to maintain similar eye movement behaviour during 
truth and lie trials and a further 36% explicitly reported that they attempted to 
reduce eye movement behaviour during lies about recognition.   
 
It is pertinent to note that the newly learned items in the current experiment 
were learned to criterion and thus should be similarly familiarly encoded to the 
central crime details in the study of Peth et al (2013).  However, it is also possible 
that the learning of ten newly familiar items at the start of each test block was too 
high a memory load for participants, according to information theory that states that 
human memory has limits for information processing for approximately seven items 
(Miller, 1956).  Despite all participants learning all ten items to the satisfactory 
criterion it is possible that they forgot the items soon after.  Forgetting combined 
with cognitive effort for recollection and lying may have resulted in participants 
averting their gaze (Doherty-Sneddon et al., 2002; Doherty-Sneddon & Phelps, 
2005).  The effort of both tasks combined may well have produced the significant 
decrease (with large effect size) in number of fixation, run counts and interest areas 
visited observed in the present experiment and in addition to Experiment 2.  Future 
research might reduce the load of the memory task to directly examine the effect of 
memory load on gaze during deception in addition to examine deceptive strategies 
more carefully also with the inclusion of a between subjects factor for different 
strategies.   
 
The present experiment also explored the ability of fixation duration to 
reveal recognition of newly learned and personally familiar scenes and objects.  
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Fixation durations were longer during concealed recognition of both newly learned 
and personally familiar objects and scenes showing robust and large memory effects 
by the third fixation after presentation of photographs.  Although it should be noted 
that honest recognition of newly learned and personally familiar scenes and objects 
only produced a trend for increased fixation durations, and thus the significant 
effects for found for lies about probes appear to be a combined product of memory 
effects and efforts for deception (Griffin & Oppenheimer, 2006; Hannula et al., 
2007).  It is also noted that the combined effects of memory and deception produced 
trends in the fixation duration data during lies about personally familiar scenes and 
objects as early as the first fixation.  A similar trend was observed in fixations 
durations when lying about newly familiar probes, but not until the second fixation.  
Furthermore, longer fixation durations also clearly distinguished lies about probes 
compared to irrelevants in the last 500 ms before liars explicitly denied recognition 
via a button press and accompanying verbal response.  These results provide new 
findings for the ability of fixation durations to reveal recognition of both newly 
learned and personally familiar scenes and objects.  It also suggests that memory 
and efforts for deception are closely linked in the time-course of the present 
experiment as no effect of memory appeared in the first three fixations during truth 
trials.  Peth et al. (2013) found increases in fixation duration during concealed 
recognition of objects central to a mock crime but found no evidence for effects of 
memory or deception for objects that were peripheral to the mock crime and less 
well encoded.  The research suggests that fixation duration might be a better 
measure for memory detection such that it distinguished lies about recognition in 
the first three fixations as well as directly before explicit responses (500 ms) with 
large effect sizes, and are less likely to be vulnerable to intentional manipulation 
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(Rayner, 1998).  Also, since increases in effort during deception serve to augment 
differences in fixation duration, they do not pose the same vulnerability as memory 
effects manifested in fixation quantity, which are potentially diminished by 
increases in fixation during cognitive effort. 
 
  Furthermore, predictions that liars would display more variability in verbal 
confidence ratings for objects and scenes that were unfamiliar, compared to familiar 
objects and scenes where familiarity was denied, were partially supported by the 
data.  Less variability was found in verbal confidence ratings for personally familiar 
objects and scenes but not for those that were newly learned.  Thus reduced 
variability in the patterns of verbal confidence ratings for personally significant 
items might potentially be used to indicate concealed memory but not for lesser 
known items.  Also, an unexpected interaction occurred in variability of verbal 
confidence ratings between honest responses to personally familiar items and 
deceptive confidence ratings.  Liars produced significantly more variability when 
lying about confidence of personally familiar scenes and objects compared 
equivalent truthful responses to personally familiar items.  Assessment of the 
Deception Strategies Questionnaire revealed that all participants reported some sort 
of confidence reporting strategy.  The majority (43%) said they intentionally 
reported high confidence during lies which would suggest that there would be less 
variability in their confidence ratings.  A further 40% reported that they tried to give 
similar ratings during both truths and lies.  Despite attempted strategies, variability 
in verbal confidence ratings still distinguished lies stating no recognition of 
personally familiar objects and scenes from those that were actually unfamiliar.  The 
results suggest that participants did not or could not produce patterns of confidence 
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variability that reflect truly unfamiliar items.  Assessment of variability in patterns 
of confidence ratings show promise as a future approach for memory detection, but 
future research should address how best to access patterns of confidence during lies 
about less familiar items.   
 
In conclusion, the present experiment supports that memory effects 
generalise also to non-face objects.  This finding is consistent with Althoff and Cohen 
(1998) and Peth et al (2013).  Memory effects were reliably found in fixation 
durations and reliably distinguished lies about recognition with a large effect sizes 
that appeared to be a result of combined effects of memory and deception.  Fixation 
quantity also revealed reliably memory effects in the number of fixations also with 
large effects sizes for personally known probes compared photographs of objects 
and scenes that were actually unfamiliar.  The current experiment, however advises 
caution in the interpretation of reduced number of fixations during concealed 
recognition of newly learned items as the data suggest they are a consequence of 
cognitive effort and attempted strategies to reduce eye movement behaviour as 
opposed to effects of memory per se.  Future research should directly explore the 
vulnerability of fixation quantity to intentional strategies.  Overall, the present 
research concludes that fixations can be used to identify concealed recognition of 
objects and scenes in addition to the findings for faces in the previous experiments.  
Furthermore, memory effects are most reliably found in fixation durations and that, 
in the present experiment, the effect of deception further augmented differences 
between honest responses to irrelevants and lies about probes.    
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CHAPTER 5.   
 
 
Faces in context: Do fixations reveal 
memory for faces associated with specific 
scenes? 
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5.1. Introduction 
 Experiment 4 posed a different set of challenges than defined in Experiments 
1-3, wherein the focus was if fixations could distinguish between familiar and 
unfamiliar faces.  However, real-world scenarios may be more challenging than 
identifying between known and unknown persons.  Consider the following scenario: 
Investigators have identified two suspects to a particular crime. Both suspects are 
equally known to the witness but only one suspect is linked to the crime in context.  
The examiners task is to identify the real culprit (crime-relevant probe) and reject 
the innocent (familiar, but crime-irrelevant target).  The deceptive witness chooses 
to protect the culprit (perhaps a friend or criminal associate) and thus conceals 
identification of the culprit in relation to the crime in question.  As part of the lie, the 
deceptive witness chooses to falsely incriminate the innocent suspect (perhaps to 
distract attention from the real culprit).  The central question is whether fixation 
location and durations can reveal recognition of the correct face-scene relationship 
when a witness is intentionally trying to incriminate the wrong person.  
Additionally, fixations are analysed to further explore whether cognitive load during 
lies about associations also increases fixation quantity and duration as suggested in 
Experiments 1-3.  
 
The study of relational memory effects in patterns of fixation behaviour is 
relatively new in the eye movement monitoring literature (Hannula & Ranganath, 
2009; Hannula, Ryan, Tranel, & Cohen, 2007; Hannula, Ranganath, et al., 2010; Ryan, 
Althoff, Whitlow, & Cohen, 2000).  Memory effects, as discussed in the thesis so far, 
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have supported assertions that eye movements are capable of revealing memory for 
newly familiar and well-known faces when contrasted with viewing of unknown 
faces using both single face displays (Althoff & Cohen, 1999; Althoff, 1998; Heisz & 
Shore, 2008) and multiple face displays (Ryan et al., 2007; Schwedes & Wentura, 
2012) even when these faces have a high degree of perceptual overlap (Hannula et 
al., 2012).  However, the question central to the present experiment is whether 
fixations can reveal memory for inter item relations among equally familiar faces 
and scenes.  Two published studies have explored evidence of relational memory for 
arbitrary face-scene pairings in viewer’s eye movements behaviour (Hannula & 
Ranganath, 2009; Hannula et al., 2007). 
 
Hannula et al. (2007) explored relational memory effects in fixation 
behaviour to presentations of faces superimposed on scenic background 
photographs that they had previously been paired with during a study phase (face-
scene relations).  Prior to the recognition test, Hannula and colleagues (2007) 
presented participants with 36 arbitrary face-scene pairings during a study block.  
Participants were first presented with a scene for 3 secs, followed by the 
presentation of a single face superimposed on the centre of the scene (face-scene 
pair) for a further 5 secs.  Participants were instructed to learn the face-scene pairs 
so that they would be able to identify the face that matched each specific scene 
during the recognition test.  At test, participants were presented with a 3 sec 
preview of an earlier studied scene (scene preview) followed by presentation of 
three faces superimposed on that same scene for 10 sec.  The scene preview was 
intended to encourage retrieval of the associated face prior to the test display to 
guide viewing behaviour among the three faces so that differential viewing to the 
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matching face might emerge earlier in the test trial (typically memory for inter-item 
relations becomes available later in time than memory for individual items; Dietl et 
al., 2005; Gronlund & Ratcliff, 1989).   
 
Three different display types were presented in each test block; match, re-
pair and novel displays.  In match displays all three faces were equally familiar from 
the study phase, only one face matched the scene on which they were presented.  In 
re-pair displays all three faces were equally familiar from the study phase, but none 
matched the scene on which they were presented.  In novel displays, none of the 
faces had been seen before.  Participants were instructed to identify the matching 
face in each three-face display type (match, re-pair, novel) even if they did not think 
a match was present by pressing a button corresponding to the spatial location of 
the face.  The results within match test displays revealed that participants viewed 
the matching face disproportionately more (proportion of fixations and proportion 
of time) compared to the other equally familiar faces in match displays, revealing 
memory for the critical face-scene match.  This preferential viewing of the matching 
face reached nearly 57% (significantly greater than predicted by 33% chance) of 
total viewing time as early as 500-750 ms after the test screen was presented and 
1500 ms prior to response selection.  Similar results were found in a second 
experiment where participants were instructed simply to study the three faces 
along with the associated scene for a later recognition test.  The findings in the 
second experiment further suggest that relational memory effects are spontaneous 
or involuntary in nature, as are memory effects for single items (i.e., Althoff & Cohen, 
1999). 
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To explore whether fixation behaviour might expose lies about face scene 
relations, three changes were made to the experimental design from Experiments 1-
3 presented in the current thesis.  The most important design change was to exclude 
the use of unknown (irrelevant) items typically used for memory detection, and 
instead attempt to identify memory based on the relationship between faces and 
scenes.  With this change, the present experiment moved away from designs based 
on CIT three stimulus protocols to a design more representative of a differentiation 
of deception paradigm (Dionisio, Granholm, Hillix, & Perrine, 2001; Furedy, Davis, & 
Gurevich, 1988).  The differentiation of deception paradigm aims to identify specific 
patterns in behavioural or physiological variables that differ systematically between 
truthful and deceptive behaviour.  Participants are asked to lie on half the items and 
tell the truth on the other half, sometimes using the same items in both conditions.   
 
In the current experiment, the learning procedure was modified so that all 
faces and scenes were learned to a criterion that produced similar familiarity 
(Hannula et al., 2007).   In lie trials, deceptive participants had to specifically identify 
and select the familiar face that did not match the scene.  In terms of response 
planning this differs from single button presses made to single faces in Experiments 
1-3.  Selecting an alternative face might require more complex decision making 
processes than in the previous experiment (Lefebvre et al., 2009), but also 
potentially offers further opportunity to detect deceit based on pattern of fixations 
to both faces.  This design posed a new challenge for eye movements as markers of 
memory.  It is unknown whether, if all other factors are considered equal, memory 
of a particular face-scene relation and cognitive efforts required for the suppression 
of the true match are distinct enough to effect change on fixation behaviour to 
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differentiate deception when lying about similarly familiar faces.  Experiment 4 
addresses this previously untested question. 
 
The experimental design, based on Hannula et al. (Hannula et al., 2010), was 
adapted to address questions related to lies about face-scene relations.  The present 
experiment was the first to explore memory for faces associate with specific scenes 
via the monitoring of fixation behaviour.  Specifically, Experiment 4 aimed to 
explore the effect of both information processing linked to memory retrieval as well 
as explicit choices based on deceptive response selections.  To achieve this goal, the 
present experiment analysed the proportion of trials made to the matching face 
(Hannula et al., 2010) in the first and last fixations as well as the mean duration of 
these individual fixations  (Ryan et al., 2007; Schwedes & Wentura, 2012).  
Furthermore, the present research also examined the effects of memory and 
cognitive load overall in the number of fixations and run counts made to the 
different faces during truths and lies.  Analyses directly compared fixation 
behaviour between truthful trials (correct identification of matching face) and lie 
trials (intentional misidentifications of non-matching face).  
 
Based on Hannula et al.'s (2007) findings that viewers preferentially view 
faces matched to specific scenes and claims that relational memory effects might be 
involuntary in nature, our first predictions were that both truth-tellers and liars 
would display a preference to fixate the matching face in the first fixation 
(Prediction 1a) as well as longer fixation durations to the matching face during that 
first fixation (Prediction 1b).  Also based on Hannula et al (2007; see also Hannula 
2009), it was predicted that liars would preferentially fixate the to-be-selected face 
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in the last fixation (Prediction 2a) in addition to longer fixations during that last 
fixation just prior to response selection (Ryan et al., 2007) (Prediction 2b). More 
general predictions were that task demands would be greater for liars than truth 
tellers as observed in more fixations behaviour overall during deceptive selection 
choices (Cook, Hacker, Webb, Osher, Kristjansson, Woltz, & Kircher, 2012), 
specifically it is predicted that deception would produce an increase in both number 
of fixations (Prediction 3a) and run counts (Prediction 3b).  A final supplementary 
prediction, although not central to the question in the present experiment, is that 
liars’ reported confidence based on their deceptive recognition judgements will be 
inflated as compared to ratings based on honest judgements (Prediction 4). 
 
5.2. Method 
5.2.1. Design 
A within subjects design independently manipulated task instruction (2 
levels of veracity: honestly identify matching face, deceptively select non-matching 
face).  On each trial participants were presented with a single display that 
comprised one scene with two faces displayed centrally on the background scene: a 
familiar face that matched the scene in the display (match) and another face that 
was familiar but did not match the scene in the display (non-match) (see Figure 5.2).  
There were six unique test screens in each block of trials.  The six test screen were 
repeated twice within each test block so that all participants told the truth (correctly 
identified matching face) and lied (misidentified non-matching face) about which 
face that matched the scene in each test screen.  There were three blocks in total.  
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Unique pairs of faces and scenes were learned prior to each block of trials.  The 
order in which each block of trials was presented was fully counterbalanced.  The 
location of the matching face was counterbalanced so that the position of the 
matching face was on the left side of the display for half the trials.   
5.2.2. Participants 
Sixty-four undergraduate psychology students (47 females, 17 males) from 
The University of Portsmouth participated in the study.  Mean ages ranged from 18 – 
42 years (M = 19.47, SD = 3.94).  All participants had normal or normal-to-corrected 
vision.  All participants received course credit for participation. 
 
5.2.3. Apparatus and Materials 
Eye tracker 
As in Experiments 1-3, eye movements were recorded with the Eyelink II head 
mounted eye tracker (SR Research, Ontario, Canada) at a sampling rate of 250 Hz.  
Sixty-one participant’s eye movements were tracked using both retinal and corneal 
reflection.  The remaining 3 participants were tracked using Pupil only mode due to 
difficulties detecting corneal reflections.  Forty-three participants were tracked 
using the left eye, and 21 with the right eye.  Button presses were recorded with the 
Microsoft sidewinder Plug and Play game pad. 
 
Photographs 
Photographic stimuli for the experiment were 36 scenes and 36 photographs 
of previously unseen faces.  All faces were male with eye gaze directed towards the 
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camera with neutral expressions (faces were sourced from the database created for 
the present thesis as cited in Experiment 1 (see section 2.2.3).  Photographs of 
scenes required for the study phase were printed on A4 photographic paper, four 
per page, cut to the same size and laminated.  Faces for the study phase were also 
printed on A4 photographic paper, six per page, cut to the same size and laminated.  
For the test screen, all faces were re-sized to 333 x 250 pixels and superimposed 
centrally and side-by-side on the background scene measuring 800 x 600 pixels.  All 
test screens were presented centrally on the display screen with a blue background 
(HEX: #5DBCD2). 
 
Deception Questionnaires 
 The deception questionnaire included four open ended questions: 1. In general 
what behaviours do you think people do when they (a) lie, (b) tell the truth? 2. What 
behaviours do you think you actually do when you (a) lie, (b) tell the truth? 3. What 
did you do to try and convince the experimenter you were telling the truth about the 
face that matched the scene during (a) lies, (b) truths? 4. What did you do to try and 
convince the experimenter you were telling the truth about the confidence of your 
judgement during (a) lies, (b) truths?  The participant was also asked to report if 
they thought they were successful in their attempt to deceive the experimenter 
when lying (yes or no) and to explain why.  In addition the participant was asked to 
indicate when they did more of specific behaviours (such as looking more at the 
matching face or looking more at the confidence scale) by circling one of three 
options; lying, truth-telling or no difference.  In the final part of the questionnaire 
participants were presented with an image that displayed two faces, one which was 
marked as a matching face.  Participants were instructed to mark on the image 
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whether they think they looked more during lie and truth trials; the matching face, 
the non-matching face or the background (see Figure 5.1 below for an example of 
one participant’s data). 
 
 
 
Figure 5. 1. Example of one participant’s report about their face viewing behaviour during truths and 
lies.  In each diagram, the face on the left is the matching face as indicated by the word ‘match’ on the 
forehead of the image. 
 
5.3. Procedure 
 Participants were seated in a chair at a desk to the side of the eye tracker.  
Following completion of the brief and consent forms participants were presented 
with twelve scenes and asked to look at them and familiarise themselves with each 
scene individually.  When the participant indicated that they had adequately 
 198 
inspected each scene, a face was placed on top of each of the twelve scenes.  The 
participant was asked to commit to memory each face-scene pair and again indicate 
when they had learned the matching pairs.  The experimenter then shuffled the 
scene and face cards, spread the scenes out on the desk and handed the participant 
the face cards.  The participant was instructed that they must correctly match all 
face-scene pairs 100% correctly twice consecutively before proceeding to the test.   
 
Once the criterion-for-learning was met the participant was seated in a chair 
in front of the eye tracker, approximately 80 cm from the display screen.  The height 
of the seat was adjusted so that the participant’s eyes rested at approximately two 
thirds of the height of the screen.  The Eyelink II headband was comfortably secured 
to the participants’ head before carrying out a calibration procedure using a 3 x 3 
spatial dot array as in previous experiments.   
 
At test, the participant was sequentially presented with six different test 
screens in each block of trials.  There were three blocks in total.  Prior to each test 
screen the participant was presented first with a fixation dot, followed by a scene 
cue screen (2 seconds), then a screen that instructed whether the participant was to 
tell the Truth or Lie (2 seconds), followed by the test screen that was displayed until 
the participant made the appropriate response (see Figure 5.2).   On each test screen 
was a scene and two faces from the study phase positioned, side by side, in the 
centre of the scene.  The six scenes presented at test were selected randomly from 
the twelve presented during the study phase.  The remaining six scenes from the 
study phase were not presented.  On each test screen, one of the faces always 
matched the scene presented as learned during the study phase, the other face was 
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also familiar from the study phase but was not the correct match for the scene 
displayed.  Participants selected the left or right face based on the task instruction 
by pressing the left or right button on the game pad whilst verbally reporting the 
location of the selected face (e.g, left) at the same time as the button press.  
Following each test screen, participants were presented with a confidence scale to 
which reported how confident they were about their previous recognition 
judgement whilst at the same time pressing any of the two buttons on the game pad.  
The instructions for both recognition and confidence judgements were that they 
should try to appear honest even when lying and that their eye movements (fixation 
locations and durations), button presses and verbal reports were being recorded to 
assess veracity.  When all three blocks were finished, participants completed a 
Deception Strategies Questionnaire. 
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Figure 5. 2. The sequence of display screens for each trial commenced with presentation of a fixation 
dot that remained until the participant accurately fixated the central point.  The next screen 
presented the scene preview for two seconds followed by the task instruction for two seconds.  The 
test screen was then displayed until a response was made.  The final screen presented a confidence 
scale that prompted participants to make a confidence rating (0-100%) based on their previous 
recognition judgement. 
 
 
 
5.3.1. Dependent measures and Analysis Strategy 
 
Separate Repeated Measures ANOVAs were performed on the proportion of 
trials made to the matching face, the average duration of individual fixations, 
number of fixations and run counts.   For fixation durations, RM ANOVAs were 
performed separately for the first and last fixations of each test trial.  Number of 
fixations and run counts were analysed over the full trial period.  Two within 
subjects factors were entered into the analyses, Task Instruction (2 levels: truth, lie), 
and Interest Area (2 levels: match, non-match).  The counterbalanced order in which 
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the three blocks of trials were presented was also entered for analysis as a between 
subjects factor with six possible combinations (123, 132, 213, 231, 312, 321). 
 
5.4. Results 
5.4.1. Exclusion Criteria 
 Two of the original 64 participants were removed from the data set due to 
problems with calibration and loss of data.  Incorrect responses were also removed 
from the data before analyses.  In truth trials errors were defined as selection of the 
non-matching face instead of the correct face-scene match.  In lies trials errors were 
recorded if participants selected the matching face when they were supposed to 
identify the non-matching face as the critical match.  Out of a total 2232 trials for 62 
participants, 31 trials were removed in the lie condition (2.8%) and 11 trials from 
the truth condition (0.9%).  This left a total of 2190 trials for analyses. 
 
 
5.4.2. Fixation Durations. 
First fixation 
Likelihood of fixating the matching face.  Both liars (53%) and truth-
tellers (61%) preferentially viewed the matching face in the first fixation.  One 
sample t-tests reveal both values to be above chance, t(61) = 2.11,  p = 0.039 and 
t(61) = 8.83, p < 0.001 respectively.  Furthermore, a paired sample t-test revealed 
that the proportion of fixations directed to the matching face in the first fixation was 
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significantly higher in the truth trials (M = 0.61, SEM = 0.01) than in the lie trials (M 
= 0.53, SEM = 0.01), t(61) = 5.37, p < 0.001, d = 0.90. 
 
Fixation Duration.  The RM ANOVA performed on the first fixation revealed 
no main effect of task instruction to tell the truth or lie, F(1,56) = 0.02, p = 0.90,  𝜂𝑝
2 < 
0.001.  A main effect of interest area, F(1,56) = 5.83, p = 0.02,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.09 revealed that 
fixation durations were significantly longer when viewing the matching face (M = 
282.34, SEM= 9.41) than the non-matching face (M= 264.54, SEM= 9.27), t(61) = 
2.66, p = 0.01, d = 0.24.  There was also a significant interaction between task 
instruction and interest area, F(1,56) = 59.26, p < 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.51 (see Figure 5.3). 
 
Paired comparisons performed to explore the interaction between task 
instruction and interest area revealed that within truth trials, first fixation durations 
were always longer on the selected face: (selected and matched, M = 320.12, SEM= 
13.09; not selected and non-matched, M = 226.56, SEM = 8.14), t(61) = 8.22, p < 
0.001, d = 1.09 (see Figure 5.3a).  The same pattern of results was found for selected 
faces in lie trials (non-match, M = 302.52, SEM = 13.42; match, M = 244.57, SEM = 
8.42), t(61) = 4.95, p < 0.001, d = 0.66). Further paired comparisons showed that 
within selected faces (matching face in the truth condition, non-matching within the 
lie condition) there was no significant difference in fixation durations when lying 
versus telling the truth, t(61) = 1.42, p = 0.16.  There was, however, a significant 
difference in fixation durations for the non-selected faces in truth and lie conditions, 
t(61) = 2.87, p < 0.006, d = 0.28.  Fixations durations were longer when viewing the 
matching face that was not selected in lie trials (M = 244.57, SEM= 8.42) than when 
viewing the non-matching face that was not selected in truth trials (M= 226.56, 
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SEM= 8.14).  The presentation order of trial blocks had no effect on the results, F(5, 
56) = 0.16, p = 0.98,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.01.   
 
Last fixation 
Likelihood of fixating the matching face. The proportion of trials in which 
liars looked at the matching face last was significantly below chance (M = 0.46, SEM 
= 0.01), t(61) = -4.28, p < 0.001, indicating that the majority of last fixations were 
directed to the non-matching face that was selected. However, truth-tellers’ 
likelihood of looking at the matching face in the last fixation was no different to 
chance (M = 0.51, SEM = 0.01), t(61) = 0.64, p = 0.52.  A paired-sample t-test 
revealed that the proportion of fixations to the matching face in truth trials was 
significantly higher than lie trials, t(61) = 3.00, p = 0.004, d = 0.57. 
 
Fixation Duration. The same RM ANOVA was performed on the last fixation 
before participants selected their response.  A main effect of task instruction, 
F(1,56) = 10.80, p < 0.002  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.16, revealed that fixation durations were longer 
during lie trials (M = 370.08, SEM= 11.28) than truth trials (M = 339.90, SEM= 8.25), 
t(61) = 3.63, p < 0.001, d = 0.39.  There was, however, no main effect of interest area, 
F(1, 56) = 0.50, p = 0.48.  As in the previous analysis of the first fixation, there was 
also a significant interaction between task instruction and interest area, F(1,56) = 
122.53, p < 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.67 (see Figure 5.3b), paired sample tests discussed below. 
 
Paired comparisons showed that participants always made longer fixations 
to the faces that were consistent with response selections.  Fixation durations on the 
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selected matching face in truth trials, t(61) = 10.87, p < 0.001, d = 1.83 and selected 
non-match (non-match): t(61) = 10.04, p < 0.001, d = 1.48. Further paired 
comparisons found that for selected faces, fixations were longer when lying (non-
matching faces, M= 450.97, SEM= 17.03) than when telling the truth (match, M = 
419.42, SEM= 13.12), t(61) = 2.46, p = 0.017, d = 0.26. This is suggestive of higher 
cognitive load for liars than truth tellers for response selection intentions.  Analysis 
of fixation durations to non-selected faces showed the same pattern of results as the 
first fixation.  Fixation durations were longer during viewing of the non-selected 
face in lie trials (match; M = 289.18, SEM= 9.71) than truth trials (non-match; M = 
260.37, SEM= 8.44), t(61) = 3.12, p < 0.003, d = 0.40.  Presentations order of trial 
blocks had no effect on the results, F(5,56) = 0.36, p = 0.88,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.03 (see Figure 
5.3b). 
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Figure 5. 3. Average fixation duration by truth (white bars) and lie (black bars), split by interest areas 
viewed (match, non-match): (a) First fixation; b: Last fixation. Error bars represent standard error 
from the mean (SEM). Post-hoc comparisons are paired samples t-tests with Bonferroni corrections 
for four comparisons (α= 0.012); *p < 0.012; **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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5.4.3. Quantity of Fixations (full trial period) 
Proportion of fixations.  Over the course of the full trial period, the 
proportion of fixations made to the matching face in lie trials was below chance (M = 
0.31, SEM = 0.01), t(61), -25.270, p = < 0.001, thus the majority (59%) of fixations 
were made to the nonmatching face.  However, the proportion of fixations made to 
the matching face in truth trials was significantly above chance (56%) indicating 
that truth-tellers preferentially view the matching face over the full trial period (M = 
0.56, SEM = 0.01), t(61) = 6.94, p < 0.001.  A paired sample t-test revealed that the 
proportion of fixations directed to the matching face in truth trials was significantly 
higher than in lie trials, t(61) = 20.55, p < 0.001, d = 3.90. 
 
Total Number of Fixations.  A RM ANOVA conducted on fixation count 
revealed a main effect of task instruction (truth, lie), F(1,56) = 31.87, p < 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 
0.36; significantly more fixations were made during lie trials (M = 2.39, SEM = 0.11) 
than truth trials (M = 2.15, SEM = 0.09), t(61) = 5.58, p < 0.001, d = 0.31.  A main 
effect of interest area (match, non-match), F(1,56) = 6.26, p = 0.015,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.10, 
revealed that more fixations were made to the matching face (M = 2.32, SEM = 0.10) 
than the non-matching face (M = 2.22, SEM = 0.10), t(61) = 2.30, p = 0.004, d = 0.14). 
 
A significant Interaction between task instruction and interest area, F(1,56) = 
306.25, p < 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.85, showed that in both truths and lies trials, participants 
always make the most fixations to the selected image, truth (match, non-match), 
t(61) = 17.36, p < 0.001, d = 1.85 and lie (non-match, match), t(61) = 16.91, p < 
0.001, d = 1.35.  Comparing truth and lie comparisons of the selected responses 
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alone, (truth, match; lie, non-match) more fixations were made when lying (M = 
3.00, SEM = 0.13) than telling the truth (M = 2.87, SEM = 0.17), t(61) = 2.39, p = 
0.020, d = 0.13.  Interestingly, comparison of the number of fixations made to the 
non-selected faces, more fixations were, again, made in the lie condition to the 
matching faces (M = 1.78, SEM = 0.09) than to the non-matching faces in the truth 
condition (M = 1.43, SEM = 0.61), t(61) = 6.09, p < 0.001, d = 0.52.  Presentation of 
trial order had no effect on results, F(5,56) = 0.94, p = 0.464,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.08 (see Figure 
5.4a). 
 
Run Count.  A main effect of task instruction, F(1,56) = 9.61, p < 0.003,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 
0.15 revealed that more runs were made in lie trials (M = 1.33; SEM = 0.04) than 
truths (M = 1.23, SEM = 0.04), t(61) = 3.63, p = 0.001, d = 0.33.  There was no main of 
effect interest area, F(1,56) = 0.61, p = 0.44,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.01.  Number of runs made to the 
matching face (M= 1.29, SEM = 0.04) were not significantly more than to the non-
matching face (M = 1.27, SEM = 0.04), t(61) = 1.06, p = 0.30 (see Figure 5.4b). 
 
Interactions between task instruction and interest area, F(2,112) = 808.26, p 
< 0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.94, show that in both truths and lies, participants always make the 
most runs to the selected image, truth (match, M = 1.45, SEM = 0.04; non-match, M = 
1.01, SEM = 0.04), t(61) = 20.25, p < 0.001, d = 1.52 and lie (non-match M = 1.54, 
SEM = 0.05; match, M = 1.13, SEM = 0.04), t(61) = 25.00, p < 0.001, d = 1.18.  
Comparing truth and lie comparisons of the selected responses alone, (truth, match; 
lie, non-match) more runs were made when lying (M = 1.54, SEM = 0.05) than telling 
the truth (M = 1.45, SEM = 0.04), t(61) = 3.20, p = 0.002, d = 0.28.  Comparing 
number of runs made to the non-selected faces, more runs were, again, made in the 
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lie condition to the matching faces (M = 1.13, SEM = 0.04) than to the non-matching 
faces in the truth condition (M = 1.01, SEM = 0.04), t(61) = 3.47, p = 0.001, d = 0.37 
(see Figure 4.4b).  
 
Figure 5. 4. Number of fixations (a) and Run Counts (b) by truth (white bars) and lie (black bars), 
split by interest areas viewed (match, non-match): Error bars represent standard error from the 
mean (M±SEM). Post-hoc comparisons are paired samples t-tests with Bonferroni corrections for 
four comparisons (α= 0.012); †p < 0.05, *p < 0.012; **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
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5.4.4. Verbal Confidence Ratings  
Repeated Measures ANOVAs revealed that task instruction manipulation 
(truth, lie) had no significant effect on the variability of confidence judgements, 
F(1,56) = 5.61, p = 0.064,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.53.   Task instruction manipulation also had no 
effect on the variability in the number of regions of the confidence scale viewed 
whilst deliberating the verbal confidence rating, F(1,56) = 3.85, p = 0.11,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.44.  
 
5.4.5. Questionnaires. 
Face viewing strategies.  Thirty-nine out of 62 (63%) participants reported 
attempts to adopt eye movement strategies to evade detection when lying.  Sixteen 
of the 39 participants (41%) explicitly tried to look less at the matching face when 
lying, whereas 23 (58%) reported trying to look the same at both matching and non-
matching faces.  When asked which faces they thought they actually looked at more 
during the lie trials, 21 out of 39 (53%) said they thought they looked more at the 
matching face, whereas the remainder thought they looked more at the face they 
selected.  Out of the 30 participants who reported trying to employ eye movement 
strategies, 14 (46%) thought that they were successful. 
 
Out of all the 62 participants tested, 34 (55%) reported that they thought 
they looked more at the matching face.  Only a quarter of these participants thought 
they were successful in deceiving the experimenter and evading lie detection.  For 
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honest responses, all participants reported that they thought they looked more at 
the matching face. 
 
 Confidence rating strategies.  Out of all 62 participants tested 33 (53%) 
reported using a high confidence reporting strategy when lying, whereas 4 (6%) 
simply reported that they tried to report similar confidence ratings in both truths 
and lies.  A further 13 (21%) specifically reported trying to vary confidence ratings 
when lying and 2 (3%) said they made lower confidence ratings during lies.  Ten 
reported no strategies at all.  
 
5.5. Discussion 
 The aim of the present experiment was to investigate whether fixation 
behaviours would reveal memory for critical face-scene associations as well as 
deceptive response intentions in different fixation analyses (first, last and total 
fixations) during an associative recognition task for face-scene relations. 
 
First fixation 
Prediction 1a that first fixations would be preferentially directed to a critical 
matching face based on its association with a co-presented scene, irrespective of 
truths or lies, was supported by the data.  Across all trials, the proportion of first 
fixations directed to the matching face during lies was significantly above chance 
(53%), compared to the fixations to the non-matching face in the display.  It should 
be noted, however, that this proportion was significantly lower than in truth trials 
where 61% of all first fixations were made to the matching face.  The result suggests 
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that intentions to falsely select the non-matching face later in the trial interfere with 
orienting responses to the matching face as early as the first fixation resulting in a 
lower proportion of first fixations to the matching face as compared to truth trials.   
 
Prediction 1b that fixation durations would be longer to the matching face 
irrespective of honesty was not fully supported by the data.  Analyses of fixations 
duration in lie and truth trials were always longer to the face governed by response 
intentions (the matching face in truth trials and the non-matching face in lie trials).  
These results suggest that response intentions impact fixation durations as early as 
the first fixations.  However, comparison of fixation durations to the faces that were 
not selected revealed that fixation durations were longer to the matched face that 
was not selected in lie trials compared to first fixations to faces that were not 
matched and not selected in truth trials.   
 
The finding that deceptive response intentions influence viewing behaviour 
in the first fixation was unexpected, however this may be partly due to the 
presentation of the scene cue followed by the instruction to deceive prior to the 
presentation of the test screen.  The scene cue was presented prior to the test screen 
to facilitate memory for the associate face-scene relation early in viewing behaviour 
as previous research has indicated that memory retrieval for inter-item relations 
occur later than that for single items (Gronlund & Ratcliff, 1989).  However, it seems 
that the combination of the scene cue to trigger memory of the associated face and 
the instruction screen to signal the action to lie prompted an early influence of 
response intentions that was not predicted.  It is also possible that longer fixations 
predicted when viewing the matching face were diminished in lie trials due to 
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attempts to reduce viewing to the matching face (41% of participants reported 
attempting to look less at the matching face in lie trials) although previous research 
suggests that voluntary control over characteristics of individual fixations is 
extremely difficult - if possible at all (Rayner, 1998).  Despite the finding that effect 
of relational memory did not emerge as strongly in first fixations as was predicted, 
fixations durations between non-selected faces in truth and lie conditions in the 
present experiment still effect a measurable difference in fixation durations that 
could potentially be used to distinguish differences in the fixation behaviour of liars 
and truth tellers during recognition of related face-scene pairs.  Furthermore, the 
finding that the liars preferentially orient to the matching face in the first fixation 
suggest the difference in average fixation duration between the non-selected faces 
are, at least part, due to memory for face-scene relations.   
 
In sum, first fixations reveal that participants are more likely to fixate the 
matching face during initial viewing of the test screen during both truth and lie 
trials, although this tendency is strongest during truths.  Fixations durations to the 
matching face are longer during truth trials reflecting both relational memory and 
effects of planning response selections.  Fixation durations to the matching face in 
lie trials were significantly shorter.  However, fixation durations to the matched but 
not selected face in lie trials was longer then the fixations to the non-matched and 
non-selected face in truth trials.  The comparison of faces that were not selected 
allows an evaluation relational memory effects in the absence of response selection 
effects, thus providing a purer index of memory. 
 
Last Fixation 
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Prediction 2a that the last fixation would be directed to the stimulus being 
responded to was partially supported by the data.  The majority of liars (54%) 
preferentially viewed the to-be-selected face (non-matching face) in the last fixation 
before making their response intention.  Unexpectedly, the same finding did not 
occur during truth trials.  The proportion of last fixations to the matching face in 
truth trials was not significantly above chance (51%).  Although no definitive 
conclusions can be drawn from the present data as to why liars gaze tended to be 
more fixed to the face that they selected, it is possible is that, because of the effort of 
lying, the last fixation on a lie trial was held on the stimulus that was lied about 
while the response was made.  Accordingly, because of the relative ease of telling the 
truth, participants in truth trials may have allowed their eyes move on after 
planning their response, and thus were less likely to be gazing at the matching 
stimulus in the final fixation.  This explanation is consistent with research that 
supports that gaze is proactive and thus often moves on before the last action is 
complete and tends to happen when a specific motor skill has become accomplished 
(Land, 2006).  It might also be possible that during truth trials participants were less 
concerned with the monitoring of their eye movement behaviour and thus spent 
more time freely viewing each face before selecting a response. 
 
Prediction 2b that the duration of the last fixation would be longer on the to-
be-selected face, thus reflecting response intentions to select that face, was fully 
supported by the data.  Fixation durations were longer when the last fixation was on 
the face that was later selected during both truths (match) and lies (non-match).  
Comparing viewing of the selected faces, fixation durations were longer during lie 
trials than truth trials also indicating suggesting higher cognitive load for the 
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planning of deceptive response intentions.  In addition, a similar finding to the first 
fixation was found; when the last fixation was made to the non-selected matching 
face in lie trials, it was longer than the equivalent fixation made to non-matching 
face that was not selected in truth trials.  The effect size of this difference in the last 
fixation was larger than in the first fixation (approaching a medium effect), 
suggesting that additional load during the suppression of the intentions to select the 
matching face produced a longer fixation.  Main effects in the analyses of the last 
fixation revealed significantly longer fixations during lies but no main effect of 
interest area, suggesting that fixation durations in the last fixations were largely 
driven by cognitive efforts to prepare deceptive response intentions.  
 
In sum, in lie trials last fixations were preferentially made on the non-
matched and selected face with longer fixation durations than on the matched face 
that was not selected.  In truth trials, there appeared no preference to view the 
selected and matched face in the last fixation, although fixation duration were 
longest to the matched and selected face.  Also in the last fixation, comparing faces 
that were not selected, fixation duration were longer in lie trials than truth trials. 
 
Full trial period 
Analysing data over the full trial period revealed no preferential viewing of 
matching faces in lie trials.  Preferential viewing to matching faces was, however, 
found in truth trials (56% of all fixations were made to the matching face). 
 
 Predictions that fixation durations would be longer during lies was evident in 
comparison of non-selected faces in truth and lie comparisons in both number of 
 215 
fixations (Prediction 3a) and run counts (Prediction 3b).  Again fixation durations 
were longest overall to the faces that were selected faces at the end of the trial.  The 
pattern of findings in the number of fixations and run counts were the same as those 
found in the last fixation durations before a selected response was made with one 
exception; the difference in fixation durations between truths and lies for selected 
faces did not quite meet the level of significance after Bonferroni corrections.  
Comparison of effect sizes for differences between truths and lies for selected faces 
were .26 for the fixation duration of the last fixation, .13 for the total number of 
fixations and .28 for the number of runs made.  Although the analysis of fixation 
number and run counts provide additional support for differences in fixations 
behaviours they do not appear to add anything to the analysis of fixation durations 
during the last fixation of viewing before a response selection.  Effect sizes for the 
last fixation, total number of fixation and run counts are larger than for the first 
fixation (approaching a medium effect size) suggesting an incremental effect of 
cognitive load of deception over the time course of the trial.  It is interesting to note 
that effect size differences were larger when comparing fixation behaviour to non-
selected faces between truths and lies than to the faces that were selected.  The 
results suggest that it might be more valuable to compare fixation behaviour to non-
selected faces when attempting to distinguish differences between honest and 
deceptive responses.   
 
In future research it might also be beneficial to manipulate motivation in test 
conditions to assess whether larger differences in fixation behaviour  might occur in 
the first fixation when participants are not attempting to control fixation behaviour.  
Modern eye tracking technology allows relatively covert recording of eye movement 
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behaviour using video based eye trackers that may facilitate a purer analysis of 
orienting responses in the first fixation when attempts to evade lie detection by the 
monitoring of eye movements are not made explicit as they were in the present 
experiment. 
 
Confidence Ratings 
 No significant differences were found in the variability of verbal confidence 
ratings or in variability of on screen viewing behaviour when examining regions of 
the confidence scale prior to the verbal response.  This finding was not consistent 
with predictions that liars would inflate confidence to appear convincing and thus 
display less variability in their verbal confidence ratings and associated eye 
movements during deliberation of ratings.  This finding is perhaps not surprising 
given that all the stimuli in the present experiment were equally learned-to-
criterion during a study phase and thus all stimuli were similarly familiar.  Findings 
from Experiment 2 revealed differences in confidence ratings but they were based 
on comparison of confidence ratings to known compared to unknown faces, and 
were most distinct when comparing ratings between personally known faces and 
unfamiliar faces.  Experiment 2 did not reveal significant differences in confidence 
ratings when comparing truths and lie to the same face types.  Also, just over half of 
the participants (53%) in the present experiment reported giving high confidence 
ratings during lies, the remainder reported a variety of different strategies in the 
Deception Strategy Questionnaire such as reporting the same as truth, varying 
confidence ratings and also giving lower ratings than in truth trials.  The results 
suggest differentiating deception based on confidence is most successful when 
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comparing ratings to honest judgements to unknown faces as in Experiments 1, 2 
and 3. 
 
Conclusion 
 The present findings supports the notion hypothesis that differences would be 
found in fixation behaviour as early as the first fixation to distinguish truths and lies 
about memory face scene relations.  Liars preferentially viewed the face that 
matched the scene in a display as measured by the proportion of trials in which 
fixations were directed to the matching face as well as making longer fixations to 
non-selected faces compared to truth trials.  The last fixation was a reliable indicator 
of response intentions and efforts to deceive, although cognitive demands in the last 
fixation appeared larger when comparing responses to non-selected faces, perhaps 
as a cumulative effect of both orienting responses and deceptive response intentions 
in the last fixation.  Analyses of number of fixations and run counts across the full 
trial period did not add a lot more to the findings except that the effects size for 
differences between truths and lie for non-selected faces was largest in the measure 
number of fixations.  This finding is similar to large effect sizes for differences in the 
Experiments 1-3 in the present thesis. 
 
 The results in the current experiment present novel findings on the way in 
which fixation behaviours to reveal memory and response intentions during 
intentional misidentifications corresponding to memory associations for specific 
faces and scenes.   Such an exploration of relational memory effects in eye 
movements have not previously been explored in the deception and memory 
detection literatures.  In fact, the use of eye movements to reveal memory for inter-
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item or co-occurring relations is a relatively understudied phenomenon (Hannula et 
al., 2007; Hannula, Ranganath, et al., 2010), although previous behavioural research 
has shown that face processing in-context results in faster and more accurate recall 
for face recognition decisions (Memon & Bruce, 1983).  
 
The use of relational memory paradigms to re-instate memory associations 
specific to particular contexts (here faces and scenes) could provide a useful tool not 
only when trying to identify people known to be related to a specific crime scene 
when a person is lying but also to stimulate memory in eye witness recall.  The 
present research also suggests that future studies attempt to further isolate 
orienting responses to critical items from cognitive load as well as strategies during 
lies to facilitate clearer distinctions between the mechanisms that modulate fixation 
behaviour.  The research supports that early fixation behaviour can reveal valuable 
information about memory and response selection processes, some components of 
which appear involuntary in nature.  Finally, the present research explored a more 
complex deception strategy, misidentification a non-critical face as guilty.  Few 
research studies have explored alternative deceptive response strategies such as 
intentional selection of known or unknown faces to divert attention from a known 
culprit (Lefebvre et al., 2009; Schwedes & Wentura, 2012).  The present research 
also suggests that using multiple face displays to extract information relating to 
knowledge of culprits co-displayed with innocent faces might be more effective in 
identifying differences in eye movement behaviour that was not evident in the 
previous experiments when attempting to differences in fixation behaviour between 
less perceptually distinct faces (e.g, unknown compared to newly learned faces).  
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CHAPTER 6.   
 
 
General Discussion 
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6.1. Aims of Thesis 
The overarching aim of this thesis was to evaluate a new approach to detect 
recognition memory in liars, when recognition of familiar photographs was 
intentionally concealed.  Eye tracking methodology was selected as a novel 
experimental approach to memory detection in a deceptive context for two key 
reasons.  First,  elementary eye movement research consistently shows that  fixation 
patterns and characteristics change as a result of previous exposure, and thus reveal 
information encoded in memory (for review see Hannula et al., 2010).  Second, 
memory effects reported in basic recognition studies suggest that the effect of 
previous exposure on visual reprocessing might be involuntary in nature, which is 
an attractive feature for methodologies that aim to detect memory in applied 
forensic contexts when interviewees are uncooperative (see Verschuere, Ben-
Shakhar, & Meijer, 2011).   
 
More specifically, the thesis examined the effect of deception on fixation-
based measures of memory to determine whether memory effects were robust in 
the face of cognitive efforts required for lying.  To achieve this goal, a range of 
different fixation behaviours displayed by lying participants during concealed 
recognition of familiar photographs (faces, scenes and objects) that varied in 
familiarity (newly learned, famous celebrities, personally familiar) were 
systematically examined.    Given the novelty of this research in the field, the paucity 
of prior research, and the nature of the experimental predictions, this systematic 
analytic approach (involving the analyses of full trial periods, first fixations, and 
fixations made just prior to response selections) is fully warranted. 
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Importantly, the work presented here is the first systematic programme of 
research to explore the suitability of different fixation measures for the purpose of 
memory detection whilst systematically manipulating degree of familiarity across 
different classes of photographic stimuli (faces, scenes and objects).  It is also the 
first research to assess which fixations measures might be best for memory 
detection given that efforts for lying might disrupt typical visual processing of 
familiar items.  The present research explored whether hypothesised increases in 
fixation quantity as a result of cognitive load during lies (Cook, Hacker, Webb, Osher, 
Kristjansson, Woltz, Kircher, et al., 2012) might diminish memory effects in fixation 
quantity, and whether hypothesised increased fixation durations during lies (Griffin 
& Oppenheimer, 2006) might magnify memory effects in fixation durations. 
 
At the conception of this doctoral work, there was no published research that 
explored fixations as a potential measure for memory detection during lying, thus 
the work was entirely novel in its approach.  Since then only two peer reviewed 
articles have been published on the topic (Peth et al., 2013; Schwedes & Wentura, 
2012).  However, the main findings presented here remain entirely novel in their 
contribution to an exciting field of research that is still in its infancy. 
 
6.2. Key findings of the thesis: Reliability of 
different fixation measures. 
Given the findings of the research conducted for this thesis, the question is 
which fixation measure might be best for memory detection of liars in real-world 
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field applications?  Of all the measures, the number of fixations most consistently 
identified differences between lies about familiar probes and truths about 
unfamiliar irrelevants.  Fewer fixations consistently distinguished lies about 
recognition of probes, compared to truths about irrelevants, across familiar faces, 
objects and scenes.  Decreased fixations during recognition displayed large 
significant effects of memory for personally familiar items in addition to memory 
effects for items that had only been viewed once briefly, albeit notably smaller in 
effect size.  However, the number of fixations also appear somewhat vulnerable to 
cognitive load during lies in Experiment 1 although this did not change the pattern 
of significant results overall.  In Experiments 2 and 3 there was also a suggestion 
that cognitive load was interfering with memory effects in the truth data as 
significant results observed in Experiment 1 were not observed in experiment 2 and 
3.  Furthermore, Experiments 2 and 3 also suggested that number of fixations was 
vulnerable to efforts to control fixations during lies about newly learned items as 
there was a marked decrease in number of fixation during lies about probes but not 
truths about targets.  Experiment 4 primarily examined fixation durations and 
revealed no unexpected variations in fixation duration that indicated confounding 
effects of cognitive load or deceptive strategies.  The results showed memory effects 
for face-scene matches in the first fixations as well as longer fixations when making 
deceptive responses in the last fixation.   
 
The present research suggests that fixation durations might be a better 
indicator of concealed memory than fixation quantity, since effects of memory and 
deception would accumulate to produce larger predictive differences during lies 
about recognition.  Furthermore, although fixation durations represent both 
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memory and deceptive efforts, the effect of memory are not likely to be weakened 
by cognitive efforts during lies.  Eye movement research also suggests that 
individual fixation durations are also less likely to be vulnerable to intentional 
control (Rayner, 1998).  The present research examined the effect of both memory 
and deception on fixation durations and found them to be intricately linked in first 
fixations and fixations made just prior to response selections.  It was informative to 
investigate the relative contribution of memory and deception on fixation durations 
in the present research.  In fact some researchers have recently explored the 
possibility of increasing cognitive load during CITs with the goal of making liars 
easier to distinguish from truth tellers (Visu-Petra et al., 2013).  Since forensic 
practitioners are mainly concerned with the discriminative ability of the test it is not 
a main concern whether it is memory, cognitive effort or the two combined as long 
as the detection of deception is reliable.   
 
6.3. Integration of Empirical Findings 
 Experiments 1-3 first replicated memory effects found in eye movement 
studies of basic recognition (Althoff et al., 1999; Althoff & Cohen, 1999; Althoff, 
1998; Ryan, Hannula, & Cohen, 2007).  In truth trials (standard recognition), 
memories of previously encoded faces, scenes, and objects changed the way 
participants viewed photographs of the same items on subsequent viewings.  
Overall, the resulting effect of memory was a decrease in fixation quantity and an 
increase in fixation duration during recognition of faces, scenes and objects 
(henceforth referred to collectively as items).  Effect sizes of memory on fixations 
were large and most reliable for personally familiar items and small and more 
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limited for newly learned items (in terms of number of fixations; but see below for 
consideration of effects of attempted gaze control).  Establishing these initial results 
allowed examination of deceptive efforts on memory effects during lying within 
each experiment.   
 
Lies about recognition of well known (personally familiar) photographs 
produced robust effects of memory in multiple fixation measures.  This finding is 
consistent with memory effects during honest face identifications of personally 
known items in Experiments 1-3.  Slightly smaller memory effect sizes were 
observed in fixation quantity during lies about personally known faces compared to 
truths about personally known items, but these tended not to change the overall 
pattern of results.   
 
Interesting results, however, emerged across Experiments 1-3 patterns when 
participants lied and told the truth about photographs of less familiar, newly 
learned, faces and objects and scenes.  In Experiment 1 participants lied about 
recognition, but monitoring of eye movements was not explicitly emphasised as a 
cue for memory detection.  Small memory effects revealing recognition were also 
observed during both truth and lies about newly learned faces, although the 
difference between irrelevants and probes did not meet significance after 
corrections for multiple comparisons.  The results suggest that cognitive effort 
during lies about newly learned faces might have increased the number of fixations 
made before a response and thus moderated the difference in number of fixations 
made during honest rejection of unfamiliar faces (irrelevants) and lies about newly 
familiar faces (probes).  
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In Experiments 2 and 3, the experimenter explicitly emphasised monitoring 
of eye movements for the purpose of memory detection during lies.  The pattern of 
fixations during truths and lies about newly learned items (faces, scenes and 
objects) in Experiments 2 and 3 differed to Experiment 1.  In truthful trials memory 
effects were no longer observed during viewing of newly familiar items, but in lie 
trials a significant decrease was observed in fixation quantity that could be 
interpreted as large memory effects.  Considering that no memory effects were 
observed during honest recognition of newly familiar items, it is plausible that 
participants were in fact attempting to control their gaze that resulted in a marked 
decrease in fixation quantity during lies (not observed in Experiment 1) and that 
this effort carried over to the effect of memory in fixations during truthful 
recognition trials.   
 
In Experiments 2 and 3, participants’ apparent efforts to control fixations 
made it easier to distinguish trials in which participants claimed they did not 
recognise familiar items from trials in which they honestly rejected unknown items.  
The observation that apparent attempts to control gaze to evade lie detection in fact 
made it easier to distinguish lies from truths is consistent with ironic effects of 
attempted mental control over actions (Wegner et al., 1998) and deception research 
suggesting that people who invest more effort in trying to evade lie detection 
paradoxically are less successful at doing so (DePaulo, Kirkendol, Susan, Tang, & 
O’Brien, 1988; Vrij, Fisher, et al., 2006; Vrij, Mann, et al., 2008).  Confirmation that 
participants made more attempts to control fixations in Experiments 2 and 3 was 
bolstered by the findings of the Deception Strategies Questionnaire.  In Experiments 
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2 and 3, 61% and 80% of participants reported attempting to employ some kind of 
eye movement strategy to evade lie detection, whereas only 32% reported trying to 
control their gaze in Experiment 1.   
 
It is also possible that the overall load of Experiment 2 and 3 was much 
higher than in Experiment 1 and that this cognitive difficulty resulted in participants 
visually disengaging from the photographs to process the lying task at hand 
(Doherty-Sneddon et al., 2002; Doherty-Sneddon & Phelps, 2005).  However, 
responses in the Deception Strategies Questionnaires for Experiments 1 and 2 
suggested that participants found it most difficult to lie about personally familiar 
items (70 % and 63% respectively).  Overall, Experiments 2 and 3 found fewer 
fixations, fewer run counts and longer fixations presented markers of memory 
during lies about faces, scenes and objects.  Further research, however, is required 
to elucidate the relative role of memory, cognitive load during lies, and strategies to 
evade lie detection on characteristics of fixations during lies about recognition. 
 
The verbal confidence ratings that participants reported after each deceptive 
recognition judgement in Experiments 2 and 3 also suggested memory for 
personally familiar items (face, objects and scenes) when recognition was denied.  
Variability in confidence ratings (0-100%) when participants lied about recognising 
personally familiar items displayed less variability than ratings for faces that were 
actually unfamiliar.  Thus, confidence ratings with low variability observed in 
Experiments 2 and 3 tended to indicate memory for well-known faces.  Although 
some participants reported attempting to vary their confidence ratings during lies 
so that their lies were not transparent it seems that participants were not successful 
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in doing so.  Thus, patterns of confidence ratings might provide an additional means 
to index memory when a person is lying about recognition.  Significant differences in 
variability were not found, however, during lies about newly learned items, 
suggesting that memory for items have to be well-encoded to produce different 
patterns in confidence variability.  Future research might look to the eye witness 
identification literature to develop more sophisticated techniques such as 
confidence accuracy classification algorithms to diagnose memory accuracy (Juslin, 
Olsson, & Winman, 1996; Sauer et al., 2008). 
 
The aim of the final experiment, Experiment 4, was to examine if fixations 
could reveal memory for face-scene associations and the effort of false 
identifications on fixation duration.  In the first fixation longer fixations revealed 
memory for faces that matched previously viewed face-scene pairs.  The last fixation 
further showed longer durations when liars selected the incorrect face that did not 
match the scene compared to the truth teller selection of the face that matched the 
scene.  Given the applied importance of linking suspects with specific crimes, this 
finding is an exciting and novel contribution to the memory detection literature. 
 
6.4. Contribution to Theoretical Understanding  
The general consensus in the literature on face processing is that familiar and 
unfamiliar faces are processed in a qualitatively different way, and also that there 
are important differences in the way that we process different classes of familiar 
faces (Natu & Toole, 2011).  Often, experimental research uses previously unfamiliar 
faces that are learned during a study phase to represent familiar faces.  However, 
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previous research (Natu & Toole, 2011) and the findings presented in Experiments 
1 and 2 in the present thesis, emphasise that newly familiar faces are not the same 
as those for which we have multiple real world experiences.  Experiment 3 also 
confirms that this issue also extends to newly familiar objects and scenes compared 
to those that have real-world familiarity.  It is most common that liars will be lying 
about a person, place or object that has distinct personal significance to them and 
thus memory detection researchers should bear this in mind in their research. 
 
Experiments 1-3 support and extend basic research (Althoff & Cohen, 1999; 
Althoff, 1998; Heisz & Shore, 2008; Ryan et al., 2007) indicating that various fixation 
measures reveal memory for well-known faces (fewer fixations, longer durations), 
scenes and objects (personally familiar) and that this finding is generally reliable 
(and produces large effect sizes) when participants make honest identifications or 
lie about recognition.  The findings for memory detection of newly learned items via 
fixations is not so clear cut.   
 
In Experiment 1, recognition of newly learned faces produced small effects of 
memory in the number of fixations made during honest identification and lies about 
newly learned faces (although results for lies were not significant after Bonferroni 
correction).  This finding was encouraging given that participants in Experiment 1 
were only briefly exposed to newly learned faces before the concealed information 
test.  Previous researchers who also used single face displays of newly learned faces 
in standard recognition tests found that participants required at least three separate 
exposures to new faces before memory effects were reliably observed (Althoff, 
1998; Heisz & Shore, 2008).  In Experiments 2 and 3 the learning procedure was 
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changed to encourage a deeper processing of newly learned faces (Experiment 2), 
and objects and scenes (Experiment 3).  In lie trials, the resulting fixations were 
fewer in quantity (number of fixations, run counts, number of interest areas visited) 
and longer in duration, as predicted by the effect of memory on visual reprocessing.  
However, the fixation data during honest recognition of the same newly learned 
items did not produce significant memory effects.  The results suggest that liars 
might have been intentionally controlling their fixations to conceal their deception 
consistent with explicit task instruction at the start of the experiment stating that 
they should try to conceal their deceit and that the experimenter would be 
monitoring their eye movements to detect deception.  This is an interesting finding 
considering that previous research proposes that memory effects in fixations are an 
obligatory consequence of previous exposure and that they occur whether 
participants make judgements based on the identity or emotional expression of a 
face (Althoff & Cohen, 1999), view the face freely (Ryan et al., 2007), make face 
misidentifications (Hannula et al., 2012) or have no conscious memory of a face such 
as in prosopagnosia (Bate et al., 2008).   
 
6.4.1. Are memory effects involuntary? 
The present results support that recognition of personally familiar items is 
fast and relatively automatic (Stacey et al., 2005; Yonelinas, 2002) and this makes it 
less vulnerable to cognitive interference as a result from conflicting recognition 
processes during lies (Seymour, 2001).  The same is not true however, for newly 
learned faces that are relatively unfamiliar compared to those that are personally 
known.  Memories for newly familiar items tend to be weaker (Hancock et al., 2000) 
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and thus require more effortful recollection.  The findings of Experiments 2 and 3 
suggest this makes them more vulnerable to cognitive efforts required to execute 
the response consistent with the lie as well as to maintain strategies to evade lie 
detection.  Thus, the main contribution that Experiment 2 and 3 makes to the 
existing literature on memory is that fixation based markers of memory appear to 
be involuntary during automatic recognition of well-known faces, scenes and 
objects, but that recollection of newly learned items are consciously more effortful 
and thus are more likely to be vulnerable to cognitive interference as a result of 
lying.  Furthermore, In Experiment 4, the durations of first fixations also revealed 
memory for face-scene relations despite effort to deceive.  This finding provides 
further support for memory effects that were unable to be concealed. 
 
6.4.2. Effect of Cognitive Load on Memory Effects 
Some support was found in Experiment 1 to suggest that memory effects for 
newly learned faces was diminished by an increase in fixation durations during lies 
about newly learned faces compared to honest identification of newly learned faces.  
However, this made little difference to the small effect sizes observed in both truths 
and lies.  It is also possible that the lack of a memory effect during honest 
identification of newly learned faces, objects and scenes in Experiment 2 and 3 was 
a result of overall efforts to strategically control fixations during lies.  Furthermore, 
analyses of fixation durations directly before deceptive responses were made 
(button press and verbal response) always revealed the longest fixation durations 
which would also suggest that most cognitive effort was experienced during lies.  
Finally, in Experiment 4, fixations durations in the last fixation before dishonest 
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response selections were longer than those during honest identification of matching 
faces. 
 
6.5. Limitations and Methodological 
Considerations 
Experiments 2 and 3 revealed particularly interesting results that suggested 
that participants were strategically attempting to control their eye movements 
compared to Experiment 1, where no indication of gaze control was observed.  The 
findings suggest that this result occurred, at least partly, as a consequence of a 
change in task instructions.  The aim of Experiment 2 was to emphasise monitoring 
of memory and eye movements to explore if patterns of confidence (and associated 
eye movements during decision making) would reveal lies about confidence in 
relation to recognition judgements.  This instructional change had an obvious 
impact on eye movements during recognition of newly learned faces.  To draw 
stronger conclusions about the effect of strategies and the monitoring of eye 
movements during deception, future studies should consider deploying a between 
subjects factor to isolate the effect of instructions for specific gaze strategies on 
actual characteristics of fixations. 
 
It is also pertinent to raise the issue here that the photographs of newly 
learned items in Experiments 1-3 were the same at study as they were at test.  The 
decision to use the same photographs for newly learned items at study and test was 
partly a practical limitation in sourcing enough quality images of the same face, 
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place or object for multiple condition blocks but also because we did not want to 
make identification of new items further difficult to recognise.  Realistically, the 
items that people lie about are likely personally significant to them.  However, in 
future researchers might wish to determine the presence of memory effects for 
recognition of different images of newly encoded items (faces, objects and scenes).  
Memory detection researchers that have examined memory effects during viewing 
of photographs of objects viewed during mock crime have been unsuccessful in 
identifying memory effects for photographs of crime objects that were not central to 
the mock crime (Peth et al., 2013; Twyman et al., 2010).  The problem with 
identifying a person with whom you have only had brief and limited visually 
exposed of is a common limitation in eyewitness identification of suspects.  Genuine 
eyewitnesses are prone to identification errors especially if they have only 
witnessed a crime in passing and the information is only incidentally encoded (Hope 
& Sauer, 2014).  When contemplating concealed recognition the problem is more 
commonly the opposite; the suspect is concealing recognition of a person whom 
they have a personal association thus consequently should identify quite easily.   
 
6.6.  Potential Field Application. 
The current research suggests that fixation-based measures of memory have 
potential for field use.  However more research is required to establish the 
reliability of fixation-based memory effects for newly familiar items.  Even more 
importantly, research into possible efforts to countermeasure memory effects 
require more thorough investigation.  In Experiments 2 and 3 the experimental 
briefing emphasised eye movement monitoring as a means for memory detection in 
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liars and observed different slightly different patterns of results than in Experiment 
1, where no explicit emphasis was put on evading lie detection.  Possible 
countermeasures strategies might include using visual imagery to disrupt visual 
processing patterns when viewing familiar faces (Ganis et al., 2011; Ganis & 
Schendan, 2008), scenes or objects, or employing a deterministic pattern of viewing 
behaviour (such as looking at each feature of a face in turn;  Althoff, 1998), so that 
viewing behaviour was consistent when viewing familiar and unfamiliar items. 
 
Furthermore, before fixations are considered for potential memory detection 
in the field, laboratory studies should examine which Concealed Information Test 
protocol is best for fixation-based memory detection.  There are two main versions 
of The Concealed Information Test, one presents a single probe in each test block 
and the other presents multiple probes of different familiar items in the same tests 
block.  The 1-probe block presents only a single probe (familiar item that is lied 
about), a single target (familiar item that is honestly identified) and at least four 
irrelevant (unfamiliar) items.  Each item is repeated at least four times.  The 
multiple probe block (e.g., Allen, Iacono, & Danielson, 1992; Farwell & Donchin, 
1991), however, presents multiple probes, targets and irrelevants within each single 
block.  Each probe is usually from a different category (such as a weapon, or a 
person) and matched across targets and irrelevants.  Farwell and Donchin (1991) 
typically used six probes within each block, mixed randomly among 6 targets and 24 
irrelevants.  Each protocol has both advantages and disadvantages.   The multiple 
probe block is a more efficient way to gather data but puts the examinee under more 
task demand.  The detection efficiencies of the two tests were recently examined 
using an ERP300-based CIT (Rosenfeld et al., 2007).  The results suggested that task 
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demands for the multiple probe block was greater than the single probe block and 
that a trend in the data favoured ERP300 sensitivity in the single probe block.   
The experiments presented in the current thesis were variations of a 
multiple probe block test.  Experiments 1-3 each presented 10 probes of the same 
(faces) or similar category (objects and scenes) which may have made the task 
particularly difficult and thus impacted the strength of memory effects manifested in 
eye movement patterns.  Furthermore, the ratio of targets and probes to irrelevants 
also differed to the single and multiple probe protocols outline above.  To address 
this methodological issue, an additional study has been developed to assess the 
discriminative power of the two tests using fixations as markers of memory.  Pilot 
data has now been collected and refinements are being made to the design before 
re-commencement of data collection during 2015.  Although this additional study 
falls outside the remit of current thesis, it represents the onward trajectory of this 
research. 
 
 In addition to identifying the optimal method, another important empirical 
direction before considering real world applications would be to test how fixation-
based memory detection compares to the discriminative ability of ANS-based 
concealed information tests.  Skin conductance rate was the first successful measure 
of concealed or guilty knowledge with high detection rates (Lykken, 1959, 1960) 
and is the main procedure utilised by practitioners in the field, although only 
consistently in Japan (Matsuda, Nittono, & Allen, 2012; Osugi, 2011).  In fact, it is 
reasonable to suggest that all new methods should be compared to autonomic 
measures of detecting concealed information (Gamer, 2011).   
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6.7. Conclusion 
 Achieving its key aim, this thesis has empirically examined the effect of 
deception on fixation-based memory effects across four different experiments.  
Memory effects have been shown to reliably expose lies about personally familiar 
faces, scenes and objects in Experiments 1-3.  Memory effects for familiar items 
were robust to cognitive efforts required for lying.  Experiment 4 also showed that 
memory effects reveal associations for specific face-scene relations.  The effect of 
deception on memory effects was less clear, however, during truths and lies about 
recognition of newly familiar items.  Fixation-based measures of memory during 
recognition of newly learned items appeared somewhat vulnerable to both cognitive 
load and gaze strategies.  Future research should further examine the effect of 
cognitive load and deceptive strategies on fixation-based memory effects and to 
determine if fixation measures are reliable in the face of countermeasures.  Should 
fixation-based measures of memory detection prove robust in the face of cognitive 
efforts and deceptive strategies then further assessment should compare its efficacy 
or incremental validity alongside ANS-based CITs. 
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